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9 March 1983

# USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1752

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## ARMED FORCES

### IMPROVEMENTS IN IDEOLOGICAL INDOCTRINATION WORK DISCUSSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 23, Dec 82 (signed to press 25 Nov 82) pp 22-32

[Article by Lt Gen B. Utkin, deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "Reaching Minds and Hearts"]

[Text] For 65 years now our socialist homeland has been confidently moving forward, toward the heights of social progress. Thanks to inspired, productive labor by Soviet citizens, guided by the Leninist party, a developed socialist society has been built in our country, and the tasks of building the material and technological foundation of communism are being successfully accomplished. The homeland of the October Revolution is honoring with new achievements in all areas of the economy, science and culture an event of great political importance -- the 60th anniversary of establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of our united and mighty multinational state. It is celebrating the event in the full bloom of strength and might.

One of the principal sources of the might of the Soviet State and its Armed Forces is the indestructible moral-political unity of the party and people and profound conviction on the part of Soviet citizens as to the historical correctness of the cause of the party. V. I. Lenin taught that the state is strong due to the consciousness of the masses. It is strong when the masses know everything, can make a judgment about everything, and carry out every action in a conscientious manner.

Conscientious participation by the masses in productive labor, in all affairs of state, and their close unity behind the party of the great Lenin constitute one of the basic conditions for successful societal development, a guarantee of new victories on our road toward communism. This is why our party and its Central Committee attach paramount importance to ideological work among the masses, to ideological-theoretical training of cadres, to enhancement of the level of awareness of all Soviet citizens, and to forming a Marxist-Leninist, Communist ideological outlook in them.

Today the tasks of indoctrinating Soviet citizens in a spirit of Marxism-Leninism, Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism are assuming increasingly greater importance and relevance. As was noted at a conference in Tallinn, a rise in the level of culture and education of the working people, their active participation in managing the affairs of state, and the scale of building

communism demand more thorough ideological preparation of each and every individual and superior information on all matters of domestic and foreign policy. New generations are coming along, and every effort must be made to ensure that young people deeply assimilate our scientific ideology and continue with honor the cause of building communism.

As we know, the 26th CPSU Congress pointed to the necessity of reorganizing many areas and domains of ideological work, of raising it to a higher scientific level, of increasing efficiency and concreteness, a link with practical realities, with accomplishing practical tasks, and making an all-out effort to develop its aggressive character and its effectiveness. It was emphasized at the congress that it is necessary to ensure that the content of ideological work becomes more relevant, that its forms be in conformity with today's interests and needs of Soviet citizens, that this work be conducted in a lively and interesting manner, without stereotyped phrases and a standard array of ready formulas.

The necessity of decisively raising the level of all ideological indoctrination work is particularly obvious in light of recent international events. As we know, imperialism has shifted in fact to psychological warfare against the USSR and the other socialist countries. Spreading a lie about our societal system and the international policy of the Soviet State, imperialist reaction is attempting to justify the arms race initiated by the United States and the NATO bloc. Washington has openly proclaimed a new "crusade" against communism and is nurturing dangerous plans of unleashing a nuclear war against our country. This demands of all Soviet citizens, and particularly of the armed defenders of the homeland, the highest degree of revolutionary vigilance, readiness and willingness conscientiously, courageously and skillfully to defend the interests of the socialist homeland.

CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade Yu. V. Andropov emphasized: "In a difficult international situation, when the forces of imperialism are attempting to push peoples onto the path of enmity and military confrontation, the party and state will unswervingly defend the vital interests of our homeland and maintain a high degree of vigilance and preparedness to offer a devastating rebuff to any attempt at aggression."

Organizing ideological and political indoctrination work in this country, our party sets for itself the task of raising the level of scientific substantiation of propaganda, its aggressive nature, efficiency and clarity, more deeply and thoroughly to expose reactionary bourgeois ideology and the policies of contemporary imperialism. In responding to the ideological intrigues of the class enemy with a decisive rebuff, it is necessary, as is demanded by the CPSU Central Committee, clearly and strongly to publicize the achievements of genuine socialism in all areas of activity, the successes of the nations of the socialist community, and the peace-seeking foreign policy of the CPSU. It is necessary thereby to expose in a more resolute, aggressive and practical manner imperialism, the antipopular essence of U.S. policy and the danger of that country's adventuristic foreign policy.



It is our duty to counter the subversive political and ideological activities of the class adversary and his vicious slander against socialism with unwavering solidarity, a powerful ideological unity of our ranks, deep conviction and a high degree of political vigilance on the part of each and every Soviet serviceman.

Ideological and political indoctrination work is a tested and proven means of indoctrinating Soviet servicemen, of uniting them behind the Leninist party and its Central Committee, and mobilization for successful accomplishment of the tasks assigned to the Soviet Armed Forces.

Performed innovatively and with party fervor, it is becoming an important factor in developing a Communist ideological outlook in servicemen and is arming them with a correct understanding of the laws governing societal development, of CPSU domestic and foreign policy, and with the ability to appraise events in this country and abroad from a class position and more clearly to see the aggressive intrigues of imperialism and its ideological henchmen. And as a result it impels military personnel to have an even more conscientious attitude toward their military labor and to devote all their resources and energy for developing the qualities inherent in genuine defenders of the homeland. Improving in every possible way the indoctrination of servicemen as ideologically convinced defenders of the socialist homeland, commanders, political agencies, and party organizations proceed from Lenin's statement that wherever political work in military units is conducted in the most conscientious manner, there is no slackness in the military, it has better precision and spirit, and wins more victories.

Carrying out the demands of the CPSU Central Committee decrees entitled "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work," "On Further Improvement of Party Instruction in Light of the Decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress," and other party documents, political agencies are doing a great deal to ensure that party organizations constantly concern themselves with the ideological conditioning of Communists and with forming in personnel profound ideological conviction, faithfulness to military duty, and constant readiness and willingness to defend the homeland and the historic achievements of socialism.

A substantial, serious discussion was held at the Sixth Armed Forces Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations held in May of this year, on how to accomplish indoctrination of servicemen more deeply and in a more practical manner at the present stage, and how to enhance the role of army and navy Communists in accomplishing the tasks assigned to the Armed Forces by the 26th CPSU Congress. It was strongly reemphasized at the conference that genuinely high-quality, stable accomplishment of the constantly more complex tasks of achieving combat readiness can be ensured only on the basis of a steady improvement in the political training and awareness of servicemen. Party organizations, which are genuine centers of ideological indoctrination work, should conduct it on a daily basis, without interruptions or diminished intensity; the more complex the conditions and the more tense the situation in which army and navy forces are operating, the more vigorous and persistent ideological indoctrination work should be.

Practical experience persuasively confirms that wherever these instructions by our party and the demands of the USSR Minister of Defense and chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy on indoctrination of servicemen are unswervingly carried out, there will also be excellent achievements in maintaining personnel combat readiness, more solid military order and discipline, and all assigned tasks will be carried out more successfully.

The results of the past training year attest eloquently to this. For example, the missile unit under the command of Col I. Shelestov, a guards tank regiment (Gds Lt Col S. Kiselev, commanding), the antiaircraft missile regiment under the command of Col S. Parshikov, the guards bomber regiment under the command of Gds Col V. Sadikov, and the missile-armed nuclear submarine commanded by Capt 1st Rank V. Zhuravlev, initiators of the competition in the Soviet Armed Forces in honor of the 60th anniversary of establishment of the USSR, have fully met their socialist pledges and have been rated excellent. A great many other units and warships of the Soviet Armed Forces have achieved excellent results. It is quite appropriate to note that militant, purposeful ideological work, its profound content, its aggressive nature, and its close link with practical realities and the concrete tasks of personnel were important component parts of the successes achieved by these military collectives.

We must state that in recent years there has been an appreciable improvement in conditions for deeper and more diversified ideological influence on personnel, the material and technical foundation for propaganda and agitation has become stronger, and the intellectual needs of all categories of military personnel are being more fully considered. In the last two years, for example, many remote garrisons in Siberia, the Transbaykal, Central Asia, the Far East, the groups of forces, and the limited military force in Afghanistan have been able to watch Moscow television via communications satellite. The total circulation of military newspapers and magazines is now 6.5 million copies. The Ministry of Defense's Military Publishing House publishes books in vast numbers of copies. Recently it has published such widely known works as "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia] and "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny" [History of World War II]; many new memoirs of Soviet military commanders have been published.

The men of the Soviet Armed Forces represent a large, activist audience for the press, radio, and television. According to recent figures, at the present time 50-60 different periodicals are received by every military unit, and 15-20 by each subunit. Military periodicals comprise approximately 20 percent of the total number of different newspaper and magazines received by military personnel.

All the above-named factors unquestionably are helping accomplish the reorganization of ideological work in the army and navy in light of the party's demands. But the main thing in reorganization is persistent, consistent work by military councils, commanders, political agencies, and party organizations to improve the quality and effectiveness of ideological influence on personnel, to ensure a close unity of political and organizational activities, and to increase the responsibility of all officer cadres for indoctrinating defenders of the homeland.

The focal thrust of ideological work in the army and navy is Marxist-Leninist education of cadres -- their thorough study of the writings of K. Marx, F. Engels, and V. I. Lenin, the decisions of party congresses, the historical experience of the CPSU, and the writings by the leaders of our party and state.

The new political and party instruction topic schedules and curricula as well as social sciences curricula at military educational institutions focus greater attention on study of the ideological-theoretical legacy of the founders of scientific communism. Political agencies are working increasingly doggedly to ensure that military cadres, Communists, and all servicemen work persistently to master revolutionary theory and be unswervingly guided by it in their practical activities.

Final tests and inspections demonstrated that the majority of personnel had firmly mastered the content of the recommended writings by the founders of Marxism-Leninism, the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums, and skillfully rely on their acquired knowledge of theory in their service activities. Many commanders, political agencies, and party organizations have begun to concern themselves in a more practical manner with ensuring that the knowledge amassed by their students becomes convictions, an activist attitude toward life, becoming embodied in their deeds, which are directed toward strengthening discipline and maintaining a high degree of combat readiness.

In the past training year we succeeded on the whole in raising the ideological-theoretical and methodological level of political instruction classes, this basic form of political indoctrination of enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers. Group instructors began preparing for instruction classes in a more innovative manner, more actively utilizing in the conduct of such classes technical propaganda means, visual propaganda materials, letters from the parents of servicemen, imaginative literature, reports by personnel back from short leaves, etc. Political training began to be coordinated more closely with the specific tasks of personnel. It helps them gain a deeper understanding of the present military-political situation and be aware of their duty pertaining to further increasing vigilance, combat readiness, and strengthening discipline.

On the whole political training of warrant officers is now being carried out on a higher qualitative level. It is more closely coordinated with the performance of their job by personnel and more strongly influences their work style in training and indoctrination of subordinates. Attendance at political instruction classes has improved, although on the whole this problem has not been fully resolved.

Some progress in improving ideological and political indoctrination work has been achieved at military educational institutions. The principal attention of command-political and teaching staff at military higher educational institutions was concentrated on enhancing their role as centers of Marxist-Leninist education and Communist indoctrination of enrolled personnel.

In the course of carrying out the guidelines of the 26th CPSU Congress and CPSU Central Committee decrees on reorganization of ideological and political indoctrination work, a number of measures have been taken to achieve further improvement of party and economics education as well as Komsomol political instruction. Their structure has been brought into conformity with the demands of the CPSU Central Committee. The scientific level of instruction classes has improved, and their link with practical activities and assigned tasks has become stronger.

Concrete steps have been taken to achieve further development of universities of Marxism-Leninism and enhancement of their role in training propagandist cadres. The large detachment of political instruction group leaders and members of agitation-propaganda collectives and groups is growing ideologically and methodologically at universities and two-year party schools. The Severomorsk and Odessa universities of Marxism-Leninism are among the leaders in performance results.

Enrichment of the ideological indoctrination activities of commanders, political agencies, and party organizations is greatly promoted by expansion of their professional contacts and contacts with local party, soviet, scientific, and creative arts organizations and establishments. We might note the good job being done in this area in the Moscow Military District. In this district a substantial number of large-scale ideological measures have been conducted since the 26th CPSU Congress, including jointly with the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the Academy of Social Sciences, and with the staffs of the magazines KOMMUNIST, PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN', and POLITICHESKOYE SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE.

It is important to realize, however, that these are merely first steps in the reorganization of political instruction as specified in the documents of the 26th CPSU Congress. If we assess it from the standpoint of today's demands and the current missions of the Armed Forces, we cannot be satisfied with the state of political training. The task of improving its quality and effectiveness is being accomplished with the greatest difficulty and extremely slowly.

Many lectures and seminars continue to be abstract in nature. In place of a deep and innovative analysis of societal processes and the concrete state of affairs at the national level, within the republic and district, one can hear over and over a mechanical repetition of general truths.

Another and perhaps the weakest element in improving the quality of political and party instruction is the methodology of holding instruction classes. The Central Committee has sharply condemned formalism, learning by rote, and a boring, "official" style, which has not yet been eradicated in ideological and political indoctrination work. It demanded that a lively and understandable form be sought and recommended more extensive exchange of views and productive discussion. Performance evaluations indicate, however, that there has not yet taken place everywhere a decisive shift from passive to active methods of class instruction, from monologue to debate and productive discussion, from exhortation and fine words to the ability to respond to sharp issues which concern people. This is why one frequently encounters cases where instruction classes are places of boredom, where people are merely sitting out the time.

In our opinion one of the reasons for inadequate results from personnel political training is that the individual continues to be ignored by a number of political training organizers and instructors. At times propagandists function not as methodologist-indoctrinators but more as popular disseminators of knowledge. A shift to thoughtful, concrete work with and concern for each individual continues to remain one of the most important directional thrusts in reorganizing party education and political training as a whole.

On the basis of the CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work," much has been done in the army and navy to ensure that primary party organizations and groups become centers of daily ideological indoctrination activity. Much attention was devoted to this issue at the Sixth Armed Forces Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations. It was discussed in detail in the most recent report-election campaign. Many party committees and bureaus successfully guide ideological and indoctrination activity, unify military collectives, skillfully organize work with individuals, and stimulate their social and labor activity.

Remarkable in this respect are the activities of the primary party organization headed by Maj I. Zhabko, a participant at the Sixth Armed Forces Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations. Paramount importance here is attached to ensuring a high level of ideological indoctrination work and its close link with practical matters and current tasks. The party organization oversees the ideological conditioning of each and every CPSU member. They regularly listen to party member reports on their ideological growth, participation in political indoctrination work, and the personal contribution of each Communist toward strengthening organization and discipline. The status of specific areas of ideological indoctrination work and measures to achieve its further improvement are discussed in detail at party meetings. Emphasis is placed on working with individual party members and a differentiated approach to indoctrination of the various categories of personnel. The party organization seeks to ensure that every ideological indoctrination measure does not simply instruct but teach one to combat deficiencies and errors of omission as well as an unconscientious attitude toward one's job.

One cannot help but note, however, that not all primary organizations have yet fully mastered methods of ideological-political and intellectual influence on military personnel. There is still a great deal of formalism in organizing indoctrination work with young party members. Their political training has not yet become the focus of close attention on the part of some party committees and bureaus. Facts of ideological passivity are not always subjected to keen appraisal in party organizations. Political agencies, party committees and bureaus have a great deal to accomplish in order to ensure that all party organizations truly become centers of daily ideological indoctrination activity.

Implementation of the guidelines of the 26th CPSU Congress in the area of reorganization of ideological activity requires further improvement of mass-political and information effort, strengthening of its link with practical matters, and bringing it closer to military collectives and specific individuals.

The majority of propaganda and agitation departments of the political directorates of the branches of service, districts, groups of forces and fleets perform measures to improve lecture propaganda and to heighten its effectiveness and influence on the intellectual world of military personnel. One can note efficient, thorough and clear explanation by lecturers of the most important areas of party domestic and foreign policy, current issues pertaining to this country's socioeconomic affairs, and exposure of the aggressive aspirations of imperialism and its accomplices.

There are many positive elements in the work being done by the group of lecturers of the Ground Forces Political Directorate, particularly on problems of military indoctrination. The group of lecturers of the political directorate of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany is very helpful in Marxist-Leninist training of officers. Meriting praise is the work being done by lecturers of the political directorate of the Turkestan Military District, especially in the area of publicizing the fighting traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces and forming excellent moral-political and fighting qualities in personnel, as well as psychological preparedness to carry out a military order at all times.

Thus we see that considerable positive experience has been amassed in accomplishing ideological indoctrination tasks. And we have plenty of people who have amassed such experience. As an example we might mention the successful activities of the political agencies to which party members R. Gorelov and A. Borovikov are assigned, the purposeful work being done by the chiefs of the propaganda and agitation department of the political directorates of the Belorussian Military District, Col N. Yermolayev, the Odessa Military District -- Col A. Buyakhchev, the Black Sea Fleet -- Capt 1st Rank N. Arinochkin, and a number of others.

Military councils, commanders, political agencies, and party organizations have begun more thoughtfully directing the ideological-political and military indoctrination of personnel of combined units, units, and naval ships, are being more demanding in regard to the results of indoctrination efforts, and are concerning themselves more with the effectiveness of and return on effort from conducted measures rather than quantity of activities, as well as the degree of influence on people's minds and hearts.

Today we can note with satisfaction that in the army and navy, just as in the country as a whole, greater attention is being paid to publicizing the historic gains, advantages and achievements of socialism and our successes in solving sociopolitical, economic and ethnic problems and in implementing a Leninist policy of all-out strengthening of the friendship and brotherhood of the peoples of the USSR.

Everywhere great attention is focused on indoctrinating young army and navy personnel in the revolutionary, fighting and labor traditions of the CPSU, the Soviet people and the Armed Forces, and publicizing the idea of the succession of generations. It was not so long ago that our homeland celebrated the 40th anniversary of the victorious Battle of Moscow. Soon we shall be marking the 40th anniversary of the defeat of the Hitlerite forces at the walls of Stalingrad. Ahead lies the anniversary of other glorious Soviet Army battles. And

fairly soon we shall be marking the 40th anniversary of our world-historic victory in the Great Patriotic War.

The inextinguishable flame of traditions and the grandeur of the people's exploits should be transmitted from one generation to the next and serve as a source of our national and military pride, our social optimism, our faith in the invincible might of the new societal system. It is the patriotic duty and moral obligation of every young man to preserve and build upon our traditions and to emulate our heroes.

The 10th rally of winners of the All-Union Excursion by Komsomol Members and Youth to Sites of Revolutionary, Combat and Labor Glory was held in Yerevan in September of this year. This rally was a happy, festive celebration, a convincing demonstration of the faithfulness of our boys and girls, of young army and navy personnel to the heroic traditions of the old generations, to the ideas of friendship and brotherhood among the peoples of our country.

Indoctrination of young people in traditions is indoctrination on the examples of selfless service to the homeland by their fathers and grandfathers, on the examples of the heroism and courage of the participants in the Great Patriotic War and the glorious exploits accomplished by the builders of socialism and communism. We must not forget that young people up to 30 years of age, who have not experienced the harsh trials of the war years, today comprise more than half of our country's population.

There is a wealth of opportunity in the military for heroic-patriotic indoctrination of young military personnel. Many combined units and units have a fighting history; many of them were given the guards designation and earned honorary appellations and decorations. The names of Heroes of the Soviet Union are entered permanently on the rolls of a great many companies and batteries, soldiers from the same unit who performed outstanding deeds on the field of battle. Competition for the right to serve in a famed unit and for the honor to be the first to fire for a hero contained on the unit's rolls and to compete for a prize named after that hero unquestionably increases the indoctrinational possibilities of military service.

One of the most important areas of ideological work in the army and navy is indoctrination of personnel in a spirit of socialist internationalism and combat friendship with the armies of the Warsaw Pact member nations. The joint military labor by the servicemen of the brother armies is an effective factor in their indoctrination in the ideals of Marxism-Leninism, internationalism, and their unification in the name of reliable defense of the achievements of socialism.

The "Shchit-82" [Shield-82] exercise of the brother armies, held in Bulgaria, recently came to an end. Alongside the "Druzhiba-82" [Friendship-82] exercise, which had been held earlier in Czechoslovakia and Poland, the exercise in Bulgaria helped increase combat proficiency, battlefield teamwork and cooperation, and fighting unity of the personnel of the allied armies.

During the period of preparation for and conduct of the Shield-82 exercise, political agencies of the brother armies joined efforts to instill in personnel

a class hatred toward our common enemy -- imperialism. Strong attention was focused on propagandizing the achievements of the world socialist system as a whole and of each Warsaw Pact member nation in particular. In the time between arrival in the exercise area and completion of the exercise, a total of 175 joint political and mass cultural activities were held, and a common newspaper was published, entitled BOYEVOYE BRATSTVO [Fighting Brotherhood].

One of the most vital tasks of propagandist cadres is to raise to an even higher level the effectiveness of ideological indoctrination work in the area of strengthening military discipline, without which it is impossible to maintain a continuous state of combat readiness. In a number of places, however, the influence of means of ideological indoctrination work on strengthening discipline is inadequate as yet. One of the reasons for this is the fact that it is not always possible to achieve a combined approach to the entire business of indoctrinating personnel or to achieve an optimal unity of military and moral indoctrination with ideological-political indoctrination. The system of political training, mass agitation and cultural-enlightenment work is sometimes inadequately utilized for the purpose of strengthening military discipline. At the present time the number of interesting, memorable activities which reveal the great moral value of the fundamental features of the Soviet way of life, the demands of the moral code of the builder of communism, the military oath and regulations is fewer than would be desirable.

Strengthening of discipline in the military depends in large measure on how matters of moral indoctrination are handled. Certain experience in this regard has been amassed everywhere. Nevertheless at the present time we are conducting too few frank discussions with a military audience on the honor and dignity of the serviceman, on the moral aspect of military discipline, on proper conduct and proper treatment of others.

Legal indoctrination of personnel is an integral component part of ideological work to strengthen discipline. The need for its comprehensive improvement was pointed out at the 26th CPSU Congress, in a number of decrees issued by the CPSU Central Committee, in orders and directives issued by the USSR minister of defense and chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. Recently commanders, political agencies and ideological workers have been paying heightened attention to this area of Communist indoctrination of servicemen. A vigorous search is in progress for the most effective forms of legal education of personnel.

In the Northern Fleet, for example, a law faculty has been organized at the university of Marxism-Leninism at the fleet Officers' Club. Recently a legal propaganda day was held in the fleet's combined units, units, and ships. Military legal specialists, commanders, and political workers spoke to the men on various problems of Soviet law, and films on law topics were shown. There have been similar examples in other military districts and fleets.

At the same time political agencies, propaganda and agitation departments are called upon to examine more deeply the state of legal education of military personnel and to show greater concern about increasing its effectiveness and strengthening its influence on the state of discipline in military collectives.



Aesthetic education of personnel is a component part of the indoctrination process. Its forms and methods are improving year by year. A prominent role in this matter is played by army and navy cultural centers. We have many examples of good organization of this work in the Odessa, Belorussian, Far East, and Transcaucasus military districts, in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, and in the Northern Fleet. Leading cultural and educational establishments publicize Marxist-Leninist aesthetics, CPSU and Soviet Government decisions on matters of aesthetics education, development of literature and art, and demonstrate in a vivid and convincing manner the nature of Soviet reality and the Soviet way of life. The majority of officers' clubs and enlisted personnel clubs work actively to form good aesthetic tastes and cultural habits in military personnel. Such forms of activity as culture universities and cultural lecture series, "Art and Life" oral magazines, and reports of creative activities by masters in the arts have proven most effective.

There are a number of oversights, however, in this work as well. Sometimes the capabilities of local cultural establishments and creative arts organizations are utilized to an insufficient degree, and few measures are organized for officer personnel, especially young officers. Such forms of activity as people's universities, culture schools and lecture series are not yet in regular use everywhere. The army and navy community has little participation in aesthetics education. Some party organizations have not yet found their place in this important area of activity.

We should also like to touch upon certain other problems resolution of which determines to a considerable degree the success of reorganization of ideological work which is being carried out in the army and navy. For example, we still encounter an approach where people picture the performance of indoctrinational tasks as increasing quantitative indices, as growth in the number of all types of activities, and yet the party demands that the center of emphasis in indoctrination be shifted to qualitative criteria and to all-out increase in the return on each conducted measure.

Meriting the closest attention in this connection is the problem of managing the ideological process in the army and navy. On the whole political agency officials correctly formulate and promptly communicate to lower-echelon agencies, party and Komsomol organizations, as well as all ideological workers tasks pertaining to the ideological-political indoctrination of personnel, give concrete assistance in performing these tasks, regularly study the state of political indoctrination work in the units and fleets, and draw up recommendations for its further improvement.

At the same time there still exist substantial deficiencies in this established system of management of the ideological process. Certain officials of political agencies at times do not very skillfully determine the general plan of ideological work for given periods of time and sometimes fail to find the main thing which proceeds for their specific work area from the demands of the CPSU Central Committee on workers of the ideological front. Giving instructions on the conduct of ideological indoctrination measures for a specified period of time, some individuals look back to yesterday, failing to isolate that new element which is imperatively dictated by the international situation, which has

recently become aggravated. In some plans covering ideological work with personnel there is at times no integral goal or core in evidence, the basic directions of ideological influence are not always clearly visible, and sometimes important forms and means of indoctrination are omitted.

Information proceeding to higher-echelon political agencies from the units is of exceptional importance for guidance of the ideological process. But the quality of this information is not always satisfactory. Reports and summaries usually list a great many facts, figures and activities but are rather short on profound conclusions, syntheses, and matters of organization. During testing and verification basic information involves primarily quantitative results, while little is said about the quality and content of political indoctrination work and about specific individuals and their actions. But of primary importance is an analysis of facts and phenomena as well as amassed experience in indoctrinating personnel.

Sometimes things are as follows. Upon arriving at a unit, inspecting officers evaluate the state of ideological work only on the basis of a perusal of schedules, subject matter, and at best with the texts of prepared lectures. But what elements in conducted activities have aroused interest in the men, have left a deep imprint in their minds and hearts, and what has had no effect at all? What activity was formalistic, uninteresting, without enthusiasm, and what activity was distinguished by genuine party fervor, aggressiveness, and great emotional force? This question is not always addressed.

Obviously a superficial acquaintance with the state of ideological indoctrination within a given military collective will not provide an answer to these questions. Therefore, when checking the state of ideological work, we should dive into the midst of the masses, figuratively speaking, not into the midst of the paper documentation; we should interview as many personnel as possible, find out what they think about the activities being conducted, to sit in ourselves as students, and preferably more than once, address activist propagandists on the party's demands on workers of the ideological front, on propaganda methodology, and reply to questions which arise.

The task consists in sequentially reorganizing the work style of propagandist cadres, in weaning some individuals away from excessive passion for shuffling papers, in instilling the desire thoughtfully to analyze the true state of ideological and political indoctrination work, in seeing its actual pluses and minuses, and in being truly concerned about the assigned job. Learning the skill of analysis is useful to all those who are involved in organization of political indoctrination of servicemen, for otherwise one can "drown" in routine affairs, lose one's points of reference, and forget why we are doing this job.

We sometimes still encounter instances where a given individual does not have the ability to isolate the fundamental element in his work but becomes carried away with secondary matters, with that which is directly at hand, as they say. A regimental propagandist, for example, sometimes limits his comments to political education group instructors to deficiencies in keeping registers, while ignoring serious errors of omission in instruction class content and methods. A party committee secretary is prepared to show party work schedules, but

sometimes can say nothing about whether a combined approach toward organizing indoctrination is employed in the regiment, what has been achieved, where and in what there are omissions. These facts raise the serious question of the preparation of our propagandists and the need for greater attention toward them on the part of political agencies and party activists.

As we know, personnel spend a large part of their training time in the field, at exercises and in firing activities, as well as on long cruises. During these activities, in an environment approximating actual combat conditions, the words spoken by the propagandist, agitator, and Communist should ring out with particular ardor and exhortation. We must admit, however, that some warriors of the ideological front have not yet acquired solid skills of working in a field situation. Sometimes their level of military, tactical-technical proficiency leaves something to be desired. And yet it is extremely essential for the propagandist to be entirely competent in these matters. Otherwise he will have a difficult time mobilizing the men to overcome difficulties successfully and to master equipment.

USSR Minister of Defense MSU D. F. Ustinov demands that a situation be achieved whereby, when organizing training and indoctrination of personnel, each commander and political worker is clearly aware of what new moral, physical and psychological tests our fighting men will encounter in actual combat, if the imperialists start a war, and with what margin of safety -- combat, ideological, and moral -- it is essential to prepare defenders of the homeland in time of peace.

I would like to emphasize the special role of military educational institutions in ideological conditioning of military cadres and in developing in future army and navy indoctrinators firm propagandist skills and a correct work style. At present this task is being carried out at academies, and particularly at service schools, on an abbreviated curriculum, as they say. Our graduates are well prepared in many respects, but some are clearly deficient in indoctrinator skills and the ability to influence the intellectual aspects of their men's lives and to organize and conduct political training and ideological measures in a methodologically correct manner. Essentially young lieutenants begin to develop these skills from zero when they report to their unit, and subsequently learn on the basis of their mistakes. Of course learning of this type is useful, but it would be much better to acquire the taste for political work with personnel in advance, at service school. The business of indoctrinating personnel can only gain from this.

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The Marxist-Leninist conception that the party's ideas, plans, and appeals become a material force when they take hold of the masses was stressed with new emphasis at the November (1982) CPSU Central Committee Plenum. Today it is particularly important and necessary, it was noted at the Plenum, for each and every working person to understand that plan fulfillment also depends on his labor contribution as well. This party instruction is also fully applicable to Soviet servicemen. In the final analysis high-quality execution of combat and political training schedules and programs depends on each and every one of

them. Persistent efforts by our propagandists, agitators, and all army and navy ideological workers are necessary in order to ensure that this truth firmly enters the consciousness of each and every serviceman.

Organizing thorough study in the units and fleets of the decisions of the November (1982) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the materials of the Seventh Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 10th Convocation, it is essential to focus Soviet servicemen on an all-out strengthening of discipline, increased revolutionary vigilance, and maintaining unabating combat readiness. It is the primary obligation and moral duty of the defenders of the homeland to be alert at all times and reliably to guard our socialist achievements.

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## ARMED FORCES

### OUTLINE LECTURE ON CPSU LEADERSHIP OF ARMED FORCES

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 23, Dec 82 (signed to press 25 Nov 82) pp 49-58

[Article, published under the heading "For Classes Within the Officer Marxist-Leninist Training System," by Candidate of Historical Sciences Col V. Zotov: "The Source of the Strength of the Army and Navy Lies in CPSU Guidance"\*; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] The entire heroic history of the Soviet people, their combat and labor victories, and their outstanding accomplishments are inseparably linked with the activities of the CPSU. The party, which is the nucleus of the political system of society, following Lenin's behests, is constantly concerned with strengthening our country's defense potential and the combat power of the Armed Forces -- which guards the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and serves as a bulwark of world peace. Participation by party and government leaders in the conference of military commanders held in the Kremlin on 27 October constituted new evidence of this concern.

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The 26th CPSU Congress confirmed the thesis that in the period of developed socialism the role of the Communist Party in the affairs of society increases to an immeasurable degree, and its influence in all areas of building communism and in all areas of sociopolitical activity becomes stronger. The party's leadership role, its great life-giving force, its monolithic solidarity, its prestige and influence on all aspects of building communism are manifested in concrete deeds directed toward a further upsurge in the economy, culture and prosperity of Soviet citizens. In carrying out its leadership role, the party becomes organizationally stronger, becomes more efficient, grows and matures together with the development of our society, together with change in its sociopolitical cultural countenance. The further our country advances toward communism, the more fully are revealed the features of the CPSU as the highest form of sociopolitical organization, the leading political force in building

\* It is recommended that this article be used in studying the topic "CPSU Guidance -- Basic Foundation of Soviet Military Organizational Development and decisive Source of the Strength and Invincibility of the Army and Navy."

socialism and communism. "The party will continue in the future," noted CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, "doing everything necessary to achieve a further rise in the people's living standards, development of the democratic principles of the Soviet society, strengthening of this country's economic and defense might, and cementing of the friendship among the brother peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

The Communist Party constitutes the acknowledged and respected vanguard of the Soviet people, a truly unbending core of our socialist society. It performs its leadership role not by virtue of its power but due to its great political prestige and ideological influence within the masses. "This role," it was stated at the 26th CPSU Congress, "is earned in the course of constant, unceasing struggle for the interests of the working people. And this role is strengthened by the fact that the party is constantly deepening its ties with the masses and is deeply committed to their needs and concerns" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress], pp 218-219).

Growth in the guiding and leadership role of the CPSU in the Soviet society at the stage of developed socialism is a logical, objectively necessary process. It is dictated first and foremost by growth in the scale and complexity of the tasks of building communism; by an upsurge in the productive activeness of the masses and by involving additional millions of working people in managing the affairs of state and production; by further development of socialist democracy, enhancement of the role of public organizations, and by broadening of the authorities of the union republics and local organizations; by the growing significance of theory of scientific communism, its creative development and dissemination, and by the need to intensify Communist indoctrination of working people; and finally, by the special responsibility of the foreign policy activities of the party and state in the interests of ensuring conditions of peace for building communism.

The conclusions of the 26th CPSU Congress on further enhancement of the party's leadership role are of great importance for development of theory and practice of Soviet military organizational development. Primarily because accomplishment of most important tasks -- defense of the productive labor of the Soviet people and strengthening of the position of socialism and peace throughout the world -- is connected with consolidation of the party's leadership role in the Armed Forces. In conditions of increased military threat on the part of the United States and the other imperialist nations, our party, consistently campaigning for peace and international détente, at the same time manifests unabating concern for the security of the Soviet nation, strengthening of its defense might, and enhancement of the moral-political and combat potential of the Armed Forces as well as their combat readiness.

Military organizational development is organized and guided by the Communist Party in a close unity and interlinkage with accomplishment of political, economic, social, and ideological tasks. V. I. Lenin pointed to the exceptional importance of such an interlinkage. He stressed that organizational development of our army could lead to successful results only if it was carried out in a spirit of overall Soviet organizational development ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 40, pp 76-77).

The Armed Forces feel on a daily basis the close attention by the CPSU toward national defense. The party formulates military, including military-technical, policy and military doctrine, guides the daily life and activities of the army and navy, directs the development of Soviet military science and art of warfare, training and indoctrination of military cadres and all personnel, and concerns itself with increasing the combat readiness of the Armed Forces, development of international ties with the armies of the brother socialist countries and strengthening the fighting alliance. In accomplishing this work, the CPSU is inalterably guided by Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army as well as by Leninist teaching on defense of the socialist homeland.

Performance of defense tasks and creation of favorable conditions for peaceful construction always has been and remains the goal of the Communist Party's military policy. The essence of this policy is clearly specified in the CPSU Program, which states that the party considers it essential to maintain the defense might of the Soviet State and the combat readiness of its Armed Forces at a level ensuring the decisive and total defeat of any enemy who dares encroach upon the Soviet homeland. The party takes into consideration thereby the complexity and interaction of internal and external factors which influence the development of military affairs as a whole.

Formulation of the military-technical policy of the Soviet State constitutes a most important area of implementation of CPSU military policy in conditions of a growing threat of aggression by imperialism, headed by the United States. As was noted at the conference of military commanders at the Kremlin, the struggle in the military-technical area has become sharply aggravated, and frequently it takes on a fundamentally new character. Falling behind in this struggle is intolerable. Therefore our military-technical policy focuses on priority development of the most advanced weapons systems, which meet the demands of today's warfare, rapid improvement of military hardware, and adoption of total automation into troop control.

Factors considered in formulating military-technical policy include the directional thrust of military doctrines, the state of industry and transportation, scientific and technological advances, and achieved levels in the equipment and hardware of the armed forces of the potential adversaries. Considerable attention is focused on study of the experience of past wars and on forecasting the character and specific features of wars for which the imperialists are preparing and which they may initiate. Scientifically substantiated provision of combat equipment and weapons to the Armed Forces, improvement in their organizational structure, and a correct ratio of branches of service, combat arms and naval forces are secured as a result of comprehensive evaluations.

Accomplishment of these tasks has demanded concentration in military industry of substantial scientific-technical, energy, and material-production resources. The party Central Committee deals on a daily basis with matters pertaining to development of military industry, supplying it with raw materials and skilled manpower, placement of defense enterprises, and improving the system of management of defense enterprises.

Enhancement of the role of the CPSU in guiding military organizational development is also dictated by the increased significance of military science. The party is continuously guiding the development of Soviet military science and seeking to ensure that it responds in a prompt and timely manner to the matters dictated by practical realities. Examining the patterns and trends of preparation for and conduct of combat operations, military science not only enriches with theory the practical business of combat training, army and navy organizational development, but also reveals the future prospects for development of military affairs. Its recommendations for the troops and naval forces are becoming more precise, concrete, and complete. Military scientists are successfully elaborating new problems dictated by changes of a sociopolitical and military-technical character and by growth of the economic might of the USSR and the entire socialist community.

The party is exerting growing influence on the solving of fundamental military-theoretical problems, in particular investigation of the possibility of preventing wars and maintaining a military balance. The CPSU Central Committee focuses military cadres on gaining a profound mastery of the art of warfare and efficient utilization of combat equipment and weapons.

Development by the Communist Party of Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, Leninist teaching on defense of the socialist homeland, and the theoretical principles of contemporary military policy has made it possible to lay down a solid foundation for the further formulation of Soviet military doctrine. "...Our military doctrine," states USSR Minister of Defense MSU D. F. Ustinov, "is of a purely defensive directional thrust. The character of the Soviet Armed Forces, the principles of their organizational development, and the strategy and tactics of their employment were constructed and continue to be constructed on the basis of figuring to repulse aggression and threats against us and our friends proceeding from imperialism." The USSR has never been the initiator of development of the most destructive weapons, which are particularly threatening to people's lives. On the contrary, it seeks to prevent weaponry from becoming increasingly more savage and to prevent the arms race from spreading to more and more new domains.

The CPSU devotes considerable attention to training, indoctrination, and placement of military cadres. The Armed Forces today possess officers who are politically mature, dedicated to the cause of party and people, and trained in a military, political, and technical respect. The percentage share of officers with a military higher education and specialized training has increased substantially in the army and navy. Today they comprise approximately 70 percent of the total. Almost all positions from brigade commander on up, almost 90 percent of regimental commander slots, and all positions of ship commanding officers first and second rank are filled with officers possessing a military higher education.

We shall note that 80 percent of compulsory-service personnel also possess higher or secondary education, while the remainder have had at least 8 years of schooling. More than 84 percent of conscripts entering the Armed Forces have mastered various occupational specialties in industry and agriculture. All this enables personnel to master modern combat equipment and weapons in a short period of time. The "Zapad-81" [West-81] and "Shchit-82" [Shield-82]



exercises are a vivid example of this: our servicemen displayed courage, initiative, and a high degree of combat skill in complex conditions, maximally approximating actual combat.

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Party direction of military organizational development also includes enormous organizational work, which is characterized by a wealth of content and a diversity of forms and methods. Its core consists of party-political work, which aims at mobilizing military personnel for successful performance of tasks connected with defending the achievements of socialism. In view of the complexity and responsibility of these tasks, the Communist Party and its Central Committee are constantly concerned with improving party-political work in the army and navy. This concern encompasses two most important and integrally linked aspects of party activities: ideological and organizational. Both aim at consistent implementation of party policy in the army and navy, putting into practice Leninist ideas of defense of the socialist homeland, and ensuring unswerving execution of the demands of the Communist Party pertaining to strengthening this country's defense capability and increasing the combat potential of the USSR Armed Forces.

Party-political work, to quote V. I. Lenin, requires the most solicitous execution, since its main area of application is people, their consciousness, their thoughts, feelings and attitudes. We are familiar with Lenin's instructions to military workers not to relax political work in any case, constantly to pursue it, and to make an effort to improve it (see "Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 50, pp 271, 328, 348). These instructions were reflected in the CPSU Central Committee decree dated 21 January 1967 entitled "On Measures to Improve Party-Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy," and in the revised Regulations on Political Agencies and Instructions to CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy, ratified by the CPSU Central Committee in 1973.

Important measures were carried out under CPSU guidance to improve the content, forms and methods of party-political work. The structure of political agencies and the party-political edifice has also undergone changes, political directorates have been established in the branches of service, political agencies have been established in some combat arms, the institution of deputy company commanders for political affairs and their equivalents has been introduced, and higher military-political schools have been established.

Now even more favorable opportunities and conditions have been created in the Armed Forces for carrying out party-political work and for raising its level and increasing its effectiveness. In conformity with the guidelines of the 26th CPSU Congress, commanders, political agencies, and party organizations are directing their efforts toward ensuring the effectiveness of party-political work and toward a steady increase in the political awareness of servicemen and their ideological conditioning. This demands a thoroughly conceived system of political and military indoctrination, effective party influence on personnel, the creation of a healthy moral climate in military collectives, knowledge of one's business, and the ability to conduct party-political work on a daily basis, without interruptions or abatement, and with increasing vigor and

persistence with increasingly more complex conditions and stressful environment in which troops and naval forces operate. Accomplishment of the increasingly complex tasks of combat training is inconceivable without scientifically substantiated activities on the part of political agencies and party organizations, without initiative and an innovative approach by commanders and political workers toward performance of their duties, and without effective party influence in military collectives.

The party sees a guarantee of further increasing the indoctrinational role of the Armed Forces in ensuring that primary party organizations become genuine centers of daily ideological indoctrination activity. As was noted at the Sixth Armed Forces Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations, the essence of party guidelines pertaining to indoctrination in the army and navy is that the powerful forming factors at the disposal of the Armed Forces be optimally utilized for superior ideological-moral and physical conditioning of military personnel and for instilling in them a strong feeling of responsibility for the historical fate of socialism and for the security of the homeland. And a special role in implementing these guidelines is to be played by political agencies and primary party organizations, working in close contact with commanders and deputy commanders for political affairs.

The May (1982) CPSU Central Committee Plenum once again reminded us that the main thing in the work of party organizations is work with people. This is why it is so important that commanders, army and navy political agencies and party organizations live a common experience with personnel, display concrete concern for the individual, his needs and requirements, and utilize work with individuals in full measure, alongside other forms.

The complex tasks which today face the Armed Forces demand of party organizations further enhancement of the level of organizational work and strengthening of party influence in military collectives. It is the duty of political agencies to concern themselves with this. It is precisely political agencies, supported by the strength of party organizations, which ensure that continuous and undivided party influence is exerted on all aspects of army and navy life and activities and which direct party-political work toward improving the quality of combat training, improvement of field, air, and sea proficiency, and increased combat readiness.

Combat readiness, in which are accumulated the results of the multifaceted activities of military collectives, cannot be of a temporary, seasonal nature or freeze at a certain level. Continuously to elevate and improve it, states USSR Minister of Defense MSU D. F. Ustinov, "means steadily to improve equipping of the army and navy with weapons and military equipment; persistently to raise the level of their combat and operational training and increase the performance smoothness of units, warships, and combined units; purposefully to instill excellent moral-political and fighting qualities in personnel, to develop political vigilance, and to strengthen military discipline; to improve the training of command cadres and staffs, troop control and control of naval forces. Combat readiness is manifested in the daily military labor of servicemen, in the regular routine of combat training, in improving military skills and mastering the science of winning.

All these issues were at the attention focus of the participants in the conference of Soviet Army and Navy leader personnel which was held at the Kremlin. It was noted at the conference that unquestioned successes have been achieved in Armed Forces combat training and preparation. Major operational, technical, and organizational measures have been carried out, which have increased army and navy combat power. Right now the times are such, however, that the level of combat readiness should be even higher. It is necessary to work constantly on improving it and to work in an exceptionally serious manner. Then no chance circumstance will take us unawares.

The Soviet Armed Forces must be up to the proper standard in all areas: equipment, structure, and training methods. They must be able to operate taking into account the latest achievements in military science and the art of warfare. It is important to work persistently to achieve positive results in combat proficiency, to master one's weapon, and to be able fully to utilize its combat capabilities. Of course party-political work in the area of indoctrination of personnel should be stepped up. High morale has always been our army's mightiest weapon. This applies to the present day to an even greater degree.

Directing party-political work toward accomplishing combat training tasks, political agencies seek to ensure that each training day produces maximum return on effort and promotes increased combat skill by the personnel of units and subunits. Such a powerful means of developing creative initiative and social activeness on the part of personnel as socialist competition is utilized effectively in the army and the navy for the purpose of further increasing combat readiness. In the recently ended training year it was dedicated to the 60th anniversary of establishment of the USSR and was conducted under the slogan "Reliable defense of the peaceful labor of the Soviet people!"

Exemplariness by Communists in performance of military duty, their high degree of responsibility, ideological conviction and intellectual maturity determine in large measure that ethical climate in the military collective which creates a truly amicable, unified, cohesive military family and forms an active attitude toward life on the part of each and every serviceman.

The military collective consists primarily of Communists and Komsomol members, who comprise more than 90 percent of Armed Forces personnel. And to ensure their exemplariness means accomplishing 90 percent of the task of further strengthening military discipline. Maintaining observance of regulations and exemplary performance of alert duty, guard duty and unit internal administrative activities are closely linked with concern about the men and meeting their needs and aspirations. Such concern should be displayed by every party and military collective.

The activities of Komsomol organizations are constantly at the attention focus of political agencies and party organizations; the role played by Komsomol organizations has appreciably increased, especially in matters pertaining to military-patriotic indoctrination of young people. The necessity of strengthening party guidance of Komsomol is specified in the recommendations of the Sixth Armed Forces Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations. Implementation of these recommendations, which proceed from the decisions of

the 26th CPSU Congress and the 19th Komsomol Congress, will promote greater activeness, initiative and firmness on the part of Komsomol organizations in work with young army and navy personnel and will help in forming ideologically convinced, skilled and courageous defenders of the homeland.

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The entire course of historical development convincingly affirms the vitality and correctness of Lenin's ideas on the party's guiding role as an essential and determining condition of successful building of socialism and communism. Under the unrelenting guidance of the Leninist party, the Soviet Armed Forces are increasing their combat potential and combat readiness year by year.

The international situation obliges us to double and treble our efforts in the campaign to preserve peace and lessen the threat of nuclear war which faces mankind. We are well aware, emphasized Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, that one cannot obtain peace from the imperialists merely for the asking. It can be defended only with reliance on the invincible might of the Soviet Armed Forces. Thanks to the party's tireless concern for strengthening the defense capability of the USSR, the army and navy today possess everything needed to accomplish the responsible tasks assigned to them. The concern by the party and people for the Armed Forces inspires Soviet servicemen and mobilizes them for selfless military labor for the sake of the freedom and happiness of the homeland, for the sake of peace on earth.

Party guidance, enhancement of the role and strengthening of the influence of party organizations on all aspects of army and navy life and activities constitute the basic foundation of Soviet military organizational development and the main source of the might of the USSR Armed Forces.

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#### Recommendations for Seminar Class

A seminar on the topic "CPSU GUIDANCE OF THE ARMED FORCES -- BASIC FOUNDATION OF SOVIET MILITARY ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT" will enable enrolled personnel to understand more deeply the guiding and organizing role of the Communist Party in theoretical elaboration and practical solving of the problems of strengthening national defense and the combat power of the Armed Forces.

It is recommended that the following topic items be discussed: 1. V. I. Lenin on CPSU Guidance of the Armed Forces; 2. Principal Areas of CPSU Activity Pertaining to Guidance of the Armed Forces; 3. CPSU Measures to Enhance the Role of Political Agencies and Party Organizations and to Improve Party-Political Work in the Army and Navy.

Following introductory remarks by the instructor, it is recommended that a report entitled "THE 26TH CPSU CONGRESS ON ENHANCEMENT OF THE ROLE OF THE CPSU IN GUIDING THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES" be presented.

In examining the FIRST TOPIC ITEM, it is necessary to emphasize first of all that scientific substantiation of the guiding and leadership role of the Communist Party in all areas of the affairs of Soviet society, including in the area of strengthening national defense, Armed Forces organizational development and training, were comprehensively and thoroughly elaborated by V. I. Lenin. The party leader viewed party direction on the socialist army as an objective mechanism and a higher principle of military organizational development, and saw in it the main and decisive source of its strength and invincibility. He stated with pride that the Bolsheviks had created an army which "is led by a vanguard segment of experienced Communists" and that the Red Army is in the firm hands of the party.

V. I. Lenin formulated the scientific principles of CPSU military policy, formulated the standards and principles of party guidance of the Armed Forces, and thus accomplished tasks of enormous historic importance. The Central Committee decree entitled "On War Ministry Policy," issued on 25 December 1918, emphasized that this agency's policy, just as that of other government agencies and establishments, "is being implemented precisely on the basis of the general directives issued by the party in the person of its Central Committee and under its immediate supervision."

V. I. Lenin viewed the army as a component part of the edifice of state. He did not separate it from the people but saw in it the defender of the people's root interests. For this reason V. I. Lenin demanded that the fundamental principles of party leadership existing in the Soviet society be extended to Armed Forces affairs and activities.

Following the victory of the Great October Revolution, V. I. Lenin persistently urged the party: "...Entirely to devote all manpower, all resources, and all ability to the cause of establishing and strengthening the Red Army" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 39, page 152). V. I. Lenin considered constant concern with strengthening the nation's defense capability, the combat power and fighting efficiency of the Soviet Armed Forces to be the sacred duty of the party and state to the people. Addressing the 8th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), he stated with inspiration: "...Our main defender, the Red Army..., will have in all party members the most ardent, totally devoted assistants, leaders, friends, and partners" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 38, page 212).

The Communist Party, V. I. Lenin stressed, "should operate on a SCIENTIFIC basis" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 41, page 65) at all times and under all circumstances, that is, it should be guided by the theory of Marxism-Leninism in the search for correct answers to the basic questions advanced by practical realities, by the practical business of the revolutionary struggle and strengthening of the nation's defense capability. This enables the party to resolve all matters pertaining to defense of the socialist homeland, army and navy organizational development and training in exact conformity with the ideology and policies of the worker class as well as the interests of all working people, and to formulate and express them in major party documents -- the Program, decrees of congresses, conferences, and Central Committee and Central Committee Politburo plenums.

V. I. Lenin assigned to party congresses an enormous role in leading the socialist state and its Armed Forces. He stated: "Our party is a governmental party, and that decree which is issued by a party congress will be mandatory for the entire republic...." ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 43, page 62). An example of this is presented by the 8th, 9th, and 10th party congresses, which were held under the guidance of V. I. Lenin. Their decisions contain basic instructions on establishment and improvement of the army of the Soviet State as a regular, cadre, rigorously disciplined military organization of a new type and on the party's leadership role in the Armed Forces.

V. I. Lenin attached paramount importance to the activities of the party Central Committee and its political leadership of the army and navy. One of the main conditions for victory by the Red Army in the civil war, noted V. I. Lenin, was the fact that everybody acted as one, following the slogan and instructions given by the party and its Central Committee (see "Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 40, page 240). The Central Committee determined the direction of military strategy and made major decisions pertaining to support of combat operations, establishment and employment of reserves, mobilization and distribution of resources; it issued directives and instructions to the Republic Revolutionary Military Council, the High Command, and the revolutionary military councils of the fronts on all basic matters pertaining to conduct of the war. It exercised guidance of party-political work through the institution of military commissars and through army and navy political agencies. The structure of troop control was devised and improved under its immediate supervision, in conformity with the conditions of the civil war.

V. I. Lenin considered organization of verification of execution of adopted decisions to be a powerful means of implementing party policy and its leadership of the Armed Forces. He warned against the danger of excessive emphasis just on the administrative aspect of things. Criticizing the work style of the Revolutionary Military Council, which was headed by Trotsky, Vladimir Il'ich wrote: "It is evident that our Republic Revolutionary Military Council is 'commanding,' while disinterested in or unable to verify EXECUTION" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 51, page 50).

We must note that the standards and principles of party leadership of the Armed Forces which were established prior to V. I. Lenin's death were further concretized and developed by the party in subsequent years. The guiding and leadership role of the CPSU in the area of military organizational development has been confirmed by the entire history of the Soviet State. It was manifested vividly and in a multinational manner in the course of establishment of the Red Army, in the flame of the civil war, during the period of reorganization and reequipping of the army and navy, during the years of the prewar five-year plans, and especially in the most difficult conditions of combating fascism.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War the party, concentrating the entirety of government authority in a single agency -- the State Defense Committee -- assigned to it the functions of guidance of the army and people. It mobilized Soviet citizens to defeat the enemy, led the struggle for the honor, freedom and independence of our homeland, unified the battle front and home front, and

transformed our country into a unified military camp, which worked and fought under the slogan "Everything for the front, everything for victory!" And this ensured it maximum and efficient utilization of all the economic, moral-political and military capabilities and advantages of the Soviet State in order to achieve victory over Hitlerite fascism and Japanese militarism.

The experience of history confirmed the genius of Lenin's thesis that only a party of a new type can lead, organize and guide the efforts of the worker class and of all working people, all our country's governmental and public organizations in the interests of strengthening the defense might of the Soviet State, securing the combat readiness of the Armed Forces, and preparing the entire people to defend the homeland. It alone is capable of cognizing the laws governing armed struggle, of profoundly analyzing the complex international situation, and of scientifically determining the directions of development of military affairs and the demands on organization of the army, its combat and political training and combat readiness which proceed from this.

During discussion of the SECOND TOPIC ITEM it is important to understand why the significance of party guidance of military organizational development is increasing in present-day conditions. This is dictated by a number of inter-linked factors, which must be examined during the seminar. Following are the most important of these factors: the complexity of the processes which are taking place in the international arena, which involves unprecedentedly increased responsibility for a correct analysis of the military-political situation and adoption of prompt, effective measures against aggression, from whatever quarter it may come; increased dependence of the combat power and combat readiness of the Armed Forces on the level of socioeconomic and cultural development and this country's moral-political and spiritual potential; expansion of tasks pertaining to defense of socialist achievements.

Exercising daily supervision over strengthening our country's defense, as well as army and navy life and activities, the CPSU takes all these factors into account and is continuously improving its political, theoretical and organizational work. The salutary influence of the party, its Central Committee and the Central Committee Politburo on military organizational development encompasses all areas connected with strengthening the nation's defense capability and increasing Armed Forces combat readiness.

Priority emphasis at the seminar should be placed on examining CPSU formulation of military policy, which is a component part of all party and government policy. This process is grounded on continuous, comprehensive analysis, objective appraisal and correct consideration of the world military-political situation, the specific features of and trends in this country's socioeconomic development. It is necessary to demonstrate with concrete facts that the military policy of our party and the Soviet State is permeated with the ideas of Leninist teaching on defense of the socialist homeland, with a spirit of proletarian, socialist internationalism, and is inseparably linked with consistent implementation by the CPSU of a peace-seeking course of policy in the international arena.

The next area of party activity is further development and strengthening of the material-technical foundation of the defense capability of the Soviet State

and the combat power of its Armed Forces. It is appropriate to note that in connection with deepening of scientific and technological revolution, which also affects military affairs, the military-technical aspect of the party's defense policy is assuming decisive significance in restraining the aggressive aspirations of imperialism.

Equipping the army and navy with the most modern weapons and combat equipment depends on the rate of development of the key branches and sectors of our economy. The materials of the 26th CPSU Congress and Central Statistical Administration reports on progress in accomplishing the targets of the 11th Five-Year Plan persuasively attest to the fact that the capabilities of the socialist societal system, the socialist economic system, and selfless labor by the Soviet people enable the army and navy to have everything they need to maintain a state of constant readiness and, if it becomes necessary, to launch swift and devastating response strikes against an aggressor.

One area of constant CPSU concern is development of Soviet military science which, together with practical military affairs, determines the means of improvement of weaponry, the forms and modes of conduct of warfare. Examining this area of party activities pertaining to guiding military organizational development, we must note that formulation of Soviet military doctrine constitutes a major contribution to the development of military science.

Bourgeois ideologists, attempting to distort the essence of Soviet military doctrine, ascribe to it an expansionist character. In exposing the ill intentions of such claims, it is necessary to proceed from the position that the character of a military doctrine depends entirely on the class nature of the state and its policies. Aggressive, expansionist aims are alien to the Soviet Union.

The success of CPSU activities pertaining to guidance of the Armed Forces is determined to a decisive degree by a correct selection, placement and indoctrination of cadres as well as organization of verification of implementation of party policy and decisions in the army and navy. V. I. Lenin considered selection of personnel and verification of execution to be one of the most important tasks. "...Choose the right people," he stated, "and verify practical execution -- the people will appreciate it" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch," Vol 45, page 112).

We must examine in this connection the demands of the 26th CPSU Congress and the November (1982) CPSU Central Committee Plenum pertaining to further improving the qualitative composition and placement of leader cadres, which are highly relevant also in the conditions of our Armed Forces.

Selection and indoctrination of cadres, monitoring and verification of execution are powerful instruments in the hands of commanders, political agencies, staffs and party organizations for improving work performance. Effective utilization of these instruments for the purpose of increasing the combat power and combat readiness of the army and navy depends first and foremost on each party organization and on each Communist.



The CPSU devotes constant attention to improving party-political work in the army and navy and comprehensive indoctrination of Soviet servicemen. During discussion of the THIRD TOPIC ITEM, enrolled personnel are given the opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of the essence of party measures directed toward enhancing the role of political agencies and party organizations.

Political agencies have a decisive role to play in increasing the effectiveness of party-political work in the Armed Forces. It is precisely through political agencies that the party exerts a guiding and organizing influence on all aspects of training and indoctrination, military life and daily activities, and on performance of tasks pertaining to defense of the socialist homeland. Army and navy political agencies guide party organizations and head all ideological and organizational-party work. At the same time they perform the functions of administrative agencies subordinate to the corresponding command authority. This organizational form of party development in the Armed Forces ensures flexibility and efficiency of party-political work, its continuity and a high degree of effectiveness.

The party is constantly concerned with enhancing the role of political agencies and party organizations in our Armed Forces. This concern was manifested in the decisions of the October (1957) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and in ratification by the party's Central Committee in October 1958 of the Statute on Political Agencies of the Soviet Army and Navy. On the basis of the 21 January 1967 CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "On Measures to Improve Party-Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy," changes occurred in the structure of political agencies, and the position of deputy company commander for political affairs was established.

CPSU congress decisions are of fundamental importance for the activities of political agencies. They provide orientation toward further improvement of party direction of all areas of building communism. Party congress decisions are reflected in the Statute on Political Agencies of the Soviet Army and Navy, which was ratified by the CPSU Central Committee in February 1973. It emphasizes the duty of political agencies to strengthen the combat power of the army and navy and to ensure daily and undivided party influence on Armed Forces life and activities.

Questions pertaining to further improvement of party-political work and the activities of political agencies continue to occupy the party's attention focus at the present time. They were thoroughly examined, for example, at the Sixth Armed Forces Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations. It was pointed out at the conference that daily concern with strengthening the Armed Forces, increasing the combat readiness of combined units, units, and naval ships, and improving the quality of training and indoctrination of personnel constitutes the main directional thrust in the work of political agencies and party organizations.

We must emphasize that political agencies exert their salutary influence on the daily lives of personnel, on training and combat readiness not by number of issued orders and instructions but by increasing the militance of party organizations, the vanguard role and personal exemplariness of Communists in carrying out one's military duty and observing the demands of military discipline.

Political agencies and party organizations devote considerable attention to high-quality accomplishment of ideological indoctrination tasks. Their attention is focused on matters pertaining to thorough study and implementation of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, patriotic and internationalist indoctrination. They are waging a constant and aggressive struggle against our class enemies, are resolutely and persuasively exposing the antipopular essence of imperialism, particularly U.S. imperialism and its reactionary, aggressive policies, and are organizing effective countermeasures to the adversary's acts of ideological sabotage.

In this connection it is important at the seminar to direct attention toward exposing attempts by bourgeois ideologists to distort the leadership role of the Communist Party in military organizational development and to disparage the importance of party-political work in the Armed Forces. A detailed critique of falsifications of this kind is contained in an article by V. Kandybo entitled "Truth Against Lies," which appeared this year in issue No 21 of this journal.

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## ARMED FORCES

### COMMENTARY ON LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 23, Dec 82 (signed to press 25 Nov 82) pp 65-69

[Article, published under the heading "High Quality and Effectiveness to Ideological Work," by Col Ye. Gryaznov: "Common Concern: Reflections on the Editor's Mail"]

[Text] The editors receive a great many letters which attest to the fact that army and navy personnel have taken the decisions of the May CPSU Central Committee Plenum as their own, vital task. The authors of these letters stress that the time which has passed since adoption of the Food Program has demonstrated with renewed force that this program is a concrete manifestation of the party's concern for the people's welfare. Examining not only the economic but also the social and organizational aspects of the program and its sociopolitical significance, this journal's readers note that at all stages in the history of our socialist nation the Communist Party has considered concern for production of grain and foodstuffs to be its most important business.

"Can we forget," Lt Col (Ret) N. Gagulin writes, "that attention which the Great Lenin devoted to solving food problems? Il'ich wrote: 'It is incredibly difficult to accomplish the task of supplying the population with bread in an immense country.... Recalling all the meetings of the Council of People's Commissars, I shall state that there is not a single task on which the Soviet Government has worked so persistently as on this task.'"

This veteran relates in his letter how the party conducted the struggle to provide our country with food during the time of the ordeals of war and during the first years after the Great Patriotic War. "Times are different now. We are now living well," writes N. Gagulin. "But our young people should know: for the men of the food detachments, just as for all those who fought for Soviet rule, those who organized kolkhozes and worked on building the first projects of the first five-year plans, the words 'bread' and 'life' frequently became synonyms. And the hard-to-obtain bread in the Great Patriotic War, rigorously doled out by bread ration cards! Who can precisely set a price on it or say that it was not priceless? If it had a price, it was measured only on the highest scale of courage and staunchness during those stern times. Let us recall Leningrad under blockade, and the less than meager rations for the workers of the Urals and Siberia. It was for good reason that the road across the Ladoga

ice was called the Road of Life: bread was carried along this road to the people of the heroic city." "As it happened," Col (Res) N. Mishin writes the editors, "I experienced the burdens and deprivations of the blockade of Leningrad.... And when I recall the day when I finally could eat my fill of bread, my eyes fill with tears."

Yes, the worth of bread grown by the people is great indeed. This idea runs through many letters from our readers. And the following thought comes to mind: "Bread is a noun, while all other product is an adjective!" As we know, bread can successfully compete with gold reserves, on the basis of which one usually determines how rich or poor a country is, how great its weight is among other nations. Bread is a soldier during days of war; it is a skilled propagandist, politician and diplomat during days of peace." These are lines from a book by famed writer M. Alekseyev about bread, a book the very title of which contains great meaning -- "Tsena yemu zhizn'" [Its Value Is Life].

And is that monument not symbolic which greets a person upon entering Kustanay, that Kazakhstan granary of our homeland: an ear of wheat resting on upturned human hands. "Bread Is the Staff of Life." This is probably why letters about contributions by military personnel toward carrying out the Food Program written by readers of our journal as a rule begin with statements about people's attitude toward bread.

I should like to return to the letter from Col (Res) N. Mishin, who urges a solicitous attitude toward bread. "Waste," writes Nikolay Mikhaylovich, "should evoke sharp condemnation from all of us." Correctly stating that such a thrifty attitude also constitutes a definite contribution to the USSR Food Program, N. Mishin poses the question of improving efforts of instilling in young people a sense of a good-manager approach to that which belongs to the people.

The concern on the part of the author of this letter is understandable. Every day 82,000 tons of bread of various types are baked in this country, and it is distressing to know that more than 5 percent of all the bread produced goes to waste. Why is this? There are various reasons, but they have a common source -- certain individuals still fail to be aware of their degree of responsibility for implementation of the party's demands pertaining to a concerned attitude toward that which belongs to the people.

Unquestionably our readers' wishes deserve attention. Particularly since, as letters to the editor indicate, experience has now been amassed in many army and navy party organizations on publicizing the documents of the May CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the provisions of the USSR Food Program, and on its implementation. For example, in the unit in which Capt A. Kalinovskiy serves, such forms of agitation-propaganda work as specific-topic evenings, oral journals, question-and-answer evenings, and get-togethers with officials of party and soviet agencies, with leading workers in industry and agriculture are widely utilized for these purposes. Lt Col Yu. Koldyshkin writes about this in his letter. He writes that the men listened with great attention to an address by Hero of Socialist Labor L. Lyubchenko, deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet, and in charge of one of the best kolkhozes in Zhitomir Oblast. Of course it was of interest to everybody present to hear a report firsthand on

progress in carrying out the decisions of the May CPSU Central Committee Plenum by agricultural workers.

Indeed, who can better tell about what the farmers are doing than the farmers themselves? And it is not surprising that the editor's mail includes letters about get-togethers with agricultural workers, which are always thrilling and which leave a deep imprint in the consciousness of the armed defenders of the homeland. Whether the soldiers invite distinguished farm workers to visit their unit or whether they themselves visit kolkhozes or sovkhozes -- as a rule such get-togethers always are of the nature not so much of holiday festivities as of a businesslike exchange of views on how to increase one's contribution toward carrying out the party's guidelines. Col (Res) G. Sorokovikov writes that get-togethers held during a visit to leading farms in Murmansk Oblast by sailors of the Red-Banner Northern Fleet were conducted precisely in this manner.

Contacts between military personnel, farmers and factory workers unquestionably play an important role in practical ideological indoctrination work. Lt Col A. Belyavskiy writes that one can scarcely exaggerate the importance in this work of such activities as get-together evenings, specific-topic morning events in which leading production workers are invited to participate, lecture-excursions, and question-and-answer evenings. As the author of the letter notes, however, one must approach in an innovative manner utilization of these and other forms of work. Take, for example, question-and-answer evenings. At the present time a form of activity which is quite close to it is coming into use -- interview evenings. Why should these not be utilized more extensively? One specific feature of such an evening consists in the fact that information comes from a person who is directly involved in a matter of interest to the men. The author of the letter reasons that an equally important role here is played by the fact that in this instance a monologue is replaced by a dialogue, and a serviceman, upon asking questions, hears in reply a statement directed not only to all those present but also to him personally.

Lt Col A. Belyavskiy also tells about an interview-evening held at a certain garrison, where managers of local farms and experts at producing high yields got together with the men.

Col G. Kuznetsov, a senior instructor at the Sverdlovsk Higher Military-Political Tank-Artillery School, wrote the editors about another such get-together. In his letter he told how personnel enrolled at the school had met with Capt (Ret) V. Smirnov, labor veteran and former chief agronomist of the Bisertskiy Rayon Land Administration, who shared his reminiscences about the region's past with the young men.

As we know, upon becoming acquainted with the past, one gains deeper knowledge of the full significance of today's matters pertaining to increasing the prosperity of the Soviet people and achieving the fullest satisfaction of people's material and spiritual needs.

Comrade Kuznetsov notes that a great deal is given to us in this respect by volumes of memoirs of direct participants in the building of kolkhozes and

virgin-land farming. Reader conferences and specific-topic evenings held on these memoirs leave a deep impression in people's consciousness.

By carefully reading documents of past years, one more clearly comprehends that the Food Program adopted by the May CPSU Central Committee Plenum is a solid link in the chain of the affairs of our party, which is constantly concerned with the good of the Soviet people. The more time removes us from the first furrow laid down according to the party's will by the pioneers of kolkhoz life in the village, the more substantial becomes the flow of grain into the people's granaries. The CPSU is doing everything to ensure that productive assets grow, to ensure a greater increase in the power-worker ratio on the farm and farm labor productivity.

A special place in the party's plans has always been occupied by concern about bread for the people. And it is pleasant to acknowledge that, responding to this concern, the workforces of our military sovkhozes are standing shoulder to shoulder with all our homeland's farm workers, increasing our successes. A letter from F. Yakovlev states that recently speakers at a meeting of party rear services activists in the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District noted that the workforces of military sovkhozes are honoring the homeland's jubilee with excellent performance results in production of grain, meat, milk, and in preparation of hay and silage. Lt (Res) V. Kozachok tells in his letter about the successes achieved by the workers on the military sovkhoz headed by party member B. Tsitlenko. Milkmaids A. Brukhova, V. Tyumentsova, and M. Kuznetsova, tractor operator Ye. Zav'yalov, truck drivers A. Savin, I. Aguzarov, and A. Obygraykin, as well as other specialists on this farm consistently overfulfill plan targets.

The work being done by those propagandists who loudly publicize the achievements of farm workers who are waging a vigorous campaign to carry out party guidelines also unquestionably is deserving of praise.

A great deal is being accomplished in carrying out this task by the reference-information centers operating in the districts and fleets. The activities of such a center, established under auspices of the Alma-Ata Officers' Club, are discussed in a letter by Lt Col (Res) N. Trundayev. "Here," he reports, "propagandists and personnel enrolled in political training classes have at their disposal all requisite literature pertaining to the proceedings of the May CPSU Central Committee Plenum. At the center one can always obtain from an experienced methods specialist a consultation on a given aspect of the Food Program and information on progress in program accomplishment in various parts of the country...."

The practical activities about which Comrade Trundayev reports are certainly deserving of attention. But are those readers of our journal not correct who note the importance of soldiers and farmers getting together directly in the fields, at the livestock unit, and in the combine shop? And not simply get-togethers. "Excursions are a fine thing," officer's wife T. Glibchak writes in a letter to the editor. What one sees leaves a stronger impression. But there has long since entered our lives another form of contact between farmers and armed defenders of the homeland -- assistance by military personnel to kolkhoz and sovkhoz workforces. I know what a close friendship binds the men

of our garrison with the farmers. I know that the soldiers always come to the aid of farmers, and this help has become even more substantial since the May CPSU Central Committee Plenum...."

Here is another letter. "On one day off the men of the subunit in which Sr Lt V. Tarasov serves as political worker came to the aid of the local sovkhoz. The men did a fine job helping harvest potatoes. Many individuals distinguished themselves, but the best performers were Pvts M. Antipov, I. Blatis, F. Detina, and K. Kubanatayev." These lines are from a letter written by Col N. Kusher. One reads these letters and realizes that it is not mere happenstance that the stars worn by the Red Army men on their Budenovka helmets pictured a plough. Today as well the peasant's scythe stands proudly alongside the worker's hammer on the enamel field of the five-pointed scarlet star. The alliance between our army and the people is indissoluble. And everything is of concern to the fighting men of the Soviet land: how to keep from wasting the people's money, and how to use the people's property economically. The party has advanced the Food Program -- and servicemen are already thinking about what contribution they can make toward carrying it out. Can they, military people, help the country accomplish this task in some way?

If one carefully analyzes the editor's mail, one can state that suggestions contained in letters boil down to two most important areas. The first pertains to stepping up efforts to develop in servicemen a feeling of responsibility for the people's property and a thrifty attitude toward bread and other foodstuffs. The second pertains to more extensive development of subsidiary farming operations, alongside assistance to kolkhozes and sovkhozes. One must agree with comrades F. Yakovlev and N. Kusher, who claim that development of subsidiary farming operations is one of the most effective kinds of participation by military personnel in solving problems pertaining to increasing agricultural resources.

Col N. Kusher reports, for example, that the subunit in which Capt V. Lapshin serves as political worker the subsidiary farm includes a hog house (about 200 hogs), a greenhouse, a vegetable garden, and a pond with carp. Fresh vegetables are served to the men all year. Col (Ret) F. Yakovlev relates in his letter that in the unit in which officer A. Gribennikov serves, every year the men receive 21 tons of meat, 85 tons of milk, and approximately 180,000 eggs from the subsidiary farm.

The fact is that military personnel have made a weighty contribution toward farm production and implementation of the Food Program.

Of course one can also cite other figures in letters to the editors. Behind these figures stand concrete deeds by military personnel pertaining to carrying out the tasks advanced by the party. And of course it is pleasant for servicemen to know that their labor joins the labor of their republic; and not only on the battlefield but in the grainfield as well.

Our country has an immense appetite: each year it consumes 30 million tons of bread. Half a million persons man the bake ovens day and night to feed this country. More than 50 different enterprises are baking bread just in the capital.

I recall that I was accompanying officer M. Ishchenko by vehicle to a distant "point" way off among the dunes. As the sky began to grow lighter in the east, we were passing through a rayon seat. The streets were deserted; the townspeople were still sleeping. There was a light burning in just one of the buildings.

"What is that?" I asked.

"The local bakery," my companion replied.

We stopped to look in on the bakers and saw for the first time in our lives how bread is baked for an entire town, albeit a small town. We saw how much labor, ability and, I would say, even love people put into the work of baking bread. That morning the bread we were served seemed particularly tasty to us. I then was struck by the thought that bread for each soldier, sailor, and officer is not some faceless consumer product. It is the warmth of one's father's house, as it were, and it has the aroma of home. This is the reason for such special concern for it. The words spoken at the November CPSU Central Committee Plenum by CPSU Central Committee Central Committee General Secretary Yu. V. Andropov have a special ring for each and every one of us: "Measures connected with implementation of the Food Program occupy a central place in our plans."

We receive letters to the editor -- letters about attitude toward bread, toward the labor of those who work in the field, and letters about how those tasks advanced by the May CPSU Central Committee Plenum are being carried out. We receive letters about the place of the armed defender of the homeland in the ranks of builders of the Communist tomorrow. "I am a military truck driver," writes Komsomol member Pvt S. Romanov, "and I feel that the greatest help that we servicemen can and should give to our people, including farm workers, is our persistent labor to improve our proficiency and increase our combat readiness. Each and every one of us soldiers of the USSR understands the fact that the army and navy must be on the alert at all times in order to ensure that Soviet citizens can grow wheat and produce metal in tranquility."

One reads these letters and seems to hear the voices of people for whom the most important thing is concern about the prosperity of the homeland. And it is as if one sees those who are growing fine harvests and those who are standing guard over the peaceful labor of our farmers. Each and every word spoken by the party which is written in the USSR Food Program has evoked an enthusiastic response in their hearts and deeds.

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## ARMED FORCES

### OUTLINE FOR INDOCTRINATION LECTURE ON COMMUNISM AS A GOAL

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 23, Dec 82 (signed to press 25 Nov 82) pp 70-76

[Article, published under the heading "For Political Instruction Group Leaders," by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences and Docent Col I. Klimov and Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Col N. Slesarev: "Communism -- Highest Goal of the Party and People"; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] The section of the curriculum entitled "Our Goal Is Communism," which includes six topics, begins with this topic. The study of these topics will help enrolled personnel gain a fuller grasp of the grandeur of the accomplishments of the Soviet people who, under the tested and proven leadership of the Communist Party, are confidently building a new, Communist society, are achieving further success in a planned and orderly manner in building the material and technological foundation for communism, and are reliably strengthening our homeland's might. During the years of the 10th and at the beginning of the 11th Five-Year Plan, the Soviet Union advanced in all areas of socio-economic, political, and cultural development. The achieved performance levels are enabling our homeland to accomplish even more important tasks pertaining to building communism. Awareness of these great tasks by Armed Forces personnel will enable them also to grasp most clearly their direct obligations to defend the productive labor of Soviet citizens, as well as to carry out their internationalist mission -- to defend the achievements of socialism together with the fighting men of the Warsaw Pact nations.

Six hours are allocated for study of this topic. It is advisable to use this time as follows: 2 hours for a lecture (presentation), 2 hours for individual study, and 2 hours for a seminar (discussion).

IN THE LECTURE (PRESENTATION) it is recommended that the following topic items be covered: 1. Marxism-Leninism on the two phases of building a Communist society. Developed socialism -- a logical stage on the road to communism; 2. The 26th CPSU Congress on present tasks of building communism. The campaign by the Soviet people to meet the targets of the 11th Five-Year Plan; 3. Tasks of Army and Navy personnel pertaining to reliable defense of the peaceful, productive labor of the Soviet people.

IN HIS BRIEF INTRODUCTION the instructor should note that progressive thinkers of the past, even prior to the emergence of Marxism, raised the question of a social system under which there would be equality and freedom, and where man's exploitation by man would no longer exist. Being idealists in their views on society, however, they were unable scientifically to explain and define the basic ways to create such a society. The founders of Marxism-Leninism presented a genuinely scientific solution to this problem.

I. Marxism-Leninism on the Two Phases of Building a Communist Society.  
Developed Socialism -- A Logical Stage on the Road to Communism

K. Marx and F. Engels, comprehensively substantiating a materialist interpretation of the history of development of human society, scientifically proved the inevitability of the revolutionary replacement of capitalism by communism. They were the first to substantiate the two phases of building a Communist society as different stages in its maturity. These stages, as K. Marx and F. Engels noted, differ from one another in level of development of productive resources, state of production relations, and spiritual countenance of the members of society.

Marxist teaching on the two phases of a Communist society was further developed in the writings of V. I. Lenin. After building socialism, he emphasized, we shall continue to advance, toward total communism. We shall arrive at this highest phase of societal system through powerful development of productive resources and transformation of socialist into Communist societal relations. Concretizing the teaching on communism, V. I. Lenin also specified practical tasks pertaining to building a Communist society in our country. Applying the methodology of K. Marx and F. Engels, he concretely defined the place of the various stages of this socioeconomic system. It was he who reached the fundamental conclusion that communism can develop only when socialism has been fully consolidated and has reached its final forms (see "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 40, page 33; Vol 36, page 65).

The teaching by the founders of Marxism-Leninism on socialism and communism as two phases of the Communist society was concretized and further developed in congress decisions and other CPSU documents. The 26th CPSU Congress made a major contribution toward its formulation. Communism and socialism are two phases of one and the same socioeconomic system, possessing both common traits and significant differences. Clarification of this issue is of great importance for a scientific understanding of the paths and patterns of transition from socialism to communism.

What are the common features of the two phases of the Communist society? First of all, in both instances production is grounded on public ownership of the means of production and relations of comradely cooperation and mutual assistance by people who are free of exploitation. "To the extent that the means of production become COMMON property," stated V. I. Lenin in describing socialism, "the word 'communism' is applicable here as well, if one bears in mind that this is NOT complete communism" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 33, page 98).

Marxist-Leninist ideology and a dialectical-materialist, genuinely scientific philosophical outlook is a common feature for both phases of the Communist society.

Both the first and second phases of the Communist society do away with all exploitation of man by man as well as all forms of economic, social, and ethnic oppression. Spiritual freedom for people, unprecedented in an antagonistic society, emerges on the basis of economic liberation of the toilers and continues to develop. In addition, one and the same economic law operates in both phases -- increasingly fuller satisfaction of people's constantly growing material and spiritual needs. Also common is the means of achieving this goal -- continuous growth and improvement of production on the basis of all-out utilization of the achievements of advanced science. "The Communist Party proceeds from the position," it was noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, "that it is simply inconceivable to build a new society without science" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress], page 42).

Also common to both phases of a Communist society is supremacy of the principle of the universality of labor, the existence of unity in society and its steady strengthening, and the actual participation by working people in governing the affairs of society.

In conditions both of the first and second phase of the Communist society, its development is characterized by conscious, orderly organization of production. The Communist society, in contrast to all preceding socioeconomic systems, is formed not spontaneously but as a result of conscious and purposeful activity by the masses, led by a Marxist-Leninist party.

And finally, the Communist system at both stages of its development is a bearer of brotherhood and mutual understanding, progress and peace among the peoples and nations of all the countries on earth. War is alien to the nature both of socialism and of communism. A Communist society can be built only in conditions of peace. The 26th CPSU Congress emphasized that "preserving peace has been and continues to be our main concern in the world arena and the main foreign-policy objective of our state" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," page 219).

At the same time, there are also differences between the two phases of the Communist system. In contrast to socialism, a qualitatively new material and technological foundation will correspond to communism. Communism will be distinguished from socialism by the degree of development of productive forces as well as by maturity of production and other societal relations.

There are differences between socialism and communism in forms of societal division of labor, organization of societal affairs, governance of the affairs of society, there are differences in the level of satisfaction of the needs of the members of society, in development of spiritual and intellectual culture, consciousness, etc.

A comprehensive definition of the Communist society was first given in the CPSU Program: "Communism is a classless societal system with common, public ownership of the means of production and complete social equality of all the members of society, in which, alongside comprehensive development of individuals, productive forces will also grow on the basis of continuously developing science and technology, all sources of society's wealth will flow in a mighty

stream, and the great principle of 'From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs' will be carried out. Communism is a highly organized society of free and conscientious workers, in which public self-government will be established and labor for the good of society will become for all a primary and vital need, a recognized necessity, and the capabilities of each individual will be employed with maximum benefit for the people."

Following are the principal stages of the process of emergence of a Communist society: a transition period from capitalism to socialism; socialism and communism as the two phases of a Communist society.

The first phase -- a transition period from capitalism to socialism -- was the most difficult and thorniest for the young Soviet nation. The Soviet people had to endure a great deal -- foreign intervention and civil war, sabotage and terrorist activity, conspiracies and acts of sabotage. Important tasks in building socialism included eliminating all exploiter classes within the country, acquisition by the working people of the skills of governance, overcoming a mixed economy and creation of a socialist system, formation of a new socialist culture, etc.

Building the foundations of socialism, the political consolidation of which was reflected in the USSR 1936 Constitution and in the decisions of the 18th CPSU Congress, came to an end with accomplishment of the tasks of the transition period in this country.

The period of functioning and development of socialism as the first phase of a Communist society began in the latter half of the 1930's. Not only was the building of socialism completed during this phase, but the process of building a developed socialist society has also been comprehensively carried out. Precisely during these years the Soviet people, led by the party of Lenin, have transformed their country into an economically and sociopolitically powerful state.

Victory in the Great Patriotic War, growth in the might of the USSR, and changes in the correlation of class forces in the international arena in favor of socialism, connected with establishment of the world socialist system, enabled the party to formulate at the 21st CPSU Congress the conclusion that socialism has gained not only a complete but also final victory in the USSR. This signified that not only had the internal sources of danger of the restoration of capitalism been eliminated in our country, but also that there was no longer a possibility of restoration of capitalism from without by any aggressive imperialist forces.

The features of a mature socialist society become predominant toward the moment of the complete and final victory of socialism. A conclusion on the creation of developed socialism in the USSR was reached in 1967 on the 50th anniversary of the Great October Revolution, and was subsequently concretized in the decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress, where it was emphasized that "a developed socialist society has been built by the selfless labor of Soviet citizens...." ("Materialy XXIV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 24th CPSU Congress], page 38).

The basic traits of a developed socialist society are defined and formally stated in the new USSR Constitution. The productive forces of the new system and the advantages of the socialist way of life are revealed increasingly more fully at this stage, when socialism is further developing on its own foundation, and working people are increasingly more widely enjoying the fruits of the great revolutionary transformations.

Developed socialism is a society of mature socialist societal relations, in which a new historical community of people -- the Soviet people -- has been established on the basis of drawing together of all classes and social strata, legal and actual equality of all nationalities and ethnic groups, and their fraternal cooperation.

Developed socialism is a logical, quite prolonged stage in the development of a Communist system, which is an essential foundation on which communism can be built. This period cannot be bypassed or omitted. "...Cognition and utilization of all the possibilities of developed socialism," noted Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "is at the same time a transition to the building of communism. In other words, the dialectics of development here are such that as a mature socialist society becomes perfected, there takes place its gradual evolvement into a Communist society. It is impossible to separate these two processes, to draw a line of demarcation between them" ("Leninskim kursom" [Following a Leninist Course], Vol 6, page 627).

A flourishing of genuine democracy occurs in a developed socialist society, with active worker participation in governing all the affairs of state; genuine human rights and freedoms are combined with civic responsibility. Soviet citizens constitute the principal wealth of the Soviet nation.

These are the general theses of Marxism-Leninism on the two phases of a Communist society. They are of enormous importance for formulation and implementation by other Communist and worker parties of a program, policy, strategy and tactics of struggle for the victory of socialism and communism. Communist and worker parties are guided by these theses in the struggle against bourgeois ideology and all types of opportunist and leftist-sectarian distortions.

Imperialist reaction is presently mobilizing all means of ideological influence on the masses, attempting to smear communism and its noble ideas, which are becoming the banner of progressive mankind. All the enemies of social progress have joined forces under the foul banner of anticommunism and have embarked upon a hysterical campaign of slander: these enemies include the financial oligarchy and the military establishment, neofascists and reactionary clergy, and all ideological and political accomplices of imperialist reaction.

The feeble attempts by our ideological adversaries to besmirch the radiant ideals of communism are in vain, however. "How many times... they have predicted our inevitable collapse," states the Central Committee Accountability Report to the 26th CPSU Congress. "How many times they have attempted to force us to give up our stated goals. How many times our adversaries have attempted to assure us that we are in error, that the path we are following is wrong....

"And what is the upshot? Most of these people have long since been forgotten. But socialism continues to live! It is continuing to develop. It is steadily advancing. And we do not simply believe but firmly know that our highest goal will also be attained -- a Communist society will be built!" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," pp 219-220).

The correctness of the conclusions reached at the 26th CPSU Congress is confirmed by the practical building of socialism, along the road toward which many peoples are now advancing. All the peoples of our planet will proceed to socialism sooner or later. Evidence of this is the increasing number of countries which are marching toward socialism and countries of socialist orientation.

## II. The 26th CPSU Congress on Present Tasks of Building Communism. The Campaign by the Soviet People to Meet the Targets of the 11th Five-Year Plan

In presenting the second topic item, it is advisable to stress that our country has achieved enormous success in all areas of building communism thanks to the measures taken by the Communist Party and Soviet Government and the selfless labor of the Soviet people. Soviet citizens are taking active part in performing the tasks specified at the 26th CPSU Congress and in implementing the plans for the 11th Five-Year Plan in the 1980's. Their successful accomplishment is based on our actual economic might. Precisely for this reason matters pertaining to party economic policy occupy the attention focus of all working people, for the foundation for accomplishing social tasks, strengthening the nation's defense capability, and the foundation of a vigorous foreign policy is laid down precisely in the domain of the economy, and it is precisely here that the requisite preconditions are created for the successful advance by the Soviet society toward communism.

"A steady rise in the economy and improvement in the people's living standards constitute our duty to the Soviet people as well as our internationalist duty," stressed CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade Yu. V. Andropov in his speech at the November (1982) CPSU Central Committee Plenum. "Stating the question in this manner, the party is guided by Lenin's perspicacious statement that we exert our principal influence on the world revolutionary process by means of our economic policy."

The 1980's are a new and important stage in building the material and technological foundation of communism, in development of societal relations, and in forming the new man. During this period we must ensure the fullest possible utilization of the possibilities and advantages of the society of mature socialism and substantially increase its material and spiritual wealth, its economic and scientific-technical potential.

The USSR entered the 1980's possessing great economic and scientific-technological potential. Just in the last 10 years national income has increased by a factor of 1.6, and real personal income by a factor of almost 1.5. In five days our country generates as much national income as was produced in the entire year 1928, on the eve of the 1st Five-Year Plan. As was noted at the 7th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 10th Convocation, in 1982 national income utilized for consumption and accumulation will total 460 billion rubles, and will be

2 percent greater than in 1981. Approximately 80 percent of total national income will go directly for ensuring our people a decent standard of living. In 1981-1985 national income utilized for consumption and accumulation is to increase by 78.5 billion rubles, as compared with 74.5 billion rubles in the preceding 5-year period.

This year industrial output will increase by 2.8 percent and exceed 722 billion rubles. As specified by the plan, those branches on which technological progress and overall economic growth depend primarily have been growing at a more rapid rate -- machine building, chemicals, petrochemicals, the gas industry, plus a number of others.

The Soviet Union accounts for one fifth of world industrial output. Pre-revolutionary Russia's share was slightly more than 4 percent. The USSR produces more than the FRG, Great Britain, and France combined, as follows: 40 percent more electric power, 64 percent more steel, and 74 percent more woolen textiles. Our country is the world leader in production of steel, oil, iron and manganese ore, coke, mineral fertilizers, cement, diesel and electric locomotives, as well as certain other products.

On the basis of the party's thoroughly elaborated agrarian policy, the Soviet people have accomplished a great deal in the area of agriculture. The USSR Food Program for the Period up to 1990, which was ratified by the May (1982) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, is a new stage in our country's socioeconomic development. This program constitutes not only a radical turning point in an upswing by agriculture and related branches. By virtue of its nature and importance, it is called upon to support the advance of the entire economy.

The USSR Food Program is a most important component part of the party's economic strategy for the coming decade. The main goal of this program is reliably to provide this country's population with foodstuffs in the very near future.

The program specifies the task of boosting average annual grain production in the 11th Five-Year Plan to 238-243 million tons, and to 250-255 million tons in the 12th Five-Year Plan. In particular, by 1990 yields are to be raised by 6-7 quintals, up to a national average of 21-22 quintals per hectare.

It was noted at the November (1982) CPSU Central Committee Plenum that execution of the Food Program cannot be delayed. The workers in the agroindustrial complex must increase their efforts day by day and work so that the enormous assets being channeled into accomplishment of this task will already generate return today and even greater return tomorrow.

Just as in past years, a rapid rate of housing construction will be retained in the 11th Five-Year Plan. In 1981 10 million persons moved into new housing, and the number will be approximately the same in 1982. Out of every 100 apartments built in the USSR, 85 are funded by the state and are turned over to citizens free of charge. It is appropriate to note thereby that rents in this country are the lowest in the world and have remained unchanged for many years, while in the United States the cost of housing more than doubled just between

1970 and 1980. In conditions of unchecked growth of military expenditures and diminished allocations for government social services and financial care programs, U.S. working people can scarcely anticipate any easing of the situation as regards education and housing construction.

Wages as the principal source of real personal income are also steadily growing for Soviet citizens. By the end of the 11th Five-Year Plan average monthly worker and employee wages are to rise an additional 14.5 percent, while kolkhoz farmer earnings are to rise 20 percent, increasing to 193 and 142 rubles respectively. In the current five-year plan we are implementing a new system of measures to provide financial support and services for mothers with children, and improved living standards for the younger generation, young families and retired persons. Approximately 50 million Soviet citizens will receive increased incomes thanks to these measures.

The 26th CPSU Congress stressed that the principal task of the present five-year plan consists in ensuring a further rise in living standards for Soviet citizens on the basis of a steady advance by the economy, acceleration of scientific and technological progress, moving the economy onto an intensive path of development, more efficient utilization of this country's production potential, all-out savings in all types of resources, and improvement in the quality of work performed.

On the eve of the glorious 60th anniversary of establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, reports are coming in from every part of the country on fulfillment and overfulfillment of socialist pledges in various areas of activity. The workforces of plants and factories, construction jobs and transportation, sovkhozes and kolkhozes, standing shock-work labor watch, are achieving excellent performance results in socialist competition in honor of this important date.

At the present time there is nothing more important for Soviet citizens than successful accomplishment of the tasks assigned by the 26th CPSU Congress and subsequent CPSU Central Committee decrees, accomplishment of the targets of the second year of the five-year plan, and adopted socialist pledges, complete achievement of which will be a new and victorious level of achievement in the struggle to build a Communist society.

### III. Tasks of Army and Navy Personnel Pertaining to Reliable Defense of the Peaceful, Productive Labor of the Soviet People .

Proceeding with presentation of the final topic item, it is advisable to show the complexity of the international situation in which Soviet citizens must carry out the plans of building communism.

As we know, the 1980's began in a situation of aggravation of international tension caused by the policy of aggressive imperialist forces, their policy of undermining détente and stepping up material preparations for war. At no time since World War II has the threat to peace been as serious as it is today. And reactionary circles in the imperialist nations are to blame for this, particularly the United States. Ruling circles in the United States have



commenced a political, ideological, and economic assault against socialism and have boosted the intensity of their military preparations to an unprecedented level.

The present U.S. Administration and some of its most militant partners from the capitalist countries, choking in their anti-Sovietism and in slander against socialism as a whole, have decided to disrupt the military-strategic balance between the USSR and the United States, between the Warsaw Pact organization and the NATO bloc which has been established in the last decade.

Pursuing hegemonist aims, U.S. imperialism is increasing the might of the NATO bloc and seeking to put together new military groupings under U.S. sponsorship.

Particular alarm on the part of all sober-minded people is aroused by U.S. intentions to utilize the territory of the Western European countries as a theater of military operations in a so-called "limited" nuclear war.

Activation of reactionary circles in the imperialist countries and a build-up of their military power is compelling the Soviet Union and the nations of the socialist community to display unabating vigilance and to ensure their security.

"The aggressive intrigues of imperialism," noted CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade Yu. V. Andropov at the November (1982) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, "are forcing us to be concerned, together with the brother socialist countries, and to be seriously concerned, with maintaining our defense capability at an adequate level."

The CPSU, faithful to the behests of V. I. Lenin, is doing everything necessary to strengthen the USSR Armed Forces, which have been assigned one of the most important tasks -- to guard the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, and to serve as a bulwark of world peace. All army and navy personnel are deeply aware that the strength and might of our homeland lies in constant, unabated leadership by the CPSU and its Leninist Central Committee. "During the period under review the party and state," it was stressed at the 26th CPSU Congress, "did not for a single day fail to address the issues of strengthening our country's defense might and its Armed Forces" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," page 66).

The Soviet Armed Forces, which are a reflection of the socialist society and an integral part of our people, embody the indestructible unity, friendship and brotherhood of all the nationalities and ethnic groups of our multinational state. Defense of the socialist homeland is defined in the USSR Constitution as the business of the entire people, the sacred duty of each and every citizen of the USSR.

The finest traits of the multinational Soviet people are inherent in army and navy personnel: sociopolitical unity, ideological and moral cohesiveness, ardent patriotism and internationalism. Soviet servicemen, indoctrinated in the ideals of Marxism-Leninism, are totally dedicated to their people, to the

cause of the Great October Revolution, and to the socialist homeland. Being full and equal citizens, they take active part in societal affairs.

Solidly ranked behind the CPSU and inspired by the great ideal of the struggle for communism, Soviet servicemen are prepared at all times to thwart possible aggressive actions by the imperialists and to carry out their patriotic and internationalist duty. It is the duty of each and every armed defender of the homeland first and foremost to work persistently to ensure a high degree of combat readiness of one's subunit, unit, and warship, and to strengthen military discipline and organization.

A continuous high degree of combat readiness is inconceivable without a high level of technical knowledge. Only in skilled hands do combat equipment and weapons become a force which is a threat to the enemy. Each and every soldier and sailor must master combat skills, must possess the ability to wage modern combat, which demands considerable knowledge and skill as well as enormous exertion of physical and moral resources. Ability, endurance, and courage do not come automatically, but are developed in the process of instruction classes, combat training and persistent drills.

A high degree of combat readiness presupposes solid ideological conditioning, firm military discipline, organization and strict observance of regulations by each and every serviceman. Combat readiness is a state of the USSR Armed Forces whereby they are capable at all times, regardless of time of day, time of year, weather and other situation conditions, of repulsing and thwarting aggression from any quarter and regardless of the means employed by our adversaries. "Combat readiness," notes USSR Minister of Defense MSU D. F. Ustinov, "cannot be of a temporary, seasonal nature or freeze at a certain level. It must be continuously increased and improved. The efforts of all Armed Forces personnel should be directed toward this."

Realizing this fact, Soviet servicemen work persistently to master their military occupational specialty and acquire the abilities of skilled driving and operation of combat vehicles, missile and radioelectronic systems, nuclear submarines and aircraft, etc. They work tirelessly to improve their combat proficiency and develop excellent moral-political and psychological qualities. This entire aggregate of military labor by Soviet servicemen constitutes their specific contribution to the combat readiness of their units and warships and, consequently, to continuous readiness to defend the homeland and the socialist nations.

The Warsaw Pact Organization constitutes a reliable bulwark of security for the nations of the socialist community and for world peace. Comprehensive political cooperation among the socialist nations, their close friendship and mutual assistance in the economic, scientific-technical, and cultural domains constitute a guarantee of further strengthening of the defense capability and influence of socialism and a guarantee against any and all aggressive intrigues by imperialism.

Joint exercises of allied troops and naval forces are of particular significance in the area of strengthening and defending world socialism as well as

internationalist indoctrination of military personnel of the Warsaw Pact countries. The exercise environment and the fact that servicemen of the brother armies are performing common missions help draw them closer together and foster the development of friendship and mutual trust between them. The "Oder-Neisse," "Brotherhood in Arms," "Alliance," "Shield" and other joint exercises are an example of reliable strengthening of the international community of brother peoples and their armed forces.

In conclusion it is important to stress that enormous role and responsibility assigned to army and navy personnel in the present complex international situation.

FOR INDIVIDUAL PREPARATION for the seminar (discussion) on this topic, it is necessary to recommend that enrolled personnel read the following writings by V. I. Lenin: "Great Initiative" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 39, pp 5-6, 13-20) and "Tasks of the Unions of Youth" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 41, pp 298-318); Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Preamble, articles 31, 32, 62, 63); CPSU Central Committee Report to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Immediate Party Tasks in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" pp 31-67); Proceedings of the May (1982) CPSU Central Committee Plenum (PRAVDA, 25 May 1982); the first chapter of the political instruction textbook "Nasha tsel' -- kommunizm" [Our Goal Is Communism].

IN THE SEMINAR (DISCUSSION) the following topic items should be discussed:

1. Just what is the Communist socioeconomic system?
2. What common points and differences are there between socialism and communism as two phases of a Communist society?
3. What are the principal features of mature socialism?
4. What are the principal economic tasks of the 11th Five-Year Plan?
5. What successes have been achieved by the Soviet people in implementing the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and achieving the targets of the 11th Five-Year Plan?
6. What causes the objective necessity of increasing our country's defense capability?

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## ARMED FORCES

### CPSU NATIONALITIES POLICY, ITS DETRACTORS DISCUSSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 23, Dec 82 (signed to press 25 Nov 82) pp 77-82

[Article, published under the heading "On the Fronts of the Ideological Struggle," by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Col O. Bel'kov: "Triumph of the CPSU Nationalities Policy and the Impotence of Its Falsifiers"]

[Text] The Soviet Union's successes in resolving the highly complicated nationalities question are of world-historic significance and constitute an important milestone in the many years of struggle by progressive mankind for revolutionary renewal of the world, for equality and friendship among peoples. These successes evoke keen interest and the most profound respect on the part of all those who are fighting for social and national liberation, while generating alarm and hostility in the imperialist camp. On the background of ethnic conflicts which are becoming more acute in the capitalist world, as well as a rampage of chauvinism and racism, the lofty humanism of interethnic relations which has become firmly consolidated in our country stands out in particular relief. Attempting to weaken the attractiveness of such an example, the propaganda machine of imperialism is launching massive attacks on the Leninist nationalities program and CPSU policy.

Carrying out the social imperative of monopoly capital, its ideologists are seeking to force upon public opinion the false thesis of the eternal nature of interethnic conflicts. "Researching" the development of the Soviet multinational state from this position, they vainly attempt to prove that socialism allegedly does not and cannot introduce anything new to relations between peoples, that it must inevitably perish under the pressure of nationalism. Falsifying the nature and character of socialist interethnic relations, anticommunists hope to discredit the new societal system.

But in this instance bourgeois ideologists are similar to that anecdotal figure who, having spread a false rumor, was himself trapped by it. Blind and deaf to the actual facts of life in the Soviet Union, imperialist propaganda continues to place its hopes on reviving the ethnic animosity and hatred which existed in this country under the old system. Imperialist propaganda is especially persistently pushing the idea that the West should utilize nationalism to undermine the "internal stability of the Soviet regime." American "Sovietologist" Ch. (Khostler) writes, for example, that from a military

standpoint the Soviet Union's "vulnerable spot" is the Turkic areas of its southern territories. A certain A. Shporlyuk claims that the Western Ukraine is "one of the most sensitive zones" in the USSR. What about proof? None is offered! And in fact, where could any be obtained? But the aim of such fabrications is clear: their purpose is to convince public opinion in the West about the "fragility" of the multinational Soviet State and, consequently, that victory over it is possible in the war for which the imperialists are preparing.

The results of such "research" are frequently taken by Western politicians and strategists and transformed into military-political doctrines. We might recall that the bosses of fascist Germany, in readying for aggression against the USSR, were counting on a "blitzkrieg" victory. Its achievement was supposed to be accelerated by ethnic discord which allegedly existed in the Soviet society, as Goebbels propaganda loudly proclaimed. The war, however, toppled the hopes of the aggressor and of all the world's reactionaries for the collapse of the multinational Soviet State.

"During the harsh years of the Great Patriotic War," states the CPSU Central Committee decree on the 60th anniversary of establishment of the USSR, "the brother peoples rose up shoulder to shoulder in defense of the homeland, displayed mass heroism and an unbending will to win, crushed the fascist invaders, and saved the peoples of the world from enslavement and annihilation." All the nationalities and ethnic groups in the Soviet homeland made a worthy contribution to the common cause of victory over the enemy. History had never before seen examples of such indestructible moral-political and fighting unity on the part of dozens of nationalities and ethnic groups being manifested in a multinational state in time of war.

The peoples of the USSR emerged from their battle with fascism as an even more unified family. The past war clearly demonstrated that there is no force in the world capable of splitting this family or of shaking the indestructible Leninist friendship of peoples. And particularly there are no such forces today, when our socialist society has achieved a high level of material and spiritual maturity, when a fundamentally new social and international community of people -- the Soviet people -- has formed in our country.

But warmongers are always inclined to ignore the lessons of history. It is significant that Operation "Dropshot," devised by the Pentagon and calling for initiating a nuclear war against the USSR, specified "psychological warfare" as a most important weapon "for introducing dissension and disorder among the peoples of the USSR, to undermine people's morale, and to spread discord and disorganization in that country's affairs."

Thus the acute ideological struggle on problems of ethnic relations is not some abstract debate by armchair scholars. It is a struggle for the minds and hearts of millions of people, and it is being waged by imperialism in the name of purely practical political and military-strategic objectives. These very aims dictate sophisticated and at the same time massive attempts by the class enemy to drag nationalistic attitudes and views into our environment. As is emphasized in the CPSU Central Committee decree on the 60th anniversary of

establishment of the USSR, nationalism is "one of the principal means used by imperialism in its subversive activities against genuine socialism...."

The place occupied by nationalism in the strategy of anticommunism is indicated by the fact that all the most inveterate reactionary elements are gathering under its extreme reactionary banners. Government establishments and various private foundations, religious societies, counterrevolutionary emigré organizations, etc are taking part in the furious anti-Soviet nationalist raging which is taking place in the bourgeois West. This ill-assorted alliance of ideological saboteurs is fabricating a great many phony lies about actual and imaginary ethnic processes taking place in the USSR.

It is no easy matter, however, for the bourgeois falsifiers to brush aside the enormous achievements with which the Soviet people have reached the 60th anniversary of their unified multinational state. In the West they have been forced grudgingly to acknowledge these successes. American journalists R. Knight and J. Wallace, for example, write: "Communism has created an extremely stable society in the Soviet Union. Stability and reliability are probably the two qualities which Soviet citizens prize most." "The economic and cultural achievements of the Soviet system in the non-Russian regions are enormous," states British sociologist H. Seton-Watson.

But statements such as these are merely a spoonful of honey in the barrel of propaganda tar, an attempt by these authors to give the appearance of objectivity to the bulk of their lying opinions and appraisals. That same Seton-Watson states without a twinge of conscience that the economic and social advances made by the Soviet peoples are a result of "oppression" of the non-Russian nationalities. He claims that for this reason there is taking place erosion of their ethnic distinctiveness and independence.

Shedding crocodile tears over the ethnic values which the peoples of the USSR have allegedly lost, these learned bourgeois gentlemen in fact are expressing the undisguised yearning of our class adversaries for those "good old days" when imperialism was able to exploit, rob and trample underfoot with impunity the working people of various nationalities throughout the world.

Of course there has been and can be no "destruction" of the national independence of peoples in the USSR. On the contrary, the victory of socialism and the building of a developed socialist society are fostering the comprehensive and rapid flourishing of nationalities and ethnic groups. A modern industry, agriculture, development of science and culture -- this is what characterizes today all of the Soviet republics, which possess equality before the law. At the same time they possess their own unique countenance and unique national features. History clearly demonstrates that socialism, contrary to the malevolence of our enemies, not only does not lead to peoples' loss of their ethnic and cultural distinctiveness and progressive traditions, but on the contrary elevates and carefully preserves them.

But to preserve the national heritage by no means signifies limiting oneself merely to that heritage. It should be increased and enriched with the achievements of modern civilization, by the spiritual values of socialism, by the experience of other brother peoples. And the hypocritical groans emitted by

anti-Soviet elements over the "erosion" in the USSR of traditional features of ethnic distinctiveness and their appeals to preserve ancient customs and ways are essentially directed against social progress and the forward evolution of Soviet nationalities and ethnic groups.

The hypocritical nature of bourgeois propaganda is also expressed in the fact that, under the banner of "concern" over the preservation and development of ethnic distinctiveness, it seeks to inject nationalistic views into Soviet society, to arouse mutual distrust and suspicion in relations between peoples, and to turn people away from socialism.

For example, the provision in the USSR Constitution on the continued gradual drawing together of the socialist nations, in the interpretation of West German "Sovietologist" B. Meisner signifies a "departure" from the principle of self-determination to a "unitary principle, to assertion of the priority status of the Russian nation." And what does he care that our Constitution clearly spells it out in black and white: "The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a united, multinational union state, established on the foundation of the principle of socialist federalism, as a result of the free self-determination of nations and voluntary unification of the Soviet Socialist Republics, with equality before the law."

As we know, the legal guarantee of self-determination and equality of nations is the fact that each union republic retains the right freely to secede from the USSR. Meisner simply "fails to notice" this right, since it is not included in his lie about "infringement of the sovereignty" of the Soviet republics. He deliberately "forgets" about the fact that the USSR Constitution and the constitutions of our union and autonomous republics formally state the basic underpinnings of the socialist way of life, which are common to all nationalities and ethnic groups, strengthen the guarantees of their sovereign rights, and enhance the role of the republics in carrying out the common tasks of the entire nation.

Representatives of all our country's nationalities take active part in managing the affairs of society and the state. Suffice it to say that representatives of 61 different nationalities have been elected to the USSR Supreme Soviet, of 66 different nationalities to the supreme soviets of the union republics, of 52 nationalities to the supreme soviet of autonomous republics, and of more than 100 nationalities to local soviets. The following figures are also noteworthy: while Russians comprise 52.3 percent of this country's population, they comprise only 45 percent of the total number of soviet deputies; these figures are 2.5 and 2.99 respectively for Kazakhs, 0.55 and 0.82 for Latvians, etc. Twenty-nine percent of all the deputies to the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet are representatives of autonomous republics, although the population of these republics comprises only 8 percent of this country's total population.

B. Meisner and company also deliberately "fail to notice" that enormous job which is being done by the Communist Party and Soviet State, solving urgent problems pertaining to development of all our country's republics. Anti-Soviets self-importantly expatiate on: if peoples in the USSR which were backward in the past have achieved significance success in economic and social



development, this is nothing more than a "natural result" of the "modernization" which is taking place throughout the world, and socialism has nothing to do with it.

The groundlessness of this phony argument is obvious, for during the years of Soviet rule the former hinterlands of Czarist Russia have greatly outstripped in their development neighboring regions on the other side of the border, although at the time of the victorious October Revolution they were approximately on the same level. It is not some mythical "modernization" but genuine socialism which created that launching platform from which began the swift upward movement of peoples which had previously been doomed to centuries-long backwardness, to the heights of progress.

Bourgeois falsifiers attempt by hook or by crook to besmirch the Leninist nationalities policy, to disparage and to outright slander the achievements of the peoples of the USSR. There is being disseminated, for example, the thesis that the czarist regime had accomplished "a great deal of preparatory work" in the ethnic regions, thanks to which their present successes allegedly became possible. But what are the actual facts? Quoting V. I. Lenin, czarism did everything it could to achieve mutual alienation of peoples. It undertook practically nothing to establish and develop industry in the hinterlands of the Russian empire. The governor general of Turkestan made the following official response to a petition by an entrepreneur who wished to build a textile mill there: "Deny petition. Also state that development of cotton spinning industry in this region is an issue of great importance, with a disadvantageous aspect -- detriment to this industry in Central Russia."

The situation changed radically following the victory of the Great October Revolution. "From the very first years of Soviet rule," noted the Central Committee Report to the 26th CPSU Congress, "our economic and social policy was formulated so as to boost as rapidly as possible Russia's former ethnic hinterlands to the level of development achieved by the central regions." And this task was successfully accomplished. In the period 1922-1981 total industrial output volume increased by a factor of 304 in Georgia, 428 in Uzbekistan, 729 in Belorussia, 928 in Kazakhstan, and 1,036 in Armenia. Facts, as they say, are facts. But what do Western "scholars" have to say about this? They say absolutely nothing. And what can be said by sociologists such as one (Vardis) in the FRG, who claims that the Soviet nationalities policy has nothing whatsoever to do with success in economic development.

No, gentlemen! No matter how much you slander, no matter how much you fail to acknowledge obvious facts, you will be unable to nullify the role of the close partnership among the peoples of our country in the economic development of all national regions.

Unselfish aid to the brother peoples rendered by the Russian people was of decisive significance for the advance of our society. Here is what Comrade D. A. Kunayev said in this regard in a speech dedicated to the 250th anniversary of Kazakhstan's voluntary annexation to Russia: "We have traveled a journey equal to eras together with the great Russian people, under the wise guidance of the party of Lenin. Together with them we have learned to know the

happiness of joint struggle and victories, the happiness of peaceful productive labor for the sake of a bright future -- communism. This is why the sacred feeling of deep gratitude and respect for the Russian people will never dry up in the grateful soul of the Kazakh people and all the working people of multinational Soviet Kazakhstan...."

There have long since ceased to exist any backward ethnic hinterlands in our country. But the party continues to pursue a course of policy directed toward building up the material and spiritual potential of each and every republic, and at the same time its maximum utilization for harmonious development of the entire country. In conformity with the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, the historically established economic specialization of the union republics will be further deepened during the years of the 11th Five-Year Plan. At the same time a priority rate of growth is scheduled in all republics for those branches which determine scientific and technological advance, as well as those branches for the development of which there exist the necessary natural and economic conditions, labor skills among the populace, and sociohistorical factors.

The significance of the USSR Food Program for the Period up to 1990, which was ratified at the May (1982) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, is enormous. The tasks specified in this program demand of all union republics a comprehensive rise in agricultural production and an increased contribution to the nation's stocks of foodstuffs. Accomplishment of these tasks will ensure reliable supply of foodstuffs to the population in all parts of the country. This will be achieved primarily by increasing crop and livestock production locally.

No matter how sophisticatedly devious the "Sovietologists" are in their attempts to discredit the Leninist nationalities policy, they simply fail to accomplish their objective. Therefore some are not averse to using methods of fraud and swindle. For example, anti-Soviets extract from the CPSU conclusion on the formation in the USSR of a historically new social and international community of people phony arguments for idle fabrications about the artificial creation of a unified nation of a "Russian-Soviet type" by means of "coercive assimilation" of non-Russian peoples. Such "scholars" wish to ignore the fact that our party takes a very clear-cut position on the question of flourishing and drawing together of nations. The Communist Party, as was noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, is against tendencies directed toward artificial effacement of unique ethnic features. But in equal measure it holds their artificial exaggeration to be intolerable. The growing unity of Soviet nationalities and ethnic groups and the growing commonality of all aspects of their life is an outstanding achievement of socialism. The USSR national economic complex, which encompasses the territory of the entire country, comprises the material foundation of this unity.

In our country multiethnic production, scientific, creative-arts, as well as military collectives have been established everywhere and are successfully accomplishing their assigned tasks. This is a noteworthy social and sociopolitical phenomenon of our days. In joint struggle and labor, people of different nationalities are developing common features of consciousness and conduct, which in turn foster further cohesiveness of the Soviet people. And the fact that this process is of a natural character and is taking place on a

purely voluntary basis is convincingly indicated by the widespread occurrence of interethnic marriages, which number in the millions. One must take into consideration, however, the fact that internationalization of the life of Soviet citizens is a progressing but not yet completed process.

It is a well-known fact that in the Western countries, which brag so much about their "freedoms," a person's ethnic dignity is shamelessly trampled underfoot. Numerous discriminatory obstacles are set up against people with a different color of skin, members of ethnic minorities, and immigrants. Arbitrariness, illegal treatment, and brazen outrage against the honor and dignity of people of a different nationality or of a different race -- these are the indicators of social realities in the United States, Great Britain, and in many other capitalist countries. Cruel treatment of the Palestinians and Lebanese by the fascistic Israeli racists during the aggression against sovereign Lebanon evoked the indignation of the entire world.

But hardly a word of censure was heard from the anti-Soviet camp! What do you expect! They are working even more diligently at fabricating lies about the unequal status of the members of various nationalities in the USSR and about the existence of interethnic rivalry and enmity, which are allegedly eroding away Soviet society. Depending on their "area of specialization," our ideological adversaries exaggerate "Baltic," "Muslim," "Jewish," and other issues. The Zionists display particular activeness in this regard. Taking refuge behind a provocation thesis of "persecution of Jews in the USSR," they attempt to discredit the basic principles of the nationalities policy of the CPSU and Soviet State and to slander socialism as a system.

But all these are fruitless, feeble attempts. Formation and development of the Soviet people is an objective result of the reorganization of society on socialist principles. The basic element of newness which distinguishes the Soviet people from other multinational assemblages lies in the fact that it constitutes not simply a sum of nations living side by side in a single state, but precisely a community, which presupposes the existence of unseverable bonds between these component parts. The Soviet interethnic community of people knows no enmity, discord, or mutual suspiciousness among peoples. National feelings and the ethnic dignity of each individual are respected in our country. In addition, the world has never before seen such an unbreakable unity of interests and goals, will and actions, and spiritual kinship, which are constantly manifested in our fraternal alliance. An important feature of this new historical community is close, comprehensive cooperation among peoples and their selfless mutual assistance. The contemporary countenance of any Soviet republic is determined not only by the labor of its population but also by the result of the joint efforts of all our peoples.

Endeavoring to give the appearance of respectability and authenticity to their appraisals and conclusions, bourgeois authors cite a great many genuine Soviet sources, use statistical data and materials from our periodicals, and cite many facts from the life of the multinational Soviet people. But all this is subjected in advance to special filtration and processing. In a "reader on conduct of psychological operations" prepared by NATO experts, we read in this connection: "The art of propaganda consists not in simply lying but in selecting

facts which are advantageous to us and larding them with those ideas which we would like to instill."

Manipulators of the public consciousness on both sides of the Atlantic inculcate into the masses the idea that socialism is capable neither of changing the essence of a people's existence nor the character of relations between nations. "Sovietologists" attempt from this extrahistorical position to push through the thesis that the very emergence of socialism is allegedly a result of the operation of national factors and therefore restricted to a local framework. In order to "prove" the unacceptability of socialism for other countries and peoples, bourgeois propaganda spreads the trivial notion that the October Revolution was "exclusively the business of the Russians." As regards Russia's ethnic hinterlands, socialism was allegedly introduced to these areas by the Red Army, contrary to the will of the masses. (Dzh. S. Reshetar), for example, falsifying the essence of the civil war, reduces it to a conflict "between the Russians and oppressed non-Russian peoples."

The class significance and anti-Soviet directional thrust of such "historical" concoctions are obvious. The falsifiers would like nothing better than artificially to incite anti-Russian feelings and to place them in the service of today's subversive aims of imperialism. The ideological saboteurs, however, will not attain these goals. They will fail in their attempts to slander history. The historical truth is well known to Soviet citizens and our friends abroad.

Yes, the Red Army fought domestic and external counterrevolution in the ethnic regions. In the first place, however, it never was an army of a single nationality -- Russian. By the beginning of 1919 the ranks of the armed defenders of the revolution included approximately 150,000 Ukrainians, more than 80,000 Belorussians, more than 12,000 Latvians, approximately 50,000 members of Turkic peoples, more than 17,000 Chuvash, approximately 4,000 Estonians, etc. In the second place, Red Army units were operating in ethnic areas not contrary to the will of the population but were acting in circumstances where the worker masses themselves were engaged in a revolutionary-liberation struggle and needed support in order to gain victory over local counterrevolutionary forces and foreign interventionists. Thirdly, the Red Army troops strictly observed the ethnic rights of the population of the liberated areas. For example, an RSFSR Revolutionary Military Council order to the troops which had entered Ukrainian territory during the struggle against Denikin stated: "The Ukraine is the land of the Ukrainian workers and toiling peasants. They alone have the right to exercise power in the Ukraine, to govern it and to build a new life there.... Bear firmly in mind: our task is not conquest of the Ukraine but its liberation."

Thus our enemies' ideological calculations are clearly at odds with the truth. The facts incontrovertibly demonstrate that the political system of socialism was created by the revolutionary efforts of the entire people and comprehended by the working people of all nationalities. As early as the years of the civil war and foreign military intervention the Soviets, thanks to the fact that they were close to and accessible to all segments of the toiling population, made it possible to unite behind the worker class the multimillion toiling masses in every part of the country. Precisely for this reason the nationalist

counterrevolution was unable to halt the triumphant advance of Soviet rule in Russia's former hinterlands.

All peoples comprehended and enthusiastically supported Lenin's idea of creating a unified multinational state. Establishment of the USSR crowned in a worthy manner the foundations of the fraternal cooperation among peoples which had been laid down in 1917. Their unity became toughened and strengthened in the course of industrialization, collectivization of agriculture, cultural revolution, and in the struggle to build socialism.

The friendship among the brother peoples was subjected to a stern test in the years of the Great Patriotic War. The battle with fascism showed that the most precious thing for Soviet citizens of all nationalities is the freedom and independence of their common homeland -- the USSR, and that they are willing to make any sacrifices and endure any privations for the sake of defending the socialist homeland. Mass heroism on the battle front and on the home front, and an unbending will to gain victory over the enemy is the finest evidence of the dedication of all Soviet nationalities and ethnic groups to our governmental and societal system.

In conditions of a socialist system, representatives of all this country's republics serve in the army and navy. The men of each and every subunit, unit, and warship, just as the Armed Forces as a whole, comprise a friendly multi-ethnic family of fighting men. And how could it be otherwise! After all, today's Armed Forces, noted USSR Minister of Defense MSU D. F. Ustinov, "is an integral part of a great social and international community of people -- the Soviet people. According to sociological studies, at the present time men of 60-90 different nationalities are usually serving in the military districts, of 40-50 different nationalities in combined units, of 20-30 nationalities in units, and 7-15 different nationalities in subunits (companies, batteries)."

Joint military labor, inspired by the lofty ideals of service to a unified socialist homeland, is transforming the friendship of peoples into a profoundly personal feeling, into a moral standard of conduct for Soviet servicemen. Each member of the multiethnic fighting team has confidence in his comrades in arms and is himself ready and willing to support and come to the aid of any one of them. In such a collective the sons of the different peoples enrich one another with knowledge, experience, with their finest qualities, further developing and consolidating the unified, common-Soviet traits of the fighting men of a new type. Thanks to this fact multiethnicity, which traditionally was considered to be an indication of weakness of a military organism, is becoming a source, unknown in the past, of moral staunchness, fighting cohesiveness, and the invincibility of the socialist army.

Naturally our class adversaries would like to muddy the waters of this life-giving spring, casting stones in it. The intelligence services of the imperialist powers are looking for arguments which, according to their calculations, would make it possible to undermine the unity and friendship of our servicemen, to blunt their feeling of participation in the historic destiny of their great multinational Soviet Land and their dedication to the ideas of proletarian, socialist internationalism. This search, however, is confined

within that same closed circle of anti-Soviet dogmas and nationalistic stereotypes.

For example, anti-Soviets hold forth at great length about Soviet patriotism, but with the sole aim of emasculating it of its class content and representing it to be a "totally apolitical" national pride, which is allegedly inherent for the most part in the Russian people alone. The military-patriotic indoctrination of our army and navy personnel is correspondingly characterized as "propagation of militant Russian nationalism." In other words, they are attempting to convince the world that the morale of the USSR Armed Forces is grounded not on the achievements of socialism but rather on "old Russian patriotism," on the traditional staunchness and courage of the Russian soldier. From this, they claim, one can readily conclude that in the Soviet Union people of different nationalities are unequal both in moral-fighting qualities and in their desire to defend the homeland.

But this is an outright fraud! Soviet patriotism is patriotism of a new, socialist type. It has nothing in common with petty notions of ethnic exclusiveness, notions which have become obsolete and moldy. There has not been a single battle in the history of our Soviet homeland in which fighting men of many different nationalities have not fought shoulder to shoulder. Their military skill and courage are persuasively indicated by the fact that during the Great Patriotic War the lofty title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to military personnel of more than 100 different nationalities. Today as well the ranks of excellent performers in combat and political training as well as winners of socialist competition in honor of the 60th anniversary of establishment of the USSR include the sons of all the peoples of our multinational homeland.

But the anti-Soviets are not interested in genuine facts. They are continuing their petty intrigues. The editors of the magazine OSTEUROPA, for example, held a conference for the purpose of studying the "spiritual situation in the Soviet Union." The conferees also discussed our Armed Forces. They stated that "ethnic inequality" allegedly exists in the Soviet Army, that "attitudes favoring military conquest" are cultivated in the Soviet military, etc. Of course no solid arguments bolstering these fabricated claims were brought forward, since in fact no such thing exists.

Socialism has engendered a new type of army and a new type of fighting man. They threaten nobody, but they are ready at all times to stand in defense of the homeland and our just cause. "And whenever," it was stated at the 26th CPSU Congress, "it is demanded by the interests of our nation's security and the defense of peace, whenever it is necessary to help the victims of aggression, the Soviet serviceman is perceived by the world as a selfless and courageous patriot and internationalist, who is ready and willing to surmount any and all difficulties."

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Through their many years of life experience, all the peoples of the Soviet Union have become convinced that rich results are obtained by joining into a united internationalist family of builders and defenders of the new system, with the

future offering the most extensive opportunities. At the same time the fraternal unity of working people of all nationalities does not come automatically. Its strengthening and further development demand a great deal of painstaking effort. Figuratively speaking, the life-giving warmth from the hearth of the friendship of our peoples must be supported constantly and with solicitude.

May the warmth of our native hearth continue warming us in the future. This requires resolute resistance to the slanderous fabrications of the imperialists, and for this we must reliably protect the freedom and independence of our multinational Soviet State.

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ARMED FORCES

VIETNAMESE GENERAL VISITS KIEV MILITARY DISTRICT

PM081423 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Jan 83 Second Edition p 3

[Unnamed own correspondent report: "Visit Continues"]

[Text] Red Banner Kiev Military District--Colonel General Le Truong Tan, chief of the Vietnamese People's Army General Staff, who is in the Soviet Union on an official visit at the invitation of Marshal of the Soviet Union N. Ogarkov, chief of the Armed Forces General Staff and USSR first deputy defense minister, arrived in the city of Kiev 23 January. He was met at Borispol'skiy Airport by Army General I. Gerasimov, the district commander, Lt Gen A. Fomin, first deputy commander of the district, Col Gen Avn V. Pankin, Maj Gen Arty V. Malkov and other generals and officers. The same day Col Gen Le Truong Tan paid a visit to the district commander. In the afternoon Col Gen Le Truong Tan and those accompanying him visited the memorial complex "the Ukrainian State Museum of the History of the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945." The district commander hosted a dinner in honor of the visitor.

Col Gen Le Truong Tan visited one of the district's military units 24 January. He acquainted himself with the servicemen's everyday life and the organization of combat training and of the training--material base. Explanations were provided by Lt Gen A. Fomin, first deputy commander of the district. Then Col Gen Le Truong Tan observed a motorized infantry battalion's tactical exercise. In the afternoon Col Gen Le Truong Tan and those accompanying him acquainted themselves with the sights of the hero-city Kiev.

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ARMED FORCES

'KRASNAYA ZVEZDA' ON 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF BATTLE OF STALINGRAD

PM011533 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Feb 83 Second Edition p 1

[Editorial: "Exploit on the Volga"]

[Excerpts] Tomorrow, 2 February, sees the 40th anniversary of the victorious completion of the Battle of Stalingrad--one of the most important battles in World War II. The Soviet people, USSR Armed Forces servicemen and all progressive mankind proudly celebrate this glorious date and pay tribute to the great exploit of the Stalingrad heroes--those who stopped the German fascist hordes rushing to the Volga and then encircled and defeated them.

The peoples of the world admired the Soviet Army's heroic victory and thanked our people for the exploit accomplished for the sake of mankind. U.S. President F. Roosevelt called the Battle of Stalingrad an epic struggle whose decisive result was celebrated by all Americans. He sent Stalingrad a certificate in which, assessing the exploit of its heroic defenders, he wrote: "Their glorious victory halted the wave of the onslaught and became a turning point in the allied nation's war against the forces of aggression."

Today some people in Washington are doing everything possible to erase the great importance of the exploit of the Volga from people's memories. Our ideological opponents are falsifying the history of the Battle of Stalingrad in every way, trying to belittle its political and military significance, to just it on a par with less important battles taking place at that time in other theaters of World War II, and to portray the defeat of the fascist troops on the Volga as a result of Hitler's "fatal errors" and the "bad weather."

All these "concepts" and "theories" are far from the truth. The truth of history is that the Soviet Army's victory in the Battle of Stalingrad was one of the most important events of the Great Patriotic War and all of World War II. This victory showed the whole world the great vital force of the socialist system. It graphically manifested the socialist states' indestructible might and the great power of the friendship of the Soviet peoples, the staunchness, courage and mass heroism of the Soviet servicemen educated by the party in the spirit of the all-conquering ideas of Marxism-Leninism, and the superiority of Soviet military art over the military art of fascist Germany. The inspirer and organizer of the victory was the Leninist Communist Party, which skillfully directed the efforts of the front and rear toward a single goal--defeating the enemy.

The German fascist invaders' crushing defeat at Stalingrad and the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War is a terrible warning to the imperialist aggressors. History attests that he who comes to us with a sword will die by the sword.

Some 40 years have elapsed since the last shots of the historic battle on the Volga were heard. But the greatness and nobility of the legendary exploits of the heroes of Stalingrad, the servicemen of the regiments and divisions which defeated the largest strategic grouping of German fascist troops, will live in our hearts and will live forever in the people's memory. Today we remember with great gratitude those who did not spare themselves, who joined the penetration force and drew the fire, those who, tying grenades to themselves, flung themselves under the fascist tanks. Their selfless devotion to the cause of the party and people, their ardent love for the motherland and fiery hatred for the enemy, their military skill and unswerving courage and staunchness are an unfading example to use, the moral pinnacle with which we vie in serving the motherland and the cause of communism.

Pride and responsibility--those are the feelings with which we are celebrating the 40th anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad. Great pride in the exploit accomplished by our people and their armed forces in the Stalingrad fighting. A high degree of responsibility for the reliable defense of the gains of socialism in our troubled times, when imperialism is nurturing plans for a new world war using weapons of mass destruction. Under the conditions of the growth of imperialism's aggressiveness, the Soviet people and Army and Navy servicemen see their duty as being to tirelessly strengthen the country's defense capability, for you cannot get peace from the imperialists by begging, it can only be upheld by relying on the indestructible might of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The immortal exploits of the heroes of Stalingrad summon us to vigilance, to new, loftier heights in combat and political training, and to the further consolidation of discipline and combat readiness. Soviet servicemen bear aloft the combat banners covered in the glory of victories and are honorably fulfilling the task set them--that of being the reliable guards of the Soviet motherland, and bastion of world peace and the peoples' security.

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ARMED FORCES

YEPISHEV VISITS PILOTS' SCHOOL NEAR VOLGOGRAD

PM041049 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Feb 83 Second Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Meetings at Kacha School"]

[Text] Army General A.A. Yepishev, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, who is currently in Volgograd for the celebrations marking the 40th anniversary of the rout of the German fascist troops at Stalingrad, has viewed the "Battle of Stalingrad" panorama. He has also visited the Kacha A.F. Myasnikov Red Banner Order of Lenin Higher Military Pilots' School, viewed training classrooms and lecture halls and familiarized himself with the future pilots' life and routine.

Army General A.A. Yepishev addressed the school's officers and students and conveyed greetings to them from Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of defense, and wished them success in their studies.

Army General A.A. Yepishev was accompanied by Col Gen V.K. Meretskov, commander of troops, Red Banner North Caucasus Military Okrug; Lt Gen F.K. Ishchenko, member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate; and S.Y. Krylov, secretary of Volgograd Obkom.

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## ARMED FORCES

### SOVIET FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN

#### Officers' Club Fosters Friendship

PM251523 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian No. 22, 19 Feb 83 p 1

[TASS report: "Sitting Around a Russian Samovar"]

[Text] Limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan [no date given]-- "This is the first time that I have drunk such tasty tea, and from a samovar, too," (Abid Salekh), an officer from an Afghan unit, could not help exclaiming. He had come with some comrades to the newly opened "home from home" leisure room of the officers' club [dom] of the limited contingent of Soviet troops. Tea and Russian pancakes were a fine supplement to the relaxed, warm conversation between the Soviet and Afghan servicemen. And there is much for them to talk about. A new life is being set in motion in Afghanistan. Many interesting topics for conversation are emerging. The officers' club readily meets its guests' wishes.

Meetings with Afghanistan's leaders, scientists and cultural figures are no rarity here. And even ordinary concerts occasionally end with lengthy friendly conversations. They are particularly interesting for Afghan servicemen who avidly take in any information about people's lives in the Soviet Union. Lectures on the international situation and the Soviet land's internal life are regularly read to them. Lectures are accompanied by documentary movie shows which make a great impression on listeners and viewers.

The Soviet officers' club has become a distinctive methodological center for Afghans. Cultural and educational workers from Afghan military units often come here to glean experience of work in organizing servicemen's leisure time. In this way staffers of the Soviet officers' club make their contribution to strengthening friendship between the two countries and two armies.

#### Troops Entertained in DRA

PM271543 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Feb 83 First Edition p 3

[Article by RSFSR people's artist Yosif Kobzon: "Song Always in the Vanguard"]

[Excerpt] I by no means prepare myself for each trip only as a singer. I have something to talk about with my friends. I have visited the major

construction projects of the recent 5-year plans and met a lot of interesting people. And I speak about them.

The political workers say that our meetings with the servicemen do them a great deal of good. The emotional charge that our spectators receive does not simply relieve tension but helps the servicemen to love the motherland even more consciously and raises their political vigilance and readiness to deliver a rebuff to any intrigues by socialism's enemies. Thanks for such a high assessment of our labor!

All this is particularly keenly perceived among the servicemen of the limited Soviet contingent in Afghanistan. I have visited there twice now. And in April a new trip is to take place.

I recall a concert in one garrison. At the very height of things I was passed a note from the commander asking me to cut the performance short: The subunit had to go to the assistance of Afghan comrades who were in trouble. I decided to bid the soldiers farewell with songs from the time of the great patriotic war. And I was staggered by the way they greeted them: It was as if they were swearing an oath of loyalty to the fatherland, an oath to carry out their duty to the end.

Such meetings are a great formative school for us artists too. Through direct contact with the servicemen, contact by means of song, you begin to understand more deeply that the strength of our art lies in its involvement with the fatherland's fate.

#### Soviet Soldier Remembered

PM250849 Moscow TRUD in Russian 24 Feb 83 p 4

[Article by Col I. Dynin: "The Stork, A Good Bird"]

[Text] Kabul-Moscow--For several days the assault troops stormed the craggy mountains, grasped for lack of oxygen, wilted in the heat of the foothills and froze in the mountain passes, "attacked" and "defended." Eventually, after all the rough and tumble of the exercises, they returned to their temporary garrison. They would surely collapse on their beds and fall asleep on reaching their tents.

But guard Lt Col Valeriy Klimov, having changed out of his combat gear and shaved off the prickly growth of beard, asked his neighbor for the bayan. Putting his ear to the bellows, as if listening to their breathing rather than the music, he quietly sang:

The fever has passed.  
Past the tents we walk.  
Of beloved Siberia  
And dear folk we talk.

We called on Valeriy on business, but how can you talk about business when someone is singing about life? Sensing that the poetry was not exactly professional and the music was home-made, I asked who wrote the song. Klimov kind-of stared and then, without replying, started singing again:

Dark distance lies between us, rivers and untrod heights.  
The path that links our hearts  
Is drawn by the lines of your letters.  
I know you greet the anxious  
Summer sorrowing for me.  
You expect your son's quick reply  
And silently you yearn.

I listened to songs about passes and untrod heights, about letters and the motherland. About readiness to launch an attack. How the soldiers serving in Afghanistan need them!

When the two of us were left alone, Valeriy at last answered my question:

"Stork [AIST] wrote the poetry. No, it's not a surname. It's just initials and the first two letters of the surname. Aleksandr Ivanovich Stovba. He could have been a real poet. A great shame. He died not far from here...."

I soon learned that in the last hours and minutes of his short life platoon commander Lieutenant Stovba accomplished a feat for which he was posthumously awarded the Order of Lenin. I wanted to know more about his life, about the path Aleksandr trod toward his exploit....

His mother recalls once telling little Sasha about the good bird, the stork, who brings happiness to the home. "Has the stork brought happiness to our home too?", the boy asked.

His mother did not reply immediately. For some reason she was not thinking about happiness. Even many years later she would not have been able to give a quick answer to her son's question. In the hard postwar years, having completed seven years at school, she went with her father to the plant and worked on the trucks which carried the ash and slag from the furnaces. It was at the plant that she met a young foreman from the depot and soon became his wife. Ivan Andreyevich Stovba had served at the front. As artillery battery first sergeant he had fought his way to Vienna. After engineers' school he completed correspondence courses at the railroad tekhnikum and then at the institute. He moved on and took his wife with him. He became an engineer and she became a machine operator. They applied for and joined the party together....

But you don't tell all that to a little boy.

Later, when her son had grown up, she read some poetry dedicated to her: "Wrinkled hands, white hair. Mother! Lived a lot, done a lot. Mother! A word which, like the sun, has warmed us for centuries--Mother! It is

hope, it is immorality--Mother. The first word I said was a simple Mama. It contains all things sacred--Mother!"

The poem was signed: Stork. When Sasha became Aleksandr Stovba and pondered the meaning of life, he wanted just as much as in his childhood years to be like the bird which brings people happiness....

The exercise followed all the laws of modern battle, although the situation was not like that which Lieutenant Stovba had operated in at the military academy. The mountainous terrain dictated its own terms. Subunits were often split up, the apparent proximity of targets was deceptive and the radio kept playing up. Add to that the fact that Dushmans, waging an undeclared war in Afghanistan, were observing the Soviet troops actions at all stages of the exercise like vultures. They were afraid of entering into open battle, they were waiting for an opportunity to make a surprise attack.

Having carried out an assignment, the company traveling in mechanized infantry combat vehicles started to emerge from the ravine. Lieutenant Stovba, in charge of a section which had not yet gone down, received the order to cover the column from the rear. While the combat vehicles were forming a line to go out along the dried-up river bed, Aleksandr marked the mortar position and the sector to be covered by machinegun fire. At that very moment he thought he saw a shape move quickly back from a nearby cliff. Taking up his binoculars he looked long and hard but observed nothing suspicious. But suddenly the sound of falling rock reached him from the other side.

Without binoculars one could see dark figures running from rock to rock. "Are they encircling us?" Aleksandr was wondering, when another possibility occurred to him and made him shiver: "They intend to block the platoon's path." There was no time to think. Reporting the situation to his commander, he decided to draw their fire himself and thus save his combat comrades from harm....

We flew to the area where Aleksandr Stovba was killed. The helicopter, loaded with sacks of cement, doggedly and laboriously gained height to cross the snowy peak. The land below appeared to have been tilled by a gigantic plow. After the first chain of mountains there came into view a second, followed by a third. It was clear why the commander was so alarmed: It would be difficult to negotiate the heights which even a helicopter had to struggle to reach.

Reflecting on the times and on himself, Aleksandr wrote:

The sands of time run through my fingers,  
The seconds oozing inexorably away....

Time flies still. The days flash by, building into months....but the place where the lieutenant died has not changed at all. The same bare cliffs worn smooth by the winds of centuries. The same rocky bed of the dried-up river. It is as if all the sounds and voices have been embedded in the

rocks forever. There you get a different perception of the details of those tragic minutes....

As the rocks trickled down from above, someone shouted out:

"Basmaks!"

What a foreign and distasteful word. More than 50 years before, his grandfather Andrey Ivanovich Stovba had served in Turkestan as commander of a machinegun platoon. Several times he had fought against gangs of Basmaks. The family still had the letter of thanks given to grandfather and signed by the legendary military Commander M.V. Frunze.

Years later the grandson who had never seen his grandfather, killed during the great patriotic war, followed in his footsteps. He graduated from the Kiev M.V. Frunze General Forces Officers Academy and became a platoon commander. And then he came face to face with the enemies whom the people still call Basmaks....

Bullets whistled past, ricocheting off rocks: zing, zing.

"Back everyone! That's an order! I'll hold them off!"

It was a deadly dangerous decision. There were dozens of Basmaks to face alone. But he only had to hold out for a few minutes. The main force was quite close. Help would be on its way as soon as the comrades heard the gunfire. He did not think of himself, he was only concerned to save the company.

Later, when he was no more, his comrades read in his notebook one of the great Russian Commander A.V. Suvorov's dictums: "When it was a matter of the homeland's welfare I forgot about myself." When did Aleksandr make this entry? Perhaps the day he received his party card? "Our family now has its own party organization," he said on returning to the barracks. It appeared to be a joke, but the eyes had a serious look. On joining the party he assumed the same responsibility as his father and mother for all around him.

...The sharp jolt made Stovba's hand slip off the rock he was resting on. He felt something hot and sticky run down his body. "Wounded," Aleksandr thought.

Perhaps at that moment he heard someone bark a command far below:

"Quick! There's Stork!"

He was not mistaken: comrades were hurrying toward him. They clambered up, the rocks tearing the skin from their hands. Falling and getting up again, they rushed to help their Sasha. They wanted so much to make it, but they failed. They and he needed just a few minutes more.



The third bullet tore at his belly. His eyes were filled with whirling colors. The ground heaved, dark gray turning into orange. He lost consciousness....

Coming too, he saw two Dushmans very close. He fired at the closer of the two. The other flung himself at him. Two bullets were fired almost simultaneously. A heavy blow in the chest. Hand reaching for his heart, Aleksandr fell face downward, smelling for the last time the smell of the earth....

There you have the last moments of the man who composed the following lines:

Speeding through the years,  
A meteorite in the deep blue dark,  
I would burn and destroy all adversity  
For the sake of life on earth.

Entering the Afghan town where Aleksandr Stovba served, we drove past the local school.

"It has had its share," Maj Gennadiy Gural sighed.

"It has come under fire so many times. It was burned down once. We helped to rebuild it. Sasha's platoon had its full complement then."

Yes, even before he fought the Basmaks he had seen their black deeds, seen the crippled classrooms and charred desks. Up there, in the mountains, he had taken a stand not only for his combat friends but also for the happy children who hurry in the morning to the school which he also helped to create.

Aleksandr Stovba is no more. But his songs, his weapons and the memory of him remain. The Dnepropetrovsk Publishing House has published a little book of his poems. "The Song is More Powerful Than the Storm"--the publishers chose this line of Sasha's as the title. There are teams at plants which have him registered as a worker, and his wages go to the peace fund. At Dneprodzerzhinsk's No. 20 school, which Sasha attended, every pupil knows his name. And the platoon he commanded is called the Stovba platoon.

In a letter home, Aleksandr addresses his Mother, saying:

I will come home, Mother, please believe that.  
I will return happy and grown.  
And how's my little ash tree?  
Grown up, no doubt, like its little brother?

His little ash tree is growing. The willows planted on Sasha's grave by the schoolchildren are growing too. The Stovbas' other son--Serzha--is growing up. The day will come when he will take his elder brother's place in the ranks, just as Aleksandr took his father's place and his father took his grandfather's place. Life goes on.

Soldier Decorated for Service

PM281551 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Feb 83 First Edition p 3

[Article by Capt G. Butmalay: "For Courage and Valor"]

[Text] Having performed his tour of military duty in the army, Anatoliy Goncharenko returned home and became a plumber in our unit. We all say how the reservist set about his work with enthusiasm.

We knew that he had been serving with the limited contingent of Soviet troops in the DRA. And recently it was made public that for courage and bravery shown in the performance of his internationalist duty, Goncharenko had been awarded the Order of the Red Star.

The reservist received the state award in a ceremonial atmosphere. The officers' club was full to overflowing. The first speaker was Maj P. Goncharuk, a worker of the oblast military commissariat. It transpired that in 1981 he had given Goncharenko and other draftees their sendoff on military service. And now they were meeting again. Maj Goncharuk presented Anatoliy with the order and wished him great success in peaceful labor.

Capt G. Kiselvich, unit commander, Pvt V. Sitko and others congratulated the serviceman on the high award.

The assembly listened with interest to the speech of Vladimir Nikolayevich Goncharenko, Anatoliy's father and a great patriotic war participant.

"We have three sons in our family," the war veteran related. "All three have served worthily in the army, received excellent ratings and each received commendations from their commanders."

Then the floor was given to R. Filatova, chairman of the local committee [title as published] and a Soviet army employee. On behalf of the trade union organization she presented Anatoliy Goncharenko with a free pass to one of the best boarding houses in Sochi.

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## ARMED FORCES

### REVOLUTIONARY ELAN WEAKENING

Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian No 1, Jan 83 (signed to press 14 Dec 83)  
pp 22, 23

[Article by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences and Professor Lieutenant General D. Volkogonov: "Loyalty to Revolutionary Traditions"]

[Text] Each of us, living with the present and thinking about the future, carries within himself a part of the past. It, this past, is in the historical experience of our predecessors; of general human knowledge which we use; of the customs which our fathers also followed; and finally in the unfading revolutionary traditions to which we maintain loyalty. Revolutionary traditions are a spiritual value of enduring importance. Into them are compressed a never cooling passion of the fighter against social evil, a firm will and determination to finish that which is begun, an infinite love for the homeland, and devotion to revolutionary ideals. In his speeches and articles, V.I. Lenin repeatedly drew attention to the importance of "preserving the traditions of the revolutionary struggle". Now and in the future. In thoughts and deeds.

Revolutionary traditions for the person wearing a military uniform are manifested first of all in defense of the homeland and securing its safety. Since that memorable day when the shot sounded from the "Aurora", the clocks of history began to count the time of a new era. The time, which placed the beginning of the birth of new traditions, had begun. The class amalgamation of the enormous energy of people that were liberated from oppression determined new customs, standards, rituals for the "person with a gun". These are revolutionary and heroic to the core. Among the most important traditions evoked by the October Revolution, one could name such things as: infinite devotion to the nation and party, irreconcilability towards the enemies of the homeland, loyalty to military duty and the military colors, readiness for self-sacrifice; pride in being a member of the glorious Soviet armed forces, mutual aid and mutual assistance, international aid to class brothers, constant readiness to protect the commander, high humanism of actions, and others. They are all alive and developing in our army and navy. Their living essence finds expression and consolidation in the consciousness and deeds of soldiers, the military relics of glory, developing rituals, conduct regulations, standards, and customs.

The Great Patriotic War left an indelible impression on the content of revolutionary traditions. More than a third of a century separates us from that memorable day when the red banner of victory, hoisted by the hand of a Soviet soldier, soared over the fallen Berlin. Time has succeeded in unrecognizably changing the fields of former battles: the scars of trenches and the ashes of cities have long since disappeared, and new generations of Soviet people--the sons and grandsons of those who obtained the great victory for us--have grown up. And the farther the day of 9 May 1945 moves away, the more prominent the enduring importance of the enormous feat of the Soviet nation appears before us. Time is not imperious over the memory of a nation that holds sacred its history, its heroes, and its imperishable revolutionary and military traditions. These [traditions] are not only the invaluable spiritual property of the Soviet people, but also an unfading example and a flaming reference point in the life of every person.

What does loyalty to revolutionary traditions mean for the individual personality? In what is this loyalty expressed? It would appear that several actual facets, that characterize the spiritual portrait of Soviet man and the Soviet soldier, can provide the answer to these questions.

Facet One. Loyalty to revolutionary traditions and ideals is expressed first of all in man's innovative, I would say, attacking motion of ideas and his abilities to fight decisively to the end for their realization in deed, actions, and conduct. Having mentally re-created before ourselves the images of the revolutionary Leninist Guards, we see that these were people completely captivated by a great idea, prepared to devote themselves without reserve to the revolutionary cause, and able to manifest a high degree of resolution in achieving the goal.

In our day the revolutionary storehouse of ideas is manifested in intolerance towards indifference, moral laziness, lack of spirituality, and in the ability always to place the social principle above personal interests. A long-standing noble tradition of communists is that true loyalty to our ideals does not require some kind of "remuneration" and reward. It is difficult for the person with a bourgeois world view to understand what compels a citizen outside the limits of work time to become occupied with the landscaping of a kindergarten, to build a public library, and to conduct lessons in a shooting club for boys. But the important foundations of self-sacrifice and willingness to perform a deed are cut out exactly in revolutionary citizenry. Such a deed, which was accomplished during the years of the Great Patriotic War, was that of the simple woman Aleksandra Dmitriyevna Derevenskaya who brought up 48 orphans; the deed of Anatoliy Merzlov who perished while saving public property; of the young communist Nadya Kurchenko who shielded passengers from the bullets of a criminal; of Lieutenant Viner Nigmatullin who rescued a soldier from inevitable death...

Facet two. Six and one-half decades have passed since the moment of accomplishing the main event of the 20th century--the Great October Socialist Revolution. Generation after generation passes like the ocean's waves, raging and foaming, but that powerful revolutionary impulse born with the October Revolution is just as powerful and insuperable. Therefore to bear

loyalty to revolutionary ideals in one's heart is also to preserve the memory of those who accomplished the revolution, secured and defended its conquest, and increased still more the chronicle of glorious deeds.

Probably you have observed how people become when they enter the Vladimir Il'ich Lenin Museum, the Great October Socialist Revolution Museum, and the USSR Armed Forces Museum. It is as if they hear the living breath of bygone days, and hear the voice of history directly addressing it. Touching with one's hand the cold metal of an historic armored car, the caterpillars of the legendary thirty-fourth, and peering into the faces of those who defended Moscow, held Leningrad and took Berlin by storm--everyone has experienced getting a lump in the throat and how your responsibility for peace on earth and for the good fortune of these days becomes still clearer.

Indeed everything that has been accomplished, produced and defended made you the heir to the revolutionary, heroic deeds of your fathers and grandfathers. You are responsible not only for the present and the future, but also for the past. Therefore, loyalty to revolutionary traditions assumes a profound understanding of direct involvement in everything that takes place around us and next to us. And not simply an understanding, but also the ability to act, following the revolutionary compass with which the Communist Party equips us. This is why it is so important to know how to hear the echo of revolutionary history, to know it, and to draw eternal truths from its annals.

Revolutionary traditions for us are an eternal reminder. A reminder of the past. A reminder that people realize the bond of times. And the deepest secret of tradition's strength is in its continuity. As Hegel once aptly observed: "Tradition is not only a mere caretaker, honorably taking care of that which is received. It is alive and passes on the inheritance farther." And each of us, acquiring legacies, experience, customs, habits, and the regulations of our predecessors, and the soldiers of the army of a socialist state, make this great bond of times indissoluble, firm, and dynamic. He who does not know and does not remember the past can not be spiritually rich.

Facet three. It demonstrates that loyalty to revolutionary ideals and traditions is manifested also in our irreconcilability to social evil, injustice, and to everything that reduces the value of history. Really, can a person possessing a revolutionary world perception calmly hear about the calls of American hawks for a "crusade" against the USSR? About acts of crude barbarity by the aggressors in Lebanon? About the new campaign of falsehood and slander which the American president unleashed against me and you and cynically called the doctrine of psychological warfare "Project Truth"?... The one in whom revolutionary feelings are alive cannot help seeing in all this the aspirations of the spiritual kinfolk of those who suffered defeat in 1917, to "replay" anew all the 20th century battles lost by them. And really do we not need revolutionary irreconcilability to that which has become obsolete, alien, and hostile in our customary everyday life? Indeed "we have such individuals too,"--it was noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, --"who strive to give a little less, but to snatch a little more from the state. It is based on such psychology that egoism and narrow-mindedness, hoarding, and indifference towards the concerns and matters of the nation also appear."

Reconciliation to shortages, which unfortunately are still alive in our life including both in the army and the navy environment--that is capitulation before them. A personality, thinking by revolutionary categories, cannot tolerate this and cannot be reconciled to social evil and obsolete traditions.

Traditions always played an enormous role in people's life. Having originated in the gray-haired mass of centuries, they live for a very long time, sometimes lagging behind the pace of history. The sieve of time gradually eliminates that which is reduced in value by history. A great deal of them were, and even now there are traditions in the form of vestiges which long ago lost their positive significance. Obsolete traditions, noted the classics of Marxism, are the "great brake in history". Most often such traditions are in everyday family spheres, and sometimes in the area of national relations. They are the antipodes of revolutionary traditions and are incompatible with our ideals.

Mentally ask yourself: Do you always raise a voice of criticism and condemnation when encountering evil, indifference, unscrupulousness and deceitfulness? Do not some of our omissions and defects occur from the low "enthusiasm" [goreniye] of some people at work, on the job and when fulfilling their duties? The revolutionary storehouse of ideas and actions demands from a person that he be concerned about everything; it does not tolerate indolence, stagnation, and callousness. Karl Marx defined revolution as the "locomotive of history". This "locomotive", the engine of our life, depends on the energy, will, thought, and feelings of each person. Therefore, by criticizing those or other of our omissions, we ought to be able to take account of ourselves extremely self-critically. The person loyal to revolutionary traditions always makes higher demands on himself than on those around him. This is one of the most important indicators of a personality's civility.

Revolutionary ideals and traditions for us are not something abstract and distant. They are embodied in the better features of the Soviet way of life, personified in progressive peoples, the concrete accomplishments of our nation, and the needs of its army and navy. Encounters with veterans of the revolution, the war and labor, touching the marble of monuments, the stories of your grandfather, and the exciting pages from a chronicle of a unit's or ship's military history remind us that the relics of traditions are in our hands, and that their crystalline purity and powerfully profound moral strength, which are important components of the revolutionary principle now depend on each of us. Loyalty to revolutionary traditions is loyalty to heroic history and the ability to enter new and vivid pages into it. The quality of loyalty to the revolutionary principle in the spiritual portrait of a Soviet soldier signifies the principled indissolubility with the heroics of the past, with the romantic of everyday life of the present, and with the optimism of the future. When one speaks about the heroic relay-race of generations, this is emphasized pointedly and we are reminded of the essence of that which is traditional. The noted anniversaries of the party, the state, the armed forces, and the annual military holidays are an outstanding reminder to us of loyalty to traditions. Celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of our state illuminated with enormous intensity the

grandeur of the feats of the Soviet people and its armed forces in the struggle to build socialism and communism. The memorial structures, monuments, and the fire of eternal glory are not only grateful tribute to the great deeds of our forefathers, grandfathers and fathers, but they are also a sage reminder to living generations: to be loyal to revolutionary traditions.

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## ARMED FORCES

### OUTLINE FOR LECTURE ON PATRIOTISM, INTERNATIONALISM

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 11, Nov 82 (signed to press 22 Oct 82)  
pp 22-24

[Article by Col V. Khrobostov, candidate of historical sciences: "To Assist Warrant Officers' Political Training: Implement Congress Resolutions: Indoctrination of a Soldier-Patriot and Soldier-Internationalist"; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] For 65 years the victorious banner of the Great October has fluttered proudly over the world, embodying the grandeur of communist ideals--ideals of social justice, friendship and cooperation of our Motherland's nations. A great fraternity of people of labor originated and grew strong in the country: people united regardless of their nationality by a commonality of class interests and goals. Relationships unprecedented in history took shape which, as Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said, we rightfully call the Leninist friendship of nations. The USSR now is a socialist state of the whole people which reflects the will and interests of workers, peasants and the intelligentsia, and of toilers of all nations and nationalities of the Soviet Union.

The next topic of political training is "THE 26TH CPSU CONGRESS ON INDOCTRINATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS AND ARMY AND NAVY PERSONNEL IN A SPIRIT OF SOVIET PATRIOTISM AND SOCIALIST INTERNATIONALISM." The purpose of the class is to assist warrant officers [praporshchiki and michmany] understand in more detail the essence of patriotic and international indoctrination, the party's requirements for a further strengthening of the Army and Navy's combat effectiveness, and the basic directions, forms and methods of developing high moral-political qualities in subordinates. Six hours are set aside for study of the topic: two hours for a lecture and four hours for a seminar. It is advisable to focus the students' attention on the following matters:

1. V. I. LENIN AND THE CPSU ON THE ESSENCE OF SOVIET PATRIOTISM AND SOCIALIST INTERNATIONALISM.
2. SOVIET PATRIOTISM AND FRIENDSHIP OF USSR NATIONS IS A SOURCE OF OUR MOTHERLAND'S MIGHT, THE MASS HEROISM OF MILITARY PERSONNEL AND FURTHER REINFORCEMENT OF THE ARMY AND NAVY'S COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS.



### 3. FORMS AND METHODS OF WARRANT OFFICERS' WORK TO INDOCTRINATE SUBORDINATES IN A SPIRIT OF SOVIET PATRIOTISM AND SOCIALIST INTERNATIONALISM.

1. INDOCTRINATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS, including military personnel, in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism is a component part of communist indoctrination. V. I. Lenin linked the building of a new society inseparably with the development in its members of such qualities as dedication to the ideals of communism, the homeland and their people; proletarian solidarity; and a communist attitude toward labor and state ownership.

Today we can say with complete justification that the Soviet citizen is a person who was able to win freedom during the days of the Great October and defend it in the most terrible fighting. He is a selfless creator, a fervent patriot and a consistent internationalist.

Lenin noted that patriotism is one of the deepest feelings, reinforced by centuries and millennia of isolated homelands. As a moral feeling, it expresses the Soviet citizen's desire to make his Motherland strong, powerful and prosperous; his readiness to act in her defense against an aggressor's encroachments. Patriotism also is pride for the social, economic and cultural achievements of one's people, a solicitous attitude toward their traditions and deep filial attachment to native places.

This complex feeling was and is manifested in a contradictory manner in an exploiting society. The fact is that in a capitalist state split into hostile classes the attitude to the motherland is interpreted through the prism of class interests. The latter are diametrically opposite for exploiters and the exploited, and so there can be no single, nationwide patriotism in a society based on oppression, injustice and social inequality. The elimination of exploiting classes in our country became a starting point for transforming the patriotic feeling into a nationwide feeling. From that point on patriotism became not only a social and moral feeling, but also a deeply perceived understanding of the idea of love for the socialist homeland formulated as one of the most important principles of communist morality and Marxist-Leninist ideology.

A new, historically shaped community--the socialist homeland--is the basis of the fundamental distinction of Soviet patriotism from other types. Its most essential social features are a new state system, the leading role of the Communist Party, social ownership of means of production, moral-political unity, friendship of all the country's nations and peoples, and the Soviet way of life. All this together generated a qualitatively new, supreme type of patriotism which Lenin called revolutionary patriotism.

Proletarian internationalism is a reflection of the class solidarity of all countries' toiling masses in a struggle against the bourgeoisie and for social and national liberation. It signifies a unity of actions, responsibility to the world revolutionary process, and subordination of the interests of the working people in one country to the interests of struggle on a worldwide scale. The party teaches that proletarian internationalism is one of the chief principles of Marxism-Leninism and a rejection of it would signify deprivation of communist parties and the working movement in general of a

powerful and tested weapon. With socialism's move beyond the framework of one country it became enriched with new content, the supreme manifestation of which is socialist internationalism, which became a principle of state politics. It reflects the commonality of class interests of nations of the fraternal community and is manifested in their mutual assistance, in the support of all revolutionary forces of modern times in a struggle against imperialism, for national independence, and for building socialism and communism; and in the defense of revolutionary achievements. "Capital," stated Lenin, "is an international force. An international alliance of workers and their international fraternity is needed to defeat it."

The party's leader cautioned that the imperialist bourgeoisie will strive to unify its forces so as together to eliminate achievements of the socialist revolution where it occurred. Imperialists are not limiting themselves here to using only economic, political and ideological means to weaken and eliminate the new social system, but they are attempting to achieve their goals by force of weapons. In this regard Lenin emphasized that nations which have taken the path of socialism need a close military and economic alliance without fail, since otherwise the capitalists will crush and stifle them singly.

Therefore soon after the Great October Vladimir Il'ich called on party members and the toilers of numerous nations and nationalities of our country to weld their military forces into a powerful international army. The Decree on Creation of the Red Army which he signed proclaimed that service in its ranks is the obligation of all Soviet citizens without any restrictions because of nationality. The equality of our nations in the field of military organizational development as well thus was legally confirmed.

Proletarian internationalism is a grand tradition of the international working class and its vanguard, the communist and working parties. Lenin taught that defense of revolutionary achievements is the international duty of proletarians of all countries. Our nation always has been true to this obligation to the end. It was true both to building of socialism in its own country and to giving fraternal assistance to other nations in a struggle against oppressors. Internationalism now has developed into a profound conviction and a standard of conduct for millions of Soviet citizens. The 26th CPSU Congress noted that the fraternal friendship of all nations of our multinational Motherland is strengthening steadily and that the unity of Soviet nations is as strong today as ever before. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said that "the party's sacred duty is to indoctrinate workers in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, in a proud feeling of belonging to a unified, great Soviet Motherland."

The CPSU focuses chief attention on the development of the masses' high political awareness and on indoctrinating workers and the youth in a spirit of irreconcilability toward bourgeois ideology and a readiness to defend socialism's achievements. In carrying out communist indoctrination the party arms Soviet citizens, including military personnel, with a knowledge of Marxism-Leninism and sees to it that this knowledge becomes their inner conviction and a guide in practical endeavors.

And so it can be said in conclusion that Soviet patriotism is linked organically with internationalism inasmuch as a struggle for the triumph of socialism and communism is an international process. F. Engels pointed out that truly national ideas in the working movement also are truly international. Marxism carries a completely new understanding of national pride. To be a Soviet patriot means to be true to military duty and ready at any time to come to the Motherland's defense with weapons in hand, as well as to the defense of countries of the socialist community--Warsaw Pact participants; to augment the country's economic and defense might by selfless labor; to approach the past, present and future of one's homeland from class positions and clearly realize where its friends and enemies are; to reinforce the friendship of nations and struggle actively against chauvinism and nationalism. An awareness of international duty and fiery patriotism motivates personnel for excellent mastery of weapons and equipment and for constant readiness to defeat any aggressor. The 26th CPSU Congress emphasized: "Today it is quite obvious that the Soviet Union and its allies now, more than ever before, are the chief bulwark of peace on earth." The Warsaw Pact has everything necessary to defend the socialist achievements of fraternal nations reliably, and what has been done in economic development and in raising people's standard of living by CEMA countries is an entire era.

2. THE PATRIOTISM OF SOVIET CITIZENS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL has fundamentally new features inasmuch as their love for the Motherland merges with dedication to communist ideals, and this became the chief element in its content. A real patriot evaluates all his actions and deeds by the main yardstick of how they serve the cause of communism, the Motherland and the people. Only the victory of socialism gave depth and full sound to this noble feeling. "There probably is nowhere people love to live as much as in the Soviet land," said M. I. Kalinin. "And it is the love for life in the Soviet land and for Soviet nations when that life is threatened by danger and when there is a struggle not for life but to the death to preserve it that forces the citizen of the Land of Soviets to lose his fear of death; fear is overpowered by a person's desire to preserve the life of the Soviet people and thus as it were preserve his own life forever. It is no accident that the party member goes to the executioner's block with head raised proudly and casts words imbued with deep faith to his enemies: 'I die, but our cause lives and will live.' In these minutes the person fully merges with the collective whose interests for him are higher than all else and stronger than death. Such an awareness makes the Soviet citizen a fearless fighter."

These words of Kalinin express the motivations which determine our soldiers' conduct in combat. When the situation demanded it, when it was necessary to execute the commander's order and the combat mission no matter what, brave patriots closed the embrasures of enemy pillboxes with their bodies, undertook a ram, cast themselves beneath tanks and called in fire on themselves. And they ensured victory in combat at the cost of their lives.

At times soldiers of bourgeois armies also took a risk and showed resolve in a combat situation, but their actions were guided either by fear of punishment or by an egotistical calculation and a desire to curry favor or obtain material advantage. There is also deception acting here, to which command

personnel resorted and still resort in interpreting the objectives of war in a distorted way while ascribing cruelty, bestiality and so on to the enemy. The Soviet soldier is another matter: His acts in combat are motivated by a deep understanding of a feeling of responsibility for the destiny of his people, and love and dedication for his homeland.

Soviet patriotism is nourished by all our reality and our way of life. The USSR put an end to exploitation of man by man once and for all long ago. The Soviet nation consists of socialist classes and social groups and it is welded by a commonality of goals and ideology. The historic victory in the Great Patriotic War convincingly confirmed the indisputable advantages of our social system and the indestructible might of the multinational state and its Armed Forces, which performed their patriotic duty and their international, liberation mission with honor. The CPSU CC Decree entitled "On the 60th Anniversary of the USSR's Formation" notes: "In the stern years of the Great Patriotic War fraternal nations stood shoulder to shoulder in defense of the Motherland, displayed mass heroism and an unbending will to win, smashed the fascist invaders and saved nations of the world from enslavement and destruction."

Even in our days love for the Communist Party and the Motherland inspires soldiers to military work and gives them powers to perform heroic exploits. The Soviet Army is an army of friendship and brotherhood of our country's nations. Its creation became possible thanks to a reinforcement of the alliance between the Russian and other nations. Lenin stated that the sturdy alliance of socialist republics is of enormous domestic and international importance, and he regarded its preservation and reinforcement as such a vitally necessary measure that "is needed by the world communist proletariat to fight the world bourgeoisie and to defend against its intrigues."

In the present-day situation, when imperialism is stepping up opposition to social progress with particular ferocity, there is more and more importance in an active, coordinated foreign policy of socialist states resting on their high economic and defense potentials and on the entire set of measures for the defense of socialism.

The most important functions of the Soviet state include defense of the socialist homeland. Our Constitution states: "The USSR Armed Forces have been established and universal military obligation instituted for purposes of defending socialist achievements, the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. It is the duty of the USSR Armed Forces to the people to defend the socialist homeland reliably and to be in constant combat readiness guaranteeing an immediate rebuff to any aggressor. The Communist Party and Soviet state are doing everything necessary to ensure that they are at the level of modern requirements."

The moral-political and social make-up of the Army and Navy and their material-technical outfitting fully reflected the outstanding achievements and capabilities of mature socialism. At this stage, when a reorganization of the entire system of social relationships is being completed on the collective principles internally inherent to socialism, the social-political and ideological unity of Army and Navy ranks acquires special strength. The collective

of any subunit, unit or ship as well as of the Armed Forces as a whole represents a friendly, multinational combat family and is the embodiment of Leninist ideas of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism. A feeling of national pride is inseparable for military personnel from a feeling of belonging to a single great Soviet Motherland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Patriotic and international principles also are indivisible in the military work of servicemen as in any other socially useful work in our country. The fact is that military work is directed toward the welfare of the entire society and people. This is work for the sake of freedom and independence of the Land of Soviets, work for the sake of communism and peace on earth. Lenin bequeathed that we accompany our steps toward peace with a girding of all our military readiness. The party and Soviet people steadfastly follow this behest, which is especially current today when imperialism's aggressiveness has risen sharply. The importance of efforts aimed at strengthening even more the social-political and ideological unity of our society and the fraternal friendship of military personnel grows under conditions of a fanning of international tensions by imperialist circles and a noisy ideological campaign against the Soviet Union. Our soldiers and sailors always have been characterized by high patriotic and international awareness, and a conviction as to the correctness and invincibility of socialism. The strengthening, development and enrichment of these noble qualities is a very important task of warrant officers, and neither time nor effort must be spared to accomplish it.

American imperialism and its apprentices are kindling more and more centers of tension in various parts of the world, conducting dozens of military exercises near the borders of countries of the socialist community, and intensifying the arms race. It stands to reason that all this requires Soviet soldiers to have political vigilance, constant combat readiness, and high moral-political, combat and military-professional qualities: those qualities on which the fascist armies stumbled and broke at Moscow and Stalingrad, in the Kursk Bulge and in other battles of the Great Patriotic War.

Traditions of patriotism and internationalism are passed on from generation to generation of armed defenders of the Land of Soviets as a famous baton. Today's soldiers worthily continue it, which was mentioned at the 26th CPSU Congress. "They did not go through the stern tests which fell to the lot of their fathers and grandfathers," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "but they are true to the heroic traditions of our Army and our people. And each time it is required by interests of national security and the defense of peace, when it is necessary to help the victims of aggression, the Soviet soldier stands before the world as a selfless and courageous patriot and internationalist, ready to overcome all difficulties."

3. **THUS CONCERN FOR DEVELOPMENT** in personnel of high moral-political and combat qualities and for indoctrinating soldiers in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism is the primary task of commanders, political officers, and the party and Komsomol organizations of units and ships. An important role in accomplishing it belongs to warrant officers. This includes essentially all aspects of soldiers' development as aware and vigorous fighters for the victory of communism and heroic, selfless defenders of the Soviet

Motherland and all countries of the socialist community. Patriotism and internationalism are ideological categories and so the development of these moral-political qualities in soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers is linked organically with their development of a scientific, Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Arming soldiers with Leninist ideas of patriotism and internationalism is one of the main directions of this work. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said that "the establishment of ideas of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, of pride for the Land of Soviets and for our Motherland, and a readiness to come to the defense of socialist achievements in the awareness of workers, and above all the younger generation, was and remains one of the most important party tasks."

There is special significance in this regard in a detailed study of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and of our party's foreign and domestic policy, and in an explanation of the Leninist teaching on defense of the socialist homeland and the character and purpose of the Soviet Armed Forces. The ideological-political conditioning of military personnel is a central direction in developing their high moral-combat qualities. Political classes and political briefings play an important part in this work. These and other ideological forms and means of indoctrination develop communist conviction, dedication for one's homeland and a proletarian solidarity in every serviceman, and they reinforce his ideological steadfastness.

Propaganda of the superiority of the socialist system over the capitalist system, propaganda of successes by our people in building communism and fulfilling quotas of the 11th Five-Year Plan, as well as propaganda of achievements of union and autonomous republics, oblasts and rayons where soldiers and sailors are serving serves to develop soldiers' Soviet patriotism and internationalism. Labor victories evoke their legitimate pride in the Motherland and an inner satisfaction with the people's achievements. All this together reinforces their will and desire to serve even better and, in Lenin's words, teaches them "to act as communism really demands." Persuasion as to the correctness of their cause generates courage, steadfastness and initiative and leads to a point where soldiers make fullest use of their professional and technical knowledge and skills and their tactical proficiency to achieve end results: today new goals in competition and tomorrow victory in combat. "We never must forget the possibility of future tests," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "which again may fall on the shoulders of the Soviet people."

Our military history which as a science reflects the main stages of the state and includes the history of the Army and Navy, military organizational development, military art and military technology, is a most important means of indoctrinating Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism. It represents value as a means of ideological influence on personnel. It takes an active part in developing soldiers' Marxist-Leninist outlook, expands their mental horizons, and helps them gain a deeper understanding of the essence of defense of the socialist homeland and accumulated experience of battles in the struggle for our Motherland's independence. "It is ridiculous not to know military history," was what Lenin said about the role of

military-historical knowledge. Vladimir Il'ich stated that it is impossible to learn to accomplish our missions by new techniques today if yesterday's experience has not opened our eyes to the incorrectness of old techniques. He said to delegates to the 9th RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)], Congress: "I believe that this basic experience which we gained has to be considered by us most of all. Here we have to think most of all about making the basis of our agitation and propaganda be an analysis and explanation of why we won, why these sacrifices of the Civil War were repaid a hundredfold and how we must proceed on the basis of this experience to win victory in another war..." Speaking in Lenin's words, we must try to learn from historical experience the lessons which will come in handy tomorrow.

It must be emphasized that a study of military history develops such traits of communist ideology in soldiers as a love for their Motherland, hatred for the class enemy and an awareness of the superiority of the Soviet way of life over the bourgeois way of life; and it develops such high moral qualities as dedication to duty, steadfastness, heroism, troop comradeship and collectivism. In reminding soldiers of our country's heroic past and its struggle against interventionists, the White Guards, the fascist occupiers and the Japanese militarists, which is filled with innumerable examples of combat exploits, we teach them to defeat the enemy and contribute to indoctrination of the Motherland's steadfast defenders.

This year we celebrate the 60th anniversary of the USSR's formation and elimination of foreign intervention and the White Guards in the Far East. Next year we celebrate the 80th anniversary of the Communist Party's creation, the 40th anniversary of decisive battles in the Great Patriotic War, and the 65th anniversary of the Armed Forces. We celebrate these dates as events of world-historic importance. Therefore, in demonstrating the heroism of Soviet military personnel, warrant officers are called upon to reveal the social-political, moral-psychological and professional factors of the exploit. The fact is, it is the love for one's homeland and hatred for the enemy, firmness of spirit, will, resolve, courage, tactical proficiency and faultless discipline which led patriots to perform an exploit for the sake of victory and a triumph of a just cause. Consequently one of the primary tasks of officers' assistants is to reveal profoundly and in a well-reasoned manner the moral superiority of Soviet military personnel over soldiers of the armies of capitalist states, and to propagandize vigorously the revolutionary, labor and combat traditions of our people, the party and the Armed Forces.

To this end warrant officers should turn to the books by Comrade Brezhnev entitled "Malaya Zemlya" [The Novorossiysk Base of Operations], "Vozrozhdeniye" [The Rebirth], "Tselina" [The Virgin Lands] and "Vospominaniya" [Memoirs]. They show the Soviet people's spiritual and moral force, courage and steadfastness, love for the native land and love for the Leninist party. The author reveals the diversity of forms and methods of ideological work and party propaganda, and he shows graphically and convincingly the science of "setting fire to hearts" and mobilizing people to perform tasks assigned by the party in action. Recommendations contained in Comrade Brezhnev's works give warrant officers great opportunities for improving their subordinates' training and indoctrination.

Constant use of the diverse forms of ideological work contributes to development of the personnel's patriotism and internationalism: Lenin readings, the conduct of political classes at sites of historic battles and performance of exploits by heroes, correspondence with Army and Navy veterans and meetings with them as well as with leaders of industry and agriculture, party workers and figures of science and culture, evenings of combat glory, and so on. All this generates in soldiers and sailors a surge of energy and a desire to improve combat schooling and evaluate anew their place in the formation of armed defenders. This work is conducted especially actively in Soviet troop units temporarily stationed on the territory of fraternal socialist countries in conformity with bilateral agreements.

The indoctrination of patriots and internationalists and of active fighters for the Leninist cause is a task of primary importance. The strength of our Army lies in the high ideals of its personnel and in Soviet soldiers' deep devotion to the great cause of communism.

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## ARMED FORCES

### READERS' QUESTIONS ON HOUSING BENEFITS ANSWERED

Moscow ZNAMENOSSETS in Russian No 11, Nov 82 (signed to press 22 Oct 82) p 30

[Article: "Our Consultations: Housing Benefits"]

[Text] Our readers, warrant officers [praporshchiki] V. Indyk, A. Kuz'min, A. Kulik and V. Shmakov and WO [michman] V. Savchenko request information about housing benefits granted to this category of servicemen. At the editors' request an explanation is provided by Col K. Dayneko (Ministry of Defense Main Billeting and Maintenance Directorate).

Warrant officers [praporshchiki and michmany] and extended-term servicemen who are on active military service are provided with living space from the available housing of military units at their place of service. They have the right to receive living space for themselves and members of their families living with them (spouse, children, parents and other persons dependent on them). Those who have served less than five years are granted dormitory space or official living space. For the first five years of service the living space which they occupied before entering military service is retained for them.

In case of the release of warrant officers and extended-term servicemen who have served five or less years in the Armed Forces, the living space granted them at their place of service is to be vacated. In continuing uninterrupted service for more than five years they are provided with living space on a universal basis. Contact the housing commission at the place of service on matters connected with obtaining living space. The commission coordinates its decisions with the deputy commander for political affairs and submits it for the commander's approval.

Those sent to serve abroad, to parts of the Far North and to equivalent areas have the right of reserving the living space in which they lived before being sent to those localities. It is possible to reserve living space for a period of up to six months from the day of departure. Official living space is not reserved.

This category of service personnel have a privilege in paying for the living space they occupy. They pay apartment rent based on a figure of 2.5 kopecks per square meter per month. Excess living space is paid for on an equal basis with other citizens.

Warrant officers and extended-term servicemen who have served 20 calendar years or more in the Armed Forces and who are released to the reserve or are retired because of age, state of health or a cutback in the rolls have the right to obtain living space from ispolkoms of local soviets of people's deputies on a priority basis within a three-month period from the day of arrival at the chosen place of residence. It has to be considered here that certain difficulties have arisen with the acquisition of living space in a number of cities in the southern and central part of the country in connection with the arrival of a large number of released servicemen there. It is easier to obtain living space after release from military service in cities of the Donbass, the Urals and Siberia.

The privilege of obtaining living space is granted only once, immediately after release from military service. For subsequent changes of the place of residence servicemen released to the reserve or who have retired do not have this privilege.

Persons released from the Armed Forces based on a petition of courts of honor or because of nonconformity to service do not have the right of priority acquisition of living space. They can obtain living space on a universal basis equally with other citizens.

Warrant officers and extended-term servicemen released to the reserve or retired have the right to build individual homes. Ispolkoms of local soviets of people's deputies are obligated to assist them in obtaining parcels of land, loans and construction materials at existing state prices. War participants are granted interestfree loans.

Servicemen who have become invalids because of a wound or contusion received during combat actions in defense of the USSR or in performing other duties of military service, or as a result of an illness connected with being at the front and who need housing are given living space on a priority basis by ispolkoms of local soviets of people's deputies.

The families of servicemen who perished or died as a result of a wound, contusion or mutilation received in defense of the USSR or in the performance of other duties of military service and who need housing have the right to obtain living space at their permanent place of residence on a priority basis. Such families can obtain interestfree loans for construction and capital repair of individual residences. Families receiving a pension for a deceased serviceman have a privilege in apartment rent and public utilities. They pay for the living space, heating, water, natural gas and electricity at 50 percent of the established rate. Such families cannot be evicted from the living space they occupy without being given other living space.

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ARMED FORCES

BRIEFS

KAZAKH DOSAAF--The Kazakh SSR DOSAAF includes 19,000 primary organizations, 295 rayon and town organizations, and 49 organizations with the status of rayon committees. DOSAAF membership has recently increased by 2 million, and now stands at 6.7 million. [LD010734 Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Jan 83 p 1]

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## LOGISTICAL SERVICES AND SPECIAL TROOPS

### LOGISTICAL SERVICES AND SPECIAL TROOPS ACTIVITIES

#### Problems in Food Service Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Jun 82 p 2

[Article by Col A. Drovosekov and Lt Col V. Seledkin: "Not Fully Assimilated...."]

[Text] Someday some inquisitive mind will determine the efficiency of audit reports. As regards a specific audit report on the food service of a certain unit of the Moscow Air Defense District, its efficiency approaches zero.

After 10 days of work in October-November 1981, the auditors concluded that the unit's food service chief, Sr Lt F. Terletskiy, had inadequately studied guideline documents and "has not fully assimilated accounting and reporting procedures." Sgt M. Achilov, in charge of food stores, has little understanding of his job and fails to keep records on food, dishes and utensils on hand. It is dirty inside the storage facility, the roof leaks, water seeps up through the floor, and the food is stored in a careless manner. Auditors discovered a food stores shortage of 55 rubles 8 kopecks and a surplus of 1443 rubles 6 kopecks.

Lt Col S. Yakubovskiy ordered an investigation of the shortage, with the results to be reported by 1 February 1982. For some reason Comrade Yakubovskiy had no interest in the surpluses, although it would be useful to learn where they come from.

We, that is, the authors of this article, visited the unit in the spring of 1982. As they say, we were called onto the road by a letter. The subject of the letter was precisely that to which the auditors had drawn attention. It also discussed abuses which were taking place unpunished because of failure to keep proper records. It is therefore quite understandable that we decided to begin our follow-up on the letter by studying the food service records documents. But when the clerk, on the instructions of Sr Lt F. Terletskiy, placed in front of us a pile of crumpled and dusty papers which had not been filed in two years, we realized that it would take some time to make order out of this jumbled mess. We decided instead to interview the people involved.

Sergeant Achilov, in charge of food stores, admitted that he still was not keeping records. Senior Lieutenant Terletskiy readily agreed that they were

still far behind with records and documentation in the food service. As for the audit report decision based on the shortage, he explained that no hearing had been held.

Thus this decision had not gone beyond a resolution on paper, and the good intentions of the auditors to correct the revealed shortcomings had gone no further than that. It was obvious that the auditors had wasted their time. Probably our visit would have been no more beneficial if Sergeant Achilov did not have a notebook in which he made notes just in case. One entry was as follows: in two visits to the storage facility Senior Lieutenant Terletskiy had carted off more than two cases of stewed meat and 6 kilograms of meat. He had carted them off without any authorizing documents and to an unknown destination.

Logic suggested that F. Terletskiy may have taken these provisions from food supplies he had established off the books. But the men were receiving the prescribed food in the prescribed quantities. So what was the deal here?

"The deal," we were told by Pvt V. Alekseyev, "is that beef stew is made with pork. When I was a cook I myself many times received pork, although the bill of lading indicated tinned beef."

"But the pork also had to be obtained somewhere!"

"What do you think the mess subsidiary farm plot is for?"

We expressed doubts, because it is a well-known fact that when a hog leaves for the 'antiworld' [is slaughtered], there are inspectors present. Every last gram of meat goes to the food stores.

"That is pure theory," Private Alekseyev summed up. "Go talk to Private Muradaliyev."

"What inspectors?" retorted Pvt M. Muradaliyev, surprised. "I would do everything myself. I would turn the meat over to Sergeant Achilov. He would mark the weight on the box."

But the files did contain hog slaughter documents. They were properly made out and were signed. Could Muradaliyev have the story wrong?

"No, he is right," we were assured by Pfc A. Deryabin. "When I was food service clerk, it was done as follows. Senior Lieutenant Terletskiy would give me the weight of a slaughtered hog and have me make out the proper document. I would then collect on this document the signatures of the inspection commission members, although they had not been present at the slaughter."

The chairman of the commission with the duty of keeping a vigilant eye on the mess subsidiary farm operation was off the post. I could only get together with commission members Sr Lt D. Bushuyev and WO V. Chechey. At first they insisted that they had always been present during the slaughter of hogs, but later they admitted that in the last year they had only visited the mess subsidiary farm plot on two occasions. And yet they had always signed the documents.

It turned out that Private Alekseyev had been right: the beef stew was being made with pork. He would understate the carcass weight by some 10-15 kilograms and then issue that meat in place of the tinned meat specified on the bill of lading -- this was the entire "technology." But it is not so easy for an auditor to dig down to the truth. And if he does, there is no harm done. After all, what can an auditor do? For all practical purposes he can merely draw up a report and indicate procedural deficiencies. But he cannot correct them -- this is a matter of conscience for the person being audited and his superior, for after an audit they may not be bothered until the next audit.

Of course we were quite anxious to have a talk with Sr Lt F. Terletskiy's superior, Maj V. Prudivus, and to exchange views on a number of items. Particularly since Terletskiy had swept aside obvious facts, which of course did him no honor as an officer. But for some reason V. Prudivus managed to avoid showing up for our appointment. He probably did not want to feel embarrassment over his subordinate, who "has not fully assimilated the required accounting and reporting procedures," but he had, however, clearly grasped how he could make a little on the side.

#### Uneven Performance of Communications Unit.

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Jun 82 p 1.

[Article by Col V. Starostenko, commanding officer of X unit: "Stability: The Main Thing is Efficiency and Quality"]

[Text] What does a commander do when deficiencies in conducting training activities are discovered in his subunit? Of course he thoroughly studies critical comments, analyzes the reasons for the deficiencies, and then takes steps to correct them. Company commander Maj V. Domashnev, however, acted quite differently in such a situation.

"No problem, there is plenty of time, they'll catch up," the officer commented when he was told that his signal troops had performed sluggishly in a training drill, had for the most part worked on performing the simplest procedures, and made little use of the training simulator equipment.

I recalled that I had heard similar statements from Maj V. Domashnev in the past, at the very beginning of the training year. At the time unit staff officers were checking progress in the training process and competition in the company. It was determined that some of the men were not meeting the pledges they had made prior to working on new training tasks.

"This situation can be rectified," the company commander stated. "We shall catch up by the end of the winter period."

Indeed, Major Domashnev's men did on the whole complete winter combat training with fair results. But at what cost? The men had worked under maximum stress during the final days before the performance evaluation exercise, remaining in the training classrooms until late hours.

"Well, the main thing is to achieve a good result!" stated Major Domashnev in self-justification.

He is known in the unit as an experienced expert, who has the ability to conduct any training activity with his men in a methodologically correct manner and with excellent quality. But unfortunately he does not always efficiently utilize his ability and experience.

Capt G. Volenko once made the same mistake.

Of course we sharply and frankly criticized the deficiencies in the work style of Major Domashnev and Captain Volenko and demanded that they reorganize themselves, that they show genuine concern to achieve high quality of combat training and effectiveness of competition.

Analysis of these facts also enabled us to reveal a typical miscalculation in organizing competition. Sometimes we do not adequately praise the commander who has once achieved excellent results and we fail to take note of achievements which, while somewhat below record performances, nevertheless are not attained sporadically but constantly. For example, for several years in a row now things have been going well in the training platoon under the command of Capt Yu. Kuznetsov. But in totaling up competition results more is said about those communications personnel who were able to outperform his men.

This would seem to be correct, for the winners have produced higher results. But perhaps it would be fairer, after noting the achievements of the leaders, to say a few kind words about Captain Kuznetsov's men. They did not finish far behind the winners, and the men of this platoon achieve such results constantly, and their training is distinguished by an enviable stability.

Practical experience has shown that a single inspection, even the most thorough, does not solve the problem of combating instability of performance results in combat training and competition. A system is needed here. I recall that once I observed a training class which was being conducted by one of the best platoon leaders, Sr Lt S. Kuzmenko. Expecting the inspection, he thoroughly prepared for the special training exercise, and it was conducted with precision, good organization, and excellent quality.

A few days later I decided to observe another training class in the same platoon. On this occasion the men were working on technical training, studying communications gear. To my surprise the class differed considerably from the preceding one -- there was a lack of order in the training classroom, many visual aids were missing, and some of the men, waiting for their turn to work on the equipment, were bored. I had to give a stern lecture to the platoon leader.

"I didn't think that you would drop in on one of my classes so soon," stated the embarrassed officer.

This incident was the object of a detailed analysis the next time competition results were totaled up in the subunit. It was also discussed at a meeting of the unit's officers. Many of those who spoke stressed that the main thing is to utilize each and every minute of training time with maximum effectiveness.

How can this complex, important task be accomplished more successfully? Much here depends on how precisely combat and political training plans are carried out. Recently I had a somewhat unpleasant conversation with subunit commander Maj V. Bezladnyy. An inspection showed that the training class schedule is not always observed in this subunit, and preparations for some training sessions are made in haste.

"Those were simple training topic items," stated Major Bezladnyy. "But when study of complicated material begins, there will be no deviations from the schedule."

To what do such practices lead? Young communications personnel not only poorly assimilate such items as correct procedures for switching on and tuning equipment, but from the very outset they become accustomed to having a listless attitude toward training classes.

A serious talk was held with Major Bezladnyy and with other subunit commanders on the necessity of strictly and unswervingly accomplishing everything which has been scheduled. A good example in this respect is provided by the commander of a leading subunit, Maj V. Kuts. In his subunit they always precisely observe the training schedule, do not permit a single training session not to be completed, and they make sure it is conducted on a high level.

All the men in our unit pledged to achieve excellent results in the competition in honor of the 60th anniversary of establishment of the USSR. Such a task must be accomplished by means of persistent, daily labor.

#### Chemical Reconnaissance Duties Outlined

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Jul 82 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col M. Malygin, with commentary by Lt Gen Tank Trps S. Bol'shakov: "Their Sons Are Taking the Relay Baton: Letter With Commentary"]

[Text] Dear Editor! Our older son Ondasyn completed his service in the USSR Armed Forces. He related to us with pride that his military occupational specialty was chemical reconnaissance and that he served in a chemical defense subunit. In time our younger son Murabkali will also go in the military. Perhaps he will also serve in the chemical troops. Can you give us some details about them?

Yours truly, Zhanym and Bitan Balabayev,  
Opornaya Station,  
Mangyshlak Oblast, Kazakh SSR

Our correspondent visited the subunit in which Pvt Ondasyn Bitanov served. Here is his report.

A special vehicle equipped with monitoring instruments and radioactive and chemical contamination warning devices was proceeding along a specified route.



A chemical reconnaissance squad under the command of Sgt A. Perov was performing an assigned mission independently.

Subunit commander Sr Lt V. Gorodnov had assigned the men this task, knowing that they possessed a high degree of specialized tactical proficiency. I should particularly like to stress that everybody in the squad is a highly-rated specialist, a Komsomol member, and an excellent athlete.

The exercise began. The semiautomatic CW field reconnaissance instrument (PPKhR) gave a warning that the "aggressor" had employed toxic chemical agents. The chemical recon scout noted the place and time of detection and quickly determined the type of chemical agent. He also filled in a warning sign insert on the spot.

The vehicle pulled onto the shoulder of the road and fired the warning sign.

The recon personnel operated smoothly. If necessary each and every one could fill in for his comrade. Mastery of related occupational specialties and complete interchangeability in the squads is one of the subunit's traditions. Pvt Bitanov, for example, in addition to excellent knowledge and solid skills in conducting radiological and chemical reconnaissance, could drive the truck and operate the radio. The driver, Pvt I. Ulmanis, possessed a highly-rated specialist's mastery of the special instruments. Weather observer Pvt Ye. Ilyushechkin and driver-electrician Pvt N. Sergeytsev have mastered several associated occupational specialties.

The squad continued its mission of reconnoitering the contaminated area and determining routes to bypass it and cross through it. Sergeant Perov radioed information to Lt I. Vasil'yev. On the basis of the information transmitted by the chemical reconnaissance personnel, the commander made the decision to cross the contaminated area, selecting the most advisable areas for the subunits to operate in and measures to ensure personnel safety.

The conditions in which the reconnaissance scouts were operating were highly complex. Incidentally, chemical defense subunits do not have any easy routes. Accomplishment of each and every mission assigned chemical reconnaissance personnel demands continuous exertion and a high degree of responsibility.

...They returned to the post that evening. Pines lined the paths, there were flowers in the flower beds, and there was cleanliness everywhere. By the clubhouse entrance there was an announcement about evening festivities dedicated to the 60th anniversary of establishment of the USSR. I was told that Private Ulmanis would be speaking that evening. He had something to say. He would tell how Private Bitanov had worked hard helping him master his MOS. In the army he, just as all the men in the unit, who represent more than 30 of this country's nationalities, feels every day and in full measure the strength of friendship and military comradeship.

At the request of the editors, Lt Gen Tech Trps S. Bol'shakov comments on the letter from Zh. and B. Balabayev and our correspondent's report.

Chemical reconnaissance personnel, together with the men of other military occupational specialties serving in chemical subunits and units, are doing an important job: they are ensuring reliable protection of troops when operating in conditions of radioactive and chemical contamination.

We shall briefly relate the history of the chemical troops.

In the first years of existence of our army, establishment of chemical troops became a necessary, one might say forced measure in response to the threatened employment of toxic chemical agents by the foreign interventionists.

The Communist Party and Soviet Government undertook active measures aimed at banning chemical weapons and other similar means of waging war.

These efforts met resistance on the part of the imperialist countries, however, which were extensively engaged in the search for new, more lethal chemical agents and means of applying them. In this situation the Soviet Union was forced to take measures to increase the preparedness of our Armed Forces for operations in conditions of conduct of chemical warfare by the enemy. During the years of the Great Patriotic War chemical defense units and subunits were employed, for example, to lay smoke screens. A total of 22 CW personnel were awarded the lofty title Hero of the Soviet Union for courage and valor displayed in combat, while 31 flamethrower units and 9 chemical defense battalions received honorary designations.

The need to improve the chemical troops in the postwar period was determined by the fact that the coalition of imperialist nations, united in the NATO bloc headed by the United States, sharply intensified the arms race and developed new weapons of mass destruction. The present U.S. Administration has approved a program of "chemical rearmament." As was noted at a press conference held at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in March of this year for Soviet and foreign journalists, what they intend to do is develop the potential to wage a chemical, aggressive war.

It was clearly stated at the press conference in response to slander which is being disseminated in the West about Soviet chemical troops: the Soviet chemical troops are intended not for the employment of chemical weapons but to perform missions pertaining to protecting troops against enemy offensive chemical and nuclear weapons.

Chemical defense, radiological and chemical reconnaissance units and subunits are equipped with modern technical devices.

The "West-81" exercise was a genuine school of skill and courage for the men of the chemical troops. Many of them were awarded coveted government decorations. They include colleagues of O. Bitanov. A "For Distinction in Military Service" medal, 2nd class, was awarded, for example, to Pfc S. Chozhonov, who was recently discharged into the reserve. Commendations were awarded to Sr Lt V. Sayapin and WO A. Kosyakov. The unit in which Pvt O. Bitanov served was named one of the top finishers in the socialist competition for the winter training period. The men are doing a fine job building upon the combat traditions

of their twice decorated unit, which was awarded decorations and an honorary designation during the Great Patriotic War.

#### Vehicle Repair Shop Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Jul 82 p 1

[Article by Lt Col V. Grigor'yev, Red-Banner Far East Military District: "Maintenance Personnel Are Tested"]

[Text] Beyond the traffic control barrier stood enormous shop tents, almost as tall as a two-story building. From the tents came the racket of operating machine tools, the hissing of gas welding, and people's voices. The repair and rehabilitation battalion under the command of Lt Col V. Ivashov was having a field exercise. Work at the disabled vehicle collecting point (SPPM) was in full swing. The roar of an engine occasionally intruded into the unique symphony of sounds. A tow truck was just delivering a disabled BMP [infantry fighting vehicle] to the field facility. Sr Lt M. Bazhenov emerged from the armored equipment maintenance shop. He instructed the driver to deliver the vehicle to the disabled equipment receiving station. There the combat vehicle was immediately surrounded by maintenance personnel, who determined the nature of the problem and degree of damage, as well as the volume of work required.

A flare suddenly shot skyward -- it was a signal warning of an attack by an "aggressor" raiding party. Leaving their work stations, the maintenance personnel hurried to their predesignated defense stations. The engagement ended with successfully repelling the surprise assault.

"It is no easy matter to make repairs in these conditions," stated Lt Col V. Ivashov, "but the maintenance personnel always endeavor to operate as in actual combat."

To operate as in actual combat.... There was a good deal of meaning in this phrase. For example, the fact that during repair and maintenance activities it is very important carefully to observe concealment and camouflage and properly to organize security and defense of installations. But still the principal task is to repair damaged vehicles and weapons quickly and with excellent quality, to return them to service without delay.

Let us enter the tent in which operations are supervised by Capt Ye. Malev. This tent contains assembly-disassembly stations, equipment repair, vehicle washing and servicing stations. Blacksmiths, welders, and battery charging specialists work alongside metalworking benchmen.

"Within a short period of time they repaired 12 vehicles and performed minor maintenance procedures," stated Captain Malev.

"Work in field conditions is proceeding well, without delays, due to the fact that during scheduled training classes back at the depot we constantly rehearse all situations which may arise."

Behind these words stand the men, with their ability to work diligently and conscientiously. The best sergeants include A. Levkin, O. Volkov, and V. Shapovalov. Each of them is a jack-of-all-trades, as they say, with a mastery of the associated occupational specialties of lathe operator, welder, and driver.

Lt V. Aranauskas is in charge of things in the shop where they bring artillery systems and small arms up to "norm." An engineer by training, he is always there to assist his men -- electricians and drivers, metalworking benchmen and lathe operators. Once the power generator supplying the SPPM shop broke down during an exercise. Lieutenant Aranauskas immediately found the cause of the malfunction. Working in the middle of the night, provided light by a portable lamp, he repaired the fouled fuel system.

Work at the disabled vehicle collecting point at a performance evaluation exercise was a serious test of the proficiency of the men of this battalion. Senior Lieutenant Bazhenov received a good deal of practical experience. This was the first trip to the field for him, a former tank platoon commander and now in charge of a maintenance subunit. In spite of his meager experience, this officer was able to organize socialist competition at the work stations in a precision manner, and he succeeded in obtaining uninterrupted and high-quality performance of equipment repairs. His men, just as the repair and rehabilitation battalion as a whole, fully meeting the socialist pledges made for the winter training period, are working hard to achieve new performance levels in the course of summer training.

#### Trade Directorate Chief on Food Program

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Aug 82 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen Intend Service Ye. Gol'dberg, chief of the Main Trade Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense: "Voyentorg Subsidiary Farm Operations"]

[Text] The USSR Food Program devised by the party has evoked enthusiastic response in the hearts of military trade personnel. It has encountered unanimous support and is perceived as a concrete guide to action. The practical tasks proceeding from the decisions of the May (1982) CPSU Central Committee Plenum have been discussed at conferences of military trade officials, and concrete measures have been specified for increasing meat production by expanding the fattening of hogs on food scraps, production of semifinished goods, culinary, confectionary and baked goods as well as nonalcoholic beverages. Cold-frame vegetable growing will experience further development, and there will be improvement in the system of provision of goods and services to military personnel, their families, army and navy civilian workers and employees.

A principal role in implementing these measures is assigned to the Voyentorgs [post exchanges, military commissaries]. Many of these have established subsidiary farm operations, have amassed certain experience in their operation, and have achieved decent results in this endeavor. Last year they furnished 23,000 quintals of pork, 900,000 eggs, and 230 tons of vegetables, tomatoes, and

onions. In addition, they produced 7700 quintals of root crops for live-stock.

In the first 5 months of this year the number of Voyentorgs involved in fattening hogs has increased substantially. The number of animals on such a program has increased by 30 percent, producing 24 percent more meat than in the same period last year. This work is being successfully performed in the Ural and Carpathian military districts and in the Pacific Fleet. Their Voyentorgs are maintaining an average of 100 hogs apiece. Such a target has been assigned for the current year to the Voyentorgs of all districts and fleets. Its accomplishment will make it possible to double pork production.

Unfortunately, however, there are also examples of a different kind. This work is advancing extremely slowly in the trade directorates of the Transbaykal, Turkestan, and Central Asian military districts.

Many Voyentorgs have come up against the problem of feed. Not wishing to burden themselves with the collection of food scraps, managers have taken to the procurement of concentrated feeds. In the subsidiary farm operations of the trade directorate of the North Caucasus Military District, for example, the percentage share of food scraps and waste amounted to only 15.6 percent, while 84.4 percent comprised concentrated feeds. Therefore overexpenditure of the latter per kilogram of weight increment reached 2.5 feed units. An approximately identical feed balance picture is observed in the Baltic Military District and the Moscow Air Defense District, as well as in the Baltic Fleet. Experience suggests that in order to eradicate this practice it is essential to specify a concrete target for each stock finishing station pertaining to collection of food scraps and waste at public food service enterprises, from the general public, as well as the commercial warehouse network, and to demand strict fulfillment of this target.

We should set up, based on the experience of leading Voyentorgs, on-farm feed production (growing of root crops, grain and other crops), as well as their purchase from agricultural organizations and private parties during the period of laying away feed, with more extensive use of food-processing industry enterprise waste, plus nonstandard fruits and vegetables which have lost their attractive appearance for human consumption but are suitable for feeding hogs.

Many Voyentorgs devote attention to development of facilities. Construction and repair of storage facilities are being accomplished by self-financing with Gosbank loans. A good job is being done in this area in the Ural, Carpathian and Kiev military districts and in the Pacific Fleet. Indicative in this regard is the experience of the Voyentorg headed by A. Konoshchuk. In particular, they have built an entire agricultural complex, including two hog houses accommodating 500 hogs each, a 100-ton capacity storage facility for concentrated feeds and vegetables, a garage, a veterinary facility, a feed preparation shop, an 8-unit apartment house for service personnel, plus other facilities.

Enterprise of this kind is particularly important today, with shock work expanding to boost meat production and improve supply of foodstuffs to the general public.

Amassed experience in keeping and fattening livestock on subsidiary farms of military trade enterprises attests to the fact that the best results are achieved wherever managers, party, trade union and Komsomol organizations mobilize workforces for inspired productive labor and instill in livestock workers a strong awareness of their duty and love for their assigned job.

Of great importance for accomplishing the Food Program is well organized public food service. As we know, the documents of the May SPCU Central Committee Plenum specify the following task: to secure in the current five-year plan a higher (in comparison with foodstuffs trade) rate of growth of public food service and enhancement of its role in meeting the needs of the public.

Carrying out these instructions, military trade personnel are improving the forms of serving patrons of restaurants, buffets and cafes, are improving the quality of food served, and are increasing output of their own products, especially semifinished products, culinary and confectionary goods. The goal is to provide officers and their families not only with fast service in restaurants and cafes, but also to enable them to purchase at these facilities requisite semifinished items and other products to take home.

At the same time we should note that the level of development of public food service at many enterprises is still lagging behind assigned tasks. For example, production of semifinished articles in the Baltic, Odessa, and North Caucasus military districts does not exceed 1.9 percent of sales of house-produced goods, while the figure is 7-10 percent in the Northern, Pacific, and Baltic fleets. The worst job in producing culinary items is being done in the Central Asian and Turkestan military districts.

Confectionary and baked goods comprise a substantial percentage of sales of goods produced in house. Production of these goods increased last year by 10 percent in our branch over the 1980 figure. We cannot be satisfied with this growth rate, however. Many trade workers forget that tasty, attractive and fresh cakes, pies and pastries not only generate revenues for meeting the sales target. They also are a great joy to the people living in remote garrisons, who cannot buy these items elsewhere.

Efficiency and quality of the job done by trade enterprises in furnishing their customers with quality products depends in large measure on procurement, transport and trade organizations. The stronger the links between field and retail store, the shorter the transport routes, the better things are for the business operation and for the customer. Aggressively utilizing the method of delivering products without the need to unload and reload during the hauling process, in 1981 the trade directorates of the Leningrad and Baltic military districts did not experience losses in fruits and vegetables beyond standard natural loss figures. At the same time the trade directorate of the Far East Military District, operating in the old way, lost 1 ruble 49 kopecks for every ton of product sold, while in the Transbaykal Military District the loss figure was 2 rubles 53 kopecks.

Particular importance in connection with this is assumed by precision in organizing forthcoming procurement operations. It is important to arrange things so that vegetables and root crops are hauled without losses, that they are

properly stored through the winter, and that they are expended in an efficient manner.

Military trade workers, extensively engaged in socialist competition to honor the 60th anniversary of establishment of the USSR in a worthy fashion, are applying all their energies, knowledge and experience in order to achieve already this year tangible results pertaining to accomplishing the tasks proceeding from the decisions of the May CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

#### Problem With Warehouses Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Sep 82 p 2

[Article by Voyentorg Chief V. Prudnikov: "Empty Promises: Letter to the Editor"]

[Text] This long story began 8 years ago, when there arose the need to build combined storage facilities for the Voyentorg [post exchange, military commissary]. The old wooden storage structures had fallen into disrepair; it was simply impossible to store goods in them. Following the proper procedure, Voyentorg submitted a formal request. The Billeting Directorate of the Moscow Military District prepared the technical documentation. A general contractor was also found -- a construction project administration which is presently headed by Engr-Lt Col V. Dergachev.

The construction people were progressing well. After some time the most expensive work had been completed. Then began the ordeal for the Voyentorg people. The fact is that they simply forgot about our storage facilities. Construction stopped dead in March 1978. Things did not get moving again until we appealed to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in December 1979.

Soon problems began again, however. Now the builders began blaming the clients for everything: why, they said, did you not give adequate thinking to the warehouse heat supply system? As it turns out, while construction was dragging out, a 75-unit apartment building was hooked up to the boiler house which was to supply heat to the warehouse facilities. At this point Engr-Col E. Rabinovich (now assigned elsewhere), who at the time was in charge of the construction organization, proposed that the warehouse facilities be built without a heating system.

We refused to consent to that, particularly since Rabinovich had assured us that construction of the warehouse facilities would be completed in 1980. His promises had proven to be empty words.

The new construction project administration chief, Engr-Lt Col V. Dergachev, has apparently done a fine job of assimilating the work style of his predecessors. He also lavishly gives out promises. "Forty men will be sent; expect them on 20 May," he assured us. There arrived... four men, and not until 20 June, and even these were forced to stand around idle -- the materials had not been delivered. They promised to send 12 men on 19 July. We waited until eight that evening -- nobody came.

Dear Editor! I myself am a former construction man. I devoted 32 years to this profession, which is close to my heart. And to tell you the truth, I become simply embarrassed for supervisors like this, who throw around empty promises.

#### Violation-Detained Trucks Left Idle

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Sep 82 p 2

[Article by Sr Lt A. Grinev, senior motor vehicle inspector, Military Motor Vehicle Inspectorate of the Twice Red-Banner Baltic Fleet: "'Forgotten' Trucks: Letter to the Editors"]

[Text] A truck being driven by M. Gruzdev was stopped by a military motor vehicle inspection officer. An inspection determined that the truck should not be allowed to proceed. Oil was dripping out of the rear axle, and gasoline was running out of the fuel tank. The truck had to be put into a specially designated location and the driver sent back to his military unit. It was assumed that the unit authorities, upon learning of this incident, would immediately contact the military motor vehicle inspectorate, hear the reasons for pulling the truck out of service, and would take measures to put the vehicle into proper working order. However, one day passed, another, and a third, but nobody showed any concern; the detained truck was left standing where it had been placed. The VAI [Military Motor Vehicle Inspection Service] people themselves had to locate its owner.

Perhaps if this were the only case of this type I would not be writing a letter to the newspaper. But the fact is that we military motor vehicle inspectors rather frequently encounter an indifferent attitude on the part of officials toward the truck under their supervision. For example, big dump trucks belonging to the units in which officers A. Frolov and V. Dukul' serve stood idle for several weeks after being detained by VAI inspectors. A truck belonging to the subunit commanded by officer N. Pospelov has stood idle almost an entire year for this reason.

A military motor vehicle inspector does not ground a defective vehicle out of a personal whim. He is just doing his duty. Such resolute actions help prevent traffic accidents. Those persons responsible for keeping motor vehicles in proper running order should also constantly be concerned with ensuring highway safety. And if due to somebody's negligence a vehicle has driven off the post in a condition which could cause an accident, every such incident should be viewed as taking away from highway safety.

We are also concerned by another question: could these "forgotten" trucks really not be needed by their owners for such a long period of time? We do not think so. Unquestionably their absence has created additional problems and difficulties in the units and at the military construction sites where the trucks were to be used. What is the problem, then?

Here is an interesting detail. Violators stopped by VAI officers also include drivers of military automobiles. And the curious thing is that when this occurs, the problem is corrected before the day is out. The officers in charge



of these automobiles immediately make an appointment to see the VAI inspectors, admit culpability, promise that there will be no further violations in the future, and do everything they can to obtain the car's return as quickly as possible. Why do they not show equal eagerness to obtain the return of detained trucks?

Obviously the answer is that the absence of a passenger car creates considerable personal inconvenience. But what difference does it make if a big dump truck stands idle a few more days? The loss does not come out of your own pocket. And who is keeping count anyway?

Perhaps somebody should figure how much such an attitude costs the state. Perhaps those who remember their own personal interests but forget about the interests of the state should be brought strictly to account.

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CSO: 1801/063

## CIVIL DEFENSE

### CIVIL DEFENSE IN RURAL AREAS DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 82 (signed to press 9 Nov 82)  
pp 12-13

[Article by N. Dolgin: "The Contribution of Civil Defense"]

[Text] The historical path of the Soviet Union, which is celebrating its 60th anniversary, is marked by many glorious events. The May 1982 CPSU Central Committee Plenum entered the life of the Soviet people as one such tremendously important event. The report of L.I. Brezhnev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet; the Plenum's approval of the USSR Food Program for the period up to 1990; and the decree of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers, defining the methods and means for its implementation, enrich the theory and practice of building communism, and make a huge contribution to the further creative development of the party's present agrarian policy.

The Soviet people welcomed the results of the plenum's work with deep satisfaction. Party, soviet and economic organs, and all cadres of agroindustrial complex enterprises were faced with great and responsible tasks. Civil defense workers were also called upon to make an important contribution to fleshing out the party's plan.

The processes of developing civil defense are inseparably linked with political, social and economic aspects of the country's life. That is why the plenum's decisions and the Food Program which it adopted is and will continue to be most beneficial to the further improvement of civil defense.

The first and main thing resulting from the decisions of the May Plenum is the conclusion about the indisputable growth in importance of civil defense measures, both for the country as a whole, and particularly for rural areas and agricultural production.

First and foremost this stems from the present international situation. Now as never before the striving for world supremacy in U.S. ruling circles has intensified. The sharp increase in military spending, development of new weapons and modernization of old models, and expansion of military presence in countries many thousands of kilometers distant from the United States bear witness to this. At the present time approximately 500,000 U.S. servicemen and 2,500 bases and other military facilities are located outside U.S. borders. All of this, as

well as open threats from American hawks to "use force without wavering," obligates the Soviet people to be maximally vigilant and to participate actively in solving defense issues, of which civil defense measures are a component part.

Analysis of the development of modern means of mass destruction shows that, in the event nuclear war is unleashed, the effectiveness of population protection will largely depend on the quality of civil defense measures in rural areas. It is here that the necessary conditions for receiving the evacuated population are created. A large burden of life-saving and urgent emergency recovery efforts in centers of destruction is placed on rural, nonmilitarized formations. Stable functioning of agricultural production is called upon to provide people with the means of survival.

Therefore, the issue has now arisen that the level of civil defense preparedness in rural areas, and the quality of measures carried out, should not differ from the state of civil defense in the cities. Carrying out the Food Program will greatly promote solving the most important social task--eliminating the differences between city and village. This means that the time is now right to eliminate the gap between city and village in solving civil defense tasks.

This problem is not as simple as it may seem at first glance. Unfortunately, leaders are still found who believe that since a measure is being carried out in a village--whether training the population in means and methods of protection, or developing civil defense forces--their concern about it can be less responsible. No, under present conditions there can be no concept of the "interior" in solving these problems. Each city and each rural area has its important contribution to make in the common matter of insuring that the country's civil defense is well prepared.

The growing importance of civil defense measures in rural areas also stems from important economic factors. L.I. Brezhnev, speaking at the 31 May 1982 session of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, emphasized that "today as never before a gap between production growth and social development is intolerable." This thought is also fully relevant to the development of civil defense. The growth of agricultural production envisioned in the Food Program also stipulates, naturally, a corresponding increase in the number of protective measures against weapons of mass destruction. The agroindustrial complex is already now providing 46 percent of the country's surplus products. This wealth must be reliably protected. The rural civil defense organs are faced with the noble and humane task of protecting the people and all agricultural production. And the weightiness of this task will be growing constantly.

The fact is that the development of the agroindustrial complex not only determines new prospects and bounds of civil defense. It also creates new, more favorable opportunities for its further improvement. The profound restructuring of agriculture and related branches, taking into account the achievements of science and technology, will permit the material and technical base of civil defense to be significantly strengthened. Capital investments totaling 223 billion rubles are to be appropriated into agriculture during the 11th Five-Year

Plan. Construction will take place at more rapid tempos. All of this is creating better conditions for implementing scientific and technical measures to protect the population from weapons of mass destruction. It is important only that these opportunities not be missed.

Or take transportation. During this decade more than 3 million trucks, 3.2-3.3 million tractor trailers, 200,000 excavators, 215,000 bulldozers, 93,000 scrapers, 13,000 road graders, and other equipment will be supplied to the agroindustrial complex. Consequently, the technical equipment of non-militarized formations in rural areas will sharply grow.

The significant expansion of roads in rural areas will favorably impact on increasing the effectiveness of evacuation measures. In 10 years, 130,000 kilometers of common use roads joining central farms with regional centers, and 150,000 kilometers of hardtop intrafarm roads are to be completed.

However, it would be erroneous to think that these opportunities will be realized automatically, all by themselves. To see everything useful and necessary that appears, and to be able to correctly apply it in the interests of civil defense--these are the first duties of civil defense workers. And this requires active, creative work. It is no secret that the available economic capabilities are far from always used effectively in the interests of civil defense.

But it would be an even bigger mistake to view the decisions of the May Plenum, and their link with civil defense tasks, only from the position of what these decisions may provide to improve civil defense. The country is right to count on civil defense to contribute greatly to resolving the Food Program. Kolkhozes and sovkhoses can receive appreciable assistance during combined installation and tactical-specialized training and exercises.

For example, the Panik Kolkhoz, which has been led for more than 20 years by Great Patriotic War veteran, A. Ordanyan, is located in the Armenian Artik region--one of the most advanced in civil defense. Ordanyan is a thoughtful and attentive leader who maintains an atmosphere of strictness and mutual good will, exactingness and comradely mutual assistance. He has won deep respect and authority among the kolkhoz workers for his knowledge and experience, his ability to deal with people, his sincerity and great spiritual generosity. Recently, combined installation training took place here, during the preparation for which a number of organizational issues were decided, a special plan of party-political work was worked out and adopted, and favorable conditions were created to train people for actions in different situations. During the training, formation commanders and fighters mastered through practice problems of protecting farm animals.

It is important to emphasize here that training measures were intelligently combined with production tasks. Fire prevention implements and equipment were prepared; sheilds were fitted out; a 5-7 day reserve of fodder and water was created; vegetable storage places, basements and cellars were adapted as fall-out shelters; dust-proof cloth masks and cotton gauze bandages were prepared; radiation monitoring points were set up everywhere; and living areas, industrial

premises and sources of water were made air tight. All of this had a considerable economic effect, and strengthened the economy of the kolkhoz.

The example of this and other farms convincingly shows how much may be done in the kolkhoz and sovkhos which is both in the interests of civil defense and of strengthening the farms' economy and increasing the stability of agricultural production.

It is now already commonplace for numerous fallout shelters to be built while executing training and other civil defense measures. In the hands of a good manager they are used for storage of potatoes, fruit, vegetables, and other agricultural products. They may serve as garages for trucks, tractors, trailers and other equipment during fall and winter, and as repair shops, storage places for agricultural machines, etc.

Kolkhoz and sovkhos formations should more often be encouraged to equip the livestock barns in such a way as to protect the animals, forage and various cattle feeds. Air tightening the barns, adding ventilation, building places for storing and sheltering feed, and other measures will facilitate better wintering for the cattle and increase their productivity.

Thus we can also speak confidently about formations' participation, under a well-defined, previously worked out tactical situation, in building and improving livestock complexes and barns. Of course, a creative approach, a feel for that which is new, and careful use of all that is advanced, are needed in solving these problems. The experience in implementing civil defense measures in the Zvenigov region of the Mari ASSR may serve as a guide. Combined, well-planned training programs are organized at various locales there, under the control of the region civil defense staff. In this effort, special attention is paid to building protective structures. Shelters and basements are systematically inventoried, and their technical condition is verified. Importantly, all protective structures are used here for economic purposes. It is an example worth imitating.

The kolkhozes and sovkhos of this region have developed rescue detachments, first-aid teams, livestock and plant protection detachments, and have chosen leaders and party-political apparatuses for them. All deputy formation commanders for political affairs are confirmed at the bureaus of the CPSU regional committee, and at meetings of the party committees and party bureaus. Civil defense formations have operated successfully in the battle against forest fires.

Or take road and bridge construction and repair. This work is necessary both in the interests of civil defense, and, certainly for developing and strengthening the village economy. And what about constructing reservoirs and land reclamation work? Who could solve these problems better than the civil defense formations, especially the firefighters?

I would like to say a few more words about industrial and other installations which are evacuated to rural areas. This opens up great opportunities to strengthen kolkhozes and sovkhos, and improve their material and technical

base and social and economic conditions. Obviously, each civil defense chief and chief of staff of kolkhoz, sovkhos or installation evacuated to a rural area should plan and map out the prospects both for development of civil defense, and for resolving the Food Program. In doing the one, the other must not be forgotten. The stronger the kolkhoz, the stronger civil defense is as well, and the more significant its contribution to the might of the state.

More and more leaders are understanding the importance of ably combining civil defense measures with economic interests. At the same time it is necessary to guard against extremes. Some farms have merely gone the route of substituting economic work for civil defense training or exercises. In doing this there is no tactical situation and the formation personnel do not form the necessary practical skills for conducting rescue and urgent emergency reconstruction work in centers of destruction. Clearly this is not permissible.

Introducing measures to increase the stability of agricultural production under special conditions can effectively aid agriculture. It is important that the results of various research and experiments reach the kolkhozes and sovkhos in a timely fashion. Obviously, they will already now help reduce to some extent the dependence of agricultural production on weather and other factors.

We all see that developing the Food Program was a model of the scientific approach to solving difficult economic and social tasks. As L.I. Brezhnev stated in his report at the plenum: "Preparation and implementation of this program is a fundamentally new step in our planning system and in managing the socialist economy. The program embodies an all-round, comprehensive approach to solving the food problem."

"The most important feature of this approach is to link and combine the work, both of agriculture itself and of the branches of industry, transportation, and trade which serve it, and subordinate all their activities to a common end goal--the production of high quality foodstuffs and their delivery to the consumer."

This approach is also a reliable compass for solving the tasks of civil defense. A system of measures, varied in direction and scope (staff, technical, ideological, etc.), are employed for their accomplishment. All state organizations are to some extent equipped to solve these tasks. And it is very important to insure a coordinated effort, subordinated to a single goal--protecting the population from weapons of mass destruction. Slackening attention to even one link in the common chain of measures will not allow achieving the final, favorable result.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

ARMY PAPER ON NATO INFANTRY COMBAT VEHICLES

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[Candidate of Technical Sciences Col Engr of Reserves D. Konstantinov  
"Military-Technical Review": "Infantry Combat Vehicles"]

[Text] Former Bundeswehr Commander Gen A. (Khoyzinger), speaking at the combined arms school in Hammelburg on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of the German marines, noted that "in modern warfare the infantry will play just as important a part as in the past," and that "this applies not only to conventional warfare, but to nuclear war too." This remark to some degree reflects the opinion of military circles in other NATO countries on the infantry's role in modern conditions. Of course, they do not mean the kind of infantry that existed, say, during World War II, but mobile combined arms units and subunits equipped with modern hardware and whose basic means of transport, in the view of foreign experts, will be infantry combat vehicles (ICV's).

Motorized infantry in ICV's, according to the definition of West German military observers, is the most "rapid and mobile infantry." Having comparatively light armored vehicles with good cross-country performance, it combines the qualities of combined arms and tank subunits. On board such a vehicle, the crew and infantry complement can fight directly from the ICV, or if necessary they can rapidly dismount and operate as a conventional infantry subunit with the support of the weapons (usually a 20mm cannon and two machineguns) mounted on the ICV.

When there is a threat of nuclear attack the motorized infantry is capable of rapid dispersal. The armor and the hermetically sealed nature of the ICV's body increase the antinuclear protection of personnel and guard to a significant extent against damage by chemical and bacteriological weapons. Thus, unlike armored personnel carriers, which foreign experts regard mainly as a means of transporting infantry to the battlefield, modern ICV's carry out a wider range of tasks.

Foreign observers, analyzing combat operations in the Near East and Southeast Asia, draw the conclusion that the use of tanks as the main offensive weapon of the ground forces without the support of ICV fire is insufficiently effective and leads to considerable losses of tank hardware. The journal army

wrote that only with joint operations by ICV's, armored personnel carriers and tanks are the tanks adequately protected against fire from enemy anti-tank guided missiles and rocket launchers.

Thus in the opinion of foreign experts the purpose of ICV's is mainly to provide support for infantry participation in prolonged offensive operations, to transport infantry subunits under cover of armor to the target region, to cover tanks and infantry against strikes from the air (particularly low-flying helicopters armed with antitank guided missiles), and also to support the actions of main battle tanks by firing on the move.

During the creation of ICV's, a number of requirements were formulated for these vehicles: mobility and armor protection, capacity, fire power and combat weight. Various NATO countries have found different compromises between these contradictory requirements, on the basis of the prevailing military doctrines there. The American military command, for instance, put mobility to the fore with a view to conducting assault and air-mobile operations in various theaters of hostilities. This requirement was particularly significant in connection with the creation in the United States of the rapid deployment force, which, in the American administration's view, must, in the event of "emergency circumstances in the planet's particular hot spots," defend American interests there.

After the development of a number of experimental models in the early seventies, American firms began to manufacture a new track laying ICV, the XM723 (Photo 1) [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA carries three photos of ICV's]. The configuration of design features in this vehicle devoted considerable attention to maneuverability. The ICV housed an infantry detachment which could engage in combat directly from the vehicle or after dismounting (in the latter case the driver and gunner, remaining in the vehicle, were to support the detachment with fire). The armaments of the ICV (a 25mm automatic cannon and a coaxial 7.62mm machinegun) were mounted on a revolving turret.

Subsequent research and studies led to the creation of a modernized ICV, which was named the XM2 and was adopted for series production (Photo 2). This vehicle has a more powerful engine (500 horsepower instead of 450), the body is made of aluminum-based armor plating and multilayer armor is used for protection against hollow-charge shells (the space between plates is filled with polyurethane foam). As the reference book JANE'S reports, the ICV's main armament is a 25mm automatic cannon stabilized in two planes (ammunition 900 rounds) with a coaxial 7.62mm machinegun. In addition to launcher for tow antitank missiles (ammunition 7 missiles, range 3,000 meters) is installed on the left side of the turret. The vehicle's capacity is 9 men plus the crew, its weight is 21.3 tons and its road speed about 66 kph.

The possibility of waging combat operations in conditions where mass destruction weapons are used is also envisaged, and protection against these weapons is ensured by the sealing of the vehicle's body and the provision of a filter ventilation device and an air conditioning system for the combat detachment.



The XM2 is amphibious and can cross water at 7.2 kph, and can be transported by air (on C-5A and C-141 planes).

West German experts have taken a different path in creating ICV's. They are oriented mainly toward the use of ICV's on land in the European theater. FRG experts, while devoting great attention to the vehicles' protection, believe that ICV's should be no less maneuverable than Leopard main battle tanks in joint use. This approach was manifested in the creation of the Marder ICV (Photo 3). This is one of the first, most characteristic foreign designs. The ICV's combat weight is 28.2 tons, the engine capacity is 600 horsepower, its road speed is 75 kph and its range is 600 km.

The Marder can accommodate one motorized infantry detachment: the crew consists of the commander, the driver and the gunner. The assault group consists of seven men. The armaments include a 20mm automatic cannon mounted in an armored superstructure on top of the turret, a coaxial 7.62mm machine-gun (they are operated by remote control), and also a 7.62mm machinegun mounted on the rear turret, which can be used to fire on targets on the ground and in the air. The ammunition for the cannon consists of 1,250 rounds (subcaliber and fragmentation shells), with 5,000 rounds for the machineguns.

It is proposed to use subcaliber shells for firing at armored targets--these shells, it is asserted, have an initial speed of 1,300 meters per second and can penetrate steel armor plating 200mm thick at an angle of 60 degrees from a distance of 1,000 meters.

The assault force in the ICV can fire through two firing ports on each side, and also through the vehicle's open hatches. One turret design does not give the commander all-around vision (there is an unobserved arc of about 40 degrees). The Marder can cross water only with the help of a detachable flotation kit.

As the journal SOLDAT UND TECHNIK reports, the Bundeswehr leadership has decided to update in the near future all the Marder ICV's in the ground forces' armory. A number of modifications are being made to the vehicle's design, the most important of which is the mounting of an antitank guided missile launcher on the turret.

Of the other NATO ICV's, mention should be made of the French AMX-10P and the British MCV-80. The former has waterjet propulsion for amphibious movement and has good cross-country performance on soft ground because of its low ground pressure (about 0.5 kg per square cm). The British MCV-80, which is intended to replace the Trojan armored personnel carrier among the troops, has a relatively powerful cannon for vehicles in this class, the Rarden 30mm.

Foreign military experts associate the prospects for the further development of ICV's above all with the choice of more powerful armaments and the provision of an adequate degree of protection for the crew and the infantry

assault force. Whereas in the seventies the 20mm caliber was regarded as more or less acceptable, it is admitted to be inadequate for the vehicles of the future. In all probability these weapons will be replaced by automatic cannons with a caliber of up to 30mm which are now being developed. The question of arming ICV's with antitank guided missiles is also being studied. In order to improve the level of protection of the crew and assault force, foreign observers note, future models will make increasing use of multilayer armor similar in design to that now being used in the latest models of tanks by the main NATO countries.

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END